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    This thesis focuses on the problems of the Chinese University Admission (CUA) 
system. Within the field of education, the system of university admissions involves all 
of Chinese society and causes much concern amongst all social classes. University 
admissions have been researched since the middle of last century as an issue which 
has economic impact. However, little attention has been paid to the CUA system from 
the perspective of economics. This thesis explores a number of interesting aspects of 
the system. As a special case of the priority-based matching mechanism, the CUA 
system shares most properties of the Boston Mechanism, which is another example of 
a priority-based matching mechanism. But it also has some unique and interesting 
characteristics. The first chapter will introduce the main principles of the CUA system 
in detail and discuss stability, efficiency, strategy-proofness, and other properties 
under different informational assumptions.  
    There is a heated debate about whether the CUA system should be abandoned or 
not. Educational corruption is one of the issues that have been raised. Corruption is a 
major issue of the CUA system as well as university admission systems in other areas 
in the world, e.g. India, Russia, etc. We contrast the performance of markets and 
exams under the assumption that there exists corruption in the admission process. The 
problem will be analyzed under perfect capital markets and also under borrowing 
constraints. We use auction theory to obtain equilibria of the market system and the 
exam system and analyse the effects of corruption on the efficiency of the two 
systems. We conclude that the exam system is superior to the market system if we 
only consider the issue of corruption.  
    In the third chapter, we construct a model to reveal the forces that positively sort 
students into different quality universities in a free choice system under assumptions 
of supermodular utility and production functions. Given a distribution of student 
ability and resources, we analyse the planner's decisions on the number of universities 
and the design of the "task level" for each university, as well as the allocation of 
resources between universities. Students gain from completing requirements (tasks) in 
universities, while having to incur costs of exerting effort. In contrast to previous 
literature, our model includes qualifications as well as cost in the student's utility 
function, and educational outputs depend on qualification, ability and resources per 
capita. Our main focus is on the design of task levels. Our result differs from the 
literature as regards the optimal number of colleges. A zero fixed cost of establishing 
new colleges does not necessarily result in perfect tailoring of tasks to students. 
Furthermore, if the fixed cost is not zero, then the planner has to take fixed costs into 
account when deciding the number of universities.  
 
 
Introduction to the Thesis
China is the largest developing country in the world. During the last thirty years1,
demand for higher education in China has been increasing rapidly. As a result,
concerns over college admission2 have become a focal point of discussion in China
society. Due to historical and cultural reasons, the college admission in todays
China involves the whole society and causes concerns of various social classes
(Zhang (2008)). Although public attention on this issue has been drawn widely,
most discussions occur in the popular media, and little theoretical research, spe-
cially studies from the economic perspective, has been carried out. This thesis
tries to analyse the Chinese college admission system theoretically. Empirical
analysis may be more convincing, but the collection of data about the higher
education in China is di¢ cult. Nevertheless, it will be a direction for further
studies in the future. This introduction consists of the following parts: a brief
introduction about the Chinese College Admission System; some criticisms of the
system; and the aims and contributions of this thesis.
The Chinese College Admission System
The Chinese College Admission System may be one of the most unique college
admission systems in the world. It was established in 1952 to meet political and
educational needs, as well as to serve as one of the accelerators for the economic
transition of the new Peoples Republic of China. The system was interrupted
from 1966 to 1976 during the "Cultural Revolution". In that period, almost all
education activities were suspended. It was restored in 1977. Although there
have been changes to the admission system until present day, the principle of
the system remains the same, which is to admit students into higher education
institutions through uniform national examinations.
The establishment of the original admission system in 1952 was based on ve
arguments, including external and internal factors. (Zheng, 2007)
1. There are political needs and consideration of economic construction for the
new country. As a new country reborn from wars, almost every aspect of the
society was indeed for rebuilding, and hence all kinds of professionals were
in short supply. Past experiences of higher education in Chinese history had
1The higher education system in China was interrupted due to domestic political complica-
tion during the Cultural Revolution and was restored back to normal in 1977.
2The phrase of "college admission" is used to represent the admission system of undergrad-
uate education which is the main focus of this thesis.
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suggested that a national examination system could solve the unbalanced
recruiting problems between di¤erent regions, colleges and disciplines. Also
it was thought that an examination system for admission would increase
the e¢ ciency of using limited higher education resources.
2. There was the need of educational adjustment. A large scale adjustment of
academic disciplines was underway in 1952, involving most universities and
colleges. The higher education sector needed a more scheming admission
system to ensure all institutions could recruit enough academically eligible
freshmen.
3. As China has such a large population, the scale of college admission is
enormous. Therefore equality and e¢ ciency are the most important con-
siderations for large-scale exam. Under such condition, a uniform national
admission system organised by the government is more e¢ cient than inde-
pendent admission operated by colleges.
4. In a few centuries before the establishment of new country, China had been
in the war and falling into pieces and inrmness. People of the country
desired for the unication. This desire had very deep e¤ect on the imple-
mentation of centralism in many aspects in China, including the college
admission system.
5. The last but not the least, it was inuenced by culture.
The admission system consists of two stages. Stage one is a standard exam,
called the National College Entrance Examination, and stage two is the recruit-
ment procedure which starts immediately after exam results are released. Al-
though students may sit di¤erent papers in di¤erent provinces or in the four
municipalities directly under the Central Government (i.e. Beijing, Chongqing,
Shanghai, and Tianjin) for the same academic subject, the structure and admin-
istration of the exam are the same across the country.3 The exam normally lasts
for 3 days. Three subjects are mandatory for all students: Chinese, Mathematics
and a foreign language4. Apart from the three mandatory subjects, six other
subjects are also being examined selectively depending on the course the student
3Most information and references about the exam and admission systems are from
public sources of the Ministry of Education of the Peoples Republic of China.
http://www.moe.edu.cn/
4It is usually English but may also be substituted by Japanese or Russian in some northern
provinces.
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wishes to study in higher education.5 Three of these six subjects for the category
of science include Physics, Chemistry, Biology and three for arts include History,
Geography and Political Education. These examinations are essentially the only
criterion for higher education admissions. The details of the exam are arranged
by the Ministry of Education,6 such as the exam date, subjects, qualication of
examinees, criterion of check both in politics and health, matriculation principles.
There is a National College Entrance Exam committee overseeing the operations
of the exams, which include setting exam questions, making reference answers
and grading guidance. However, the implementation and administration of the
exams are arranged by the local government at provincial level. As a tradition,
the exams take place at the same time across the country. Students who are
dissatised by the results of their rst attempt may repeat the last year study
of high school and take the exams again in the following year. These exams are
traditionally and culturally the most important event for Chinese students as it
is the only possible way to get into colleges.
Although the exam result is the only criterion, the admission also depends
on studentsorder of preferences of colleges on their preference lists. The whole
admission process takes place in four phases. Phase one is known as "Early Ad-
missions", which deals with applications to degrees in education-related courses,
applications to institutions of the armed forces and the police force, as well as
applications to institutions in Hong Kong and Macau7. Phase two is known as
"Key Undergraduate Admissions" which deals with applications to institutions
administered by central government departments and institutions, in other words,
the top universities in the country. Phase three is called "General Undergraduate
Admissions" which deals with applications to institutions located in the capital
of each province; these institutions are usually the top ones within the province.
The fourth phase deals with the applications to the remaining institutions. Stu-
dents are allowed to list four to six choices of institutions and courses in each of
the admission phase. Currently, sequences of enlisting the choice of institutions
and courses are available to students depending on where they take the exams. In
the rst sequence, students are required to report their preferences before taking
the exams; in the second sequence, students can list their preferences after exams
but before results come out; and in the third sequence, students are allowed to
5There are two main categories in Chinese higher education system: Science/engineering or
art/humanities.
6There some exceptions, e.g., Shanghai, where local government provides di¤erent exam
questions.
7Due to historical and political reasons, education systems in Hong Kong and Macau are
di¤erent from mainland China under the one country, two systemspolicy.
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report their preferences after exam results are released. For the admission oper-
ation in 2005, ve provinces adopted the rst sequence of enlisting preferences,
sixteen provinces adopted the second sequence, and ten provinces adopted the
third sequence.
The specic admission rules of each college are not necessary the same, but
most colleges adopt a policy called "Preference Clearance".8 "Preference Clear-
ance" implies that, rst, a college will consider o¤ering a place to a student who
does not rank it as the rst choice only when the college can not ll up the quota
by those who rank it as the rst choice. Second, the allocation of degree pro-
grammes in a college follows the same principle. Although in theory it is possible
that a student who does not put a college as the rst choice could still be ad-
mitted, the reality is that the chance is very small because of the large number
of applicants. The fact is that the number of students applying to an institution
is far greater than the quotas available. Moreover, as an internal policy, some
colleges do not admit those students who do not rank them as the rst choice
even when they can not ll up their quota by accepting students ranking them as
the rst choice. For example, Beijing University will only admit a student who
does not put it as the rst choice if the quota is not lled up by those who do rank
it as the rst choice, given the students score is above the average grade of those
who have been already admitted. Given this policy and the increasing number
of applicants, how to list the preferences concerns most students and families.
By making an inappropriate decision in listing preference, an applicant may be
rejected by all colleges on his preference list.
Given the large scale of higher education application (e.g. there are 10 million
applicants in 2007) and the limited resources available, it is not di¢ cult to imagine
how highly competitive it is when it comes to the admission procedure. On the
other hand, it is not di¢ cult to understand how huge the inuence is to a students
future. Therefore any reform of the system will a¤ect millions of students and
their families.
Criticisms of the System
We have talked about the reasons why the higher education system has been
running for such a long time given its importance to the Chinese people. One
fact is that criticisms never stop appearing. People question the whole system in
two aspects: the examination itself and the recruitment policies.
8See Chapter 4 of "Guide of Higher Education Entrance Examination Recruitment and
Listing Preferences (2009)".
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Some critics point out that the design of the exam lacks exibility. Di¤erent
types and levels of higher education institutions have di¤ering requirements on
their students, but in the current system, it is di¢ cult to pick the suitable students
merely according to their performance in the once-in-a-life-time exam. In other
words, the system can not include a exible personal assessment. It is also di¢ cult
to tell a students character by simply looking at exam scores. A student may
have special strength or talent in some areas, but he could be weak in exams or
in the exam of a particular subject; if this is the case, this student may fail to
enter higher education. The current system is also criticized for its emphasis on
rote learning because examinations are basically tests of how much knowledge
students are able to memorise in their years at school. Critical thinking and
personal development are rarely emphasized in Chinese classrooms, especially in
high schools where all students have only one objective: getting ready for exams.
The once-in-a-life-time exams bring many social and psychological problems to
students as most students and their families believe the result of the exam will
decide their entire lives.
Recruitment policy is another aspect being widely criticized. "Preference
Clearance" could lead to an ine¢ cient outcome9. A student is likely to lose the
opportunity of being admitted by a college if he does not list it in his preferences
or does not rank it as the rst choice. Therefore we might see the following
outcomes: a student wants to enter a college, which has places available, but he
will fail to do so because he did not list that college as one of the preferences; a
student is rejected by a college, which is on his preference list because that college
was not the rst choice, although the student has met the exam result require-
ment. We will explain this in more details in the next chapter. Another problem
of the recruitment policy is regional discrimination. Under current rules, colleges
set a xed admission quota for each province, and the number of places available
to students from the province which the institution is located is normally higher
than other provinces. As education quality and the number of universities are
highly uneven in di¤erent geographical locations across China, it is argued that
students are being discriminated in the admission process as those who are from
the area where the institution is located are given priority of being admitted
to that particular institution over students outside the area. For example, stu-
dents from outside Beijing would need a signicantly higher exam score to enter
a university or college located in Beijing compared to students from the city of
Beijing. Such regional discrimination policy leads to an abnormal phenomenon,
9We will dene e¢ ciency in the rst chapter.
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called exam immigrants. Currently, students are not allowed to take the higher
education entrance exams in locations other than the place of permanent ad-
dress where the students household is registered; however, for the sole purpose
of increasing studentschances of entering university, some families choose to re-
locate their household registrations to a di¤erent city or even province. Under
the Soviet-style population movement control, changing the location of house-
hold registration is not easy. Although the actual population movement is free in
China nowadays, it would still take a large e¤ort and may cost a lot in nancial
terms to change the permanent location where a household is o¢ cially registered.
Due to the competition in securing a higher education opportunity, o¢ cials
who can inuence the admission result have the incentive to seek personal gains.
Two scandals being reported in the news below expose the tip of the iceberg of
malpractice and corruption a¤ecting the higher education admission system.
"The Xian Conservatory of Music in Northwest Chinas Shaanxi Province
had asked for 30,000 yuan (US$3,620) from each enrolled student." 10
"China Central Television (CCTV) reported on Friday three sta¤members of
the Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics (Beihang) had extorted
at least 550,000 yuan (US$66,505) from seven students in South Chinas Guangxi
Zhuang Autonomous Region." 11
In the two cases, students who refused to pay the bribe were also threat-
ened with expulsion from the university. These scandals have indicated a number
of loopholes in the university admission system including lack of transparency
and investigation, lax management and lack of professionalism among admission
personnel. The government has invested much e¤ort in keeping the admission
processes transparent and corruption-free, however, the outcome is not satisfac-
tory. Leaking of exam materials, bribery, and other abuses are still being dis-
covered every year. These problems together with other irregular practices have
existed for long time in national college admission procedures, and the whole
system has largely been su¤ering from the so-called "hidden corruption"12. Ac-
cording to the report, it is an open secret that in most colleges, admission job
is a lucrative post, and accepting bribes is a common practice for these person-
nel. Corruption has rapidly evolved into open extortion of money because the
investigation is not strict enough. The problem of corruption in admission has
harmed the equality and e¢ ciency of the higher education system; moreover, it
has a negative impact on young studentssense of fairness and justice.
10The Peoples Daily, August 17 2004.
11The Peoples Daily, August 19 2004.
12The Peoples Daily, August 19 2004.
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One aspect of the debates over abolition of the current system concerns cor-
ruption. The opposition argues that the standard exam system has given too
much power to the administrative personnel, while the supporting side believes
that corruption is more likely to be something that has its root in the culture.
At the end of the day, it is not surprising to see some degrees of corruption when
the competition for university places is strong and the investigation of the use of
admission tutorspower is weak. It has also been argued that corruption would
be even more serious if the current exam system for higher education admission
was replaced by a free market system. In a market system, students can apply
to colleges freely, and applications are not determined only by a one-o¤ exam.
We will compare these systems from the perspective of corruption in the second
chapter.
In order to avoid the problems induced by the standard exam admission sys-
tem, many reforms or even alternative mechanisms have been proposed. One of
them is "easy admission but strict graduation". Tang (1995), Li (1996) and some
other scholars argued that this mechanism is a precious opportunity for higher ed-
ucation to break the fetters of a planned economy and is a way to deepen reforms
and to promote the development of education. They believe that the proposed
policy is ready to be put in trial cities and regions with certain degrees of eco-
nomic powers. Liu (1995) argued that "easy admission but strict graduation"
will not work in China because of the unfailing and inuential belief of "net-
working through petticoat inuence" in Chinese culture and traditions; therefore
the implementation of "easy admission" will most likely result in "easy gradua-
tion" without students paying much e¤ort in studying. Zhang (1996) suggested
that there is neither necessity nor practicality for implementing the "easy admis-
sion but strict graduation" in the near future. Generally speaking, there were
more opponents than proponents for such a view Zhang (2008). It is interesting
that the idea of "easy admission but strict graduation" has been implemented in
the French higher education system for a long time. There are two systems in
France.13 The rules adopted in the open system are exactly "easy admission but
strict graduation". The literature related to the problem of sorting suggests that
a a positive assortative matching, i.e., the higher ability students are accepted
by the higher quality institutions and the lower ability students are allocated to
the lower quality institutions, will be produced in competitive procedures, e.g.,
the Chinese exam system. It has not been discussed why there will be a positive
sorting result in an "easy admission but strict graduation" mechanism as well as
13A more detailed introduction of the two systems can be found in the third chapter.
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the competitive systems. The third chapter of this thesis will try to nd out the
driving force.
Aims and Contributions
Although the research resources on Chinese higher education are very limited,
there have been many studies on higher education in other countries over the
past several decades. The literature in this area mostly focuses on mechanism
and policy designs. E¢ ciency, fairness and welfare of the admission results are
important topics of concern. It is interesting that we can nd di¤erent mecha-
nisms for higher education admissions in di¤erent countries. In some countries,
the mechanisms have been reformed many times, but some countries have been
using the same mechanism for a long time. The main content of this thesis fo-
cuses on the Chinese college admission mechanism, and we try to discuss three
issues arising in this system. The rst chapter describes the Chinese College
Admission (CCA) mechanism, explores its main properties and compares it with
other mechanisms currently in use in other countries. In the second chapter, we
compare two college admission mechanisms from the perspective of corruption in
an auction theory framework. The last chapter explores the driving force of a
positive assortative sorting in the college admission problem when there are no
entry requirements, or under the policy of "easy admission but strict graduation".
The rst two issues concern the current admission mechanism in China, while the
third chapter discusses an alternative system, which has been used in France. In
this section, there are brief literature reviews for each chapter and more detailed
reviews can be found in the introduction of each chapter.
College admission modelling is one of the applications of matching theory. An
outcome of such modelling is a matching of students to colleges, such that each
student is matched to at most one college, and each college is matched to at most
its quota of places available. Therefore, a college admission model is an example of
many-to-one matching models. The discussion on the college admission problems
has existed since the celebrated article "College Admissions and the Stability of
Marriage" by Gale and Shapley (1962). In their model, students and colleges
have their own preferences over the opposite party. They dened the stability
and proposed a famous agent optimal stable mechanism in a college admission
problem, in which the outcomes are stable and Pareto e¢ cient.
The CCA mechanism is a special case of a priority matching mechanism. In
a priority-based mechanism, the key phase is submitted preferences determining
priorities. The school choice problem is one of the most important priority-
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based matching problems. The di¤erence between school choice problem and
traditional college admission model lies in priority takes the place of preference
of college. Priorities of students in schools are determined by studentssubmitted
preferences over schools as well as some other rules. The algorithm behind the
CCA is similar to the Boston Mechanism (Abdulkadiro¼glu, Pathak, Roth, Sönmez
(2005); Abdulkadiro¼glu, Sönmez (2003); Chen, Sönmez (2003); Ergin, Sönmez
(2006)). The priority of a student at a college in the CCA model is dependent on
the students submitted preferences and score obtained in the exam. Under the
CCA mechanism, a student who is not o¤ered a place at his top-ranked college
will only be considered for his reported second choice college after those who
have top-ranked that college. Therefore a student will lose his priority to be
admitted at a college unless he lists it as his rst choice. The match priority is
lexicographic in the CCA mechanism, which implies that any student-college pair
that ranks each other rst has the highest match priority. It rst considers the
student preferences and only then the college priorities.
In the rst chapter, we will review the general college Two-Sided Match-
ing Market model and Priority Matching Mechanism, and introduce some basic
properties of an outcome of a priority-based matching game. We briey introduce
how the CCA mechanism works and explore properties of this mechanism under
two di¤erent assumptions about the availability of information. Fairness and
e¢ ciency are the two characteristics being mainly focused in every mechanism.
Given perfect information, the equilibrium strategy of the preference revelation
game induced by the CCA mechanism is not truthful revelation of preferences
equilibrium, but it is fair and hence stable based on either true preferences or
stated preferences, and Pareto e¢ cient. If we relax the assumption of perfect
information as students do not know scores of others, then it will be proved that
the allocation is not necessarily fair, and telling the truth is not always an op-
timal strategy. E¢ ciency will be discussed separately under the assumption of
imperfect information.
Although the CCA mechanism has been used for several decades in China,
debates about the system never stopped. Criticisms mainly focus on the fair-
ness and equality of opportunity for all candidates; design of exam questions;
the pressure induced by exam on students; and corruption. There are voices to
replace the current exam system by a free market system. In the market system,
applications are not determined only by a one-o¤ exam, but with the support of
other materials including reports on students performance in high school, ref-
erences from teachers, and face-to-face interviews between the student and the
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college. The argument supporting the current system indicates that corruption
has been a very serious problem in the exam system, and it would be worse under
a free market system since there are no standard criteria. This would lead to a
more severe outcome that corruption results in unfairness and inequality of the
student being educated at college. The second chapter of this thesis addresses
the problem of corruption in college admissions by contrasting the two systems.
Corruption a¤ects many aspects of higher education. It has a negative im-
pact on the quality of colleges; it increases inequality in the access to higher
education, and causes unfairness. Hallak and Poisson (2002) dened corruption
in the education sector as "the systematic use of public o¢ ce for private benet,
whose impact is signicant on the availability and quality of educational goods
and services, and, as a consequence on access, quality or equity in education".
Corruption in education was observed in many places, and previous cases were
seen in countries such as Russia, India, France, China, etc. The second chapter
compares the market system and the exam system in a college admission environ-
ment from the perspective of corruption. We employ the auction model to discuss
the e¢ ciency and degree of corruption between the market system and the exam
system. The principle of e¢ ciency is to allocate the best resources (places of
best college) to those agents (students) who can use them most e¢ ciently. This
principle is based on the assumption of complementarity in students valuation
of college. (Becker (1973))
Fernandez (1997, 1998) examined the performance and properties of the mar-
kets system and the exam system as alternative allocation devices with perfect
capital markets. She shows that both systems would achieve e¢ cient allocation
results. However, when borrowing constraints exist, the exam system dominates
the market system in terms of matching e¢ ciency. In this thesis, we will contrast
the performance of both systems under no borrowing constraints as well as un-
der borrowing constraints. The di¤erence from Fernandezs work is that we use
auction theory to obtain the equilibrium and e¤ects of corruption. To our knowl-
edge, no researcher has previously used auction theory to analyse corruption in
education with borrowing constraints. We will derive the equilibria of the two
systems in a case with perfect capital markets and in a market with borrowing
constraints, and establish the allocation results of both systems are e¢ cient in a
perfect market, but ine¢ cient under borrowing constraints. We will also prove
that the degree of corruption would be higher in the market system than in the
exam system under both assumptions.
In France, there are two di¤erent systems for higher education admission. One
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is through competitive examination, entrance examination or application form,
with an interview where appropriate; the other is an open system, where all bac-
calaureate holders have the right to enter this system without any prior selection
procedure. The former system is a simple two-sided college admission problem,
which can be analysed by the original two-sided matching model or the priority-
based mechanism model. The mechanism with competitive procedures naturally
produces a positive sorting if a students performance is positively correlated to
his ability and the mechanism is well designed. Our question is, since students
have the right to enter the system without any prior selection in the latter system,
whether or not the sorting would still be positive assortative? If the answer is
yes, then what is the driving force? This question will be answered in the last
chapter of this thesis.
This piece of work is closely related to the literatures on the assortative sorting
and allocation of resources in higher education. In the theory of marriage, Becker
(1973) denes positive assortative matching as a positive correlation between the
values of the traits of husbands and wives. He argues that positive assortative
matching is generally optimal in most circumstances. The agent of likes or un-
likes is optimal as traits are complements or substitutes, because superior types
reinforce each other when traits are complements and o¤set each other when
traits are substitutes. The condition in the theorem is commonly referred to as
the (strict) supermodularity condition of the matching output function. Topkis
(1998) gives a comprehensive mathematical treatment of supermodularity, and
Milgrom and Roberts (1990) and Vives (1990) presents applications in game the-
ory and economics. Arnott and Rowse (1987) nd that any type partition in a
case of allocating students to various classes within an elementary or secondary
school is possible. The partition depends on the strength of peer e¤ects.
Given a distribution of studentsabilities and a limited pool of resources, we
model the planners decision to establish colleges, to design a "task level" for each
college, and to optimize the allocation of resources. The cost of accomplishing
the task is the critical factor of sorting students positively. Given all other factors
being equal, students with di¤erent abilities will have di¤erent decisions due to
di¤erent costs incurred. Kremer (1993) highlights the role of positive assortative
matching in economic development. In his model of one-sided, many-to-many
matching market, each rm consists of a xed number of workers each employed
for a production task. Workers have di¤erent skills, with a higher-skilled worker
less likely to make mistakes in performing his task. Self-matching is obtained in
equilibrium where each rm employs workers of identical skills. Kremer uses this
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form of positive assortative matching to explain the large wage and productivity
di¤erences between developing and developed countries that cannot be accounted
for by their di¤erences in levels of physical or human capital. Epple and Romano
(1998) study a competition between private and public schools and analyse the
e¤ects of vouchers under peer e¤ects assumption. Epple, Romano and Sieg (2006)
look through the admission, tuition, and nancial aid policies in higher education
market. They claim that colleges attempt to attract students with higher abilities
by designing appropriate tuition and admission policies. Fernandez and Gali
(1997), Fernandez (1998) argue that prices and borrowing constraints play the
role of sorting students in the market system, and prices and exam results decide
the matching of students to colleges in the exam system. In our model, we include
costs into the students utility function, and ignore the tuition and income e¤ects
on a students utility.
The crucial assumption of our model is supermodularity in utility function
and education output function of a particular student. Sallee, Resch and Courant
(2008) claim that the assumptions of supermodularity in production function and
xed costs of building up colleges are su¢ cient to construct an optimal tiered sys-
tem that sorts students by ability. Our model only assumes the supermodularity
and ignores the peer e¤ects as we will reach the same positive assortative sorting
as well.
The main contribution of the third chapter, in contrast with the literature,
is that we claim that students consideration of cost is crucial when they decide
whether or not and where to be educated. Based on the assumption of super-
modularity for utility and production functions, we present a general equilibrium
from a perspective of a central planner who has to sort students into colleges with
di¤erent qualities. It can be applied to either the education market or any other
occasions concerning sorting and resource allocation. The result of our model
gives the design of task levels and resource allocation. Some numerical examples
are presented to discuss the optimal number of colleges given the xed cost of set-
ting up a college as we are unable to solve the equilibrium in a general case. The
conclusion is di¤erent from Sallee, Resch and Courant (2008)s work. It would
be shown that the planner only sets up a nite number of colleges even though
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1 Chapter 1:
The Chinese College Admission Mechanism
with Perfect and Imperfect Information about
Student Scores
1.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses a matching problem that focuses on a centralized college1
admission system via standard exams. This model tries to mimic the current
college admission system running in China. For simplicity, we call it as the Chi-
nese College Admission (CCA) system. The CCA is operated as a centralized
mechanism. The admission o¢ ce in a province acts as the agent of the central
governments Ministry of Education to be responsible for processing applications
of admission to colleges in that province. Those students who have successfully
completed their senior high school leading to a Certicate of General Education
(equivalent to A-level in the UK) are eligible to take a nationwide unied exam-
ination in June of each year. The score of this exam is released one month later.
Having obtained the score, students have to report their preferences of colleges
to the provincial admission o¢ ce. After the reporting deadline, the admission
o¢ ce then assigns places of each college to students based on their scores and
reports about their orders of preferences over colleges. This process is a standard
CCA procedure, and each admission o¢ ce is only responsible for dealing with
applications made in the province where the o¢ ce is located. In the CCA sys-
tem, students with higher scores have higher priority of being admitted. However,
exam score is not the only determinant in the CCA system as the admission o¢ ce
takes account of studentsreported preferences. This piece of work analyses the
CCA mechanism from the perspective of two-sided matching market.
This introduction is organised as follows: The rst two sections are brief
literature reviews on two-sided matching market and priority-based matching
mechanism; the third section is a detailed description of the CCA system; and
the last section is to explain the di¤erence between the CCA system and other
related mechanisms as well as our ndings and contributions, such as analysis on
the CCA mechanism under perfect information and imperfect information.
1We simply use college to represent all undergraduate education institutions in China.
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1.1.1 Two-Sided Matching Market
The college admission problem was initially studied by Gale and Shapley (1962).
They introduce a marriage market model and a college admission model, which
are regarded as the beginning of study on matching theories. In the college
admission model, a set of places in colleges are allotted to a set of applicants.
Each applicant ranks the colleges according to his preference, omitting those
colleges to which he would never go under any circumstances. It is assumed that
applicants are allowed to manipulate their preferences if they believe it would
make them better o¤. They assume that there would not be any ties, which
implies that no colleges are in the same order on a stated preference ranking list.
Each college similarly has preference over applicants, excluding those students
who will never be admitted under any circumstances.
Formally a college admission problem (Gale and Shapley (1962)) consists of:
1. a set of students S = fs1; :::; sng,
2. a set of colleges C = fc1; :::; cmg,
3. a capacity vector q = fq1; :::; qmg, where qj is the capacity of college cj,
4. a list of student preferences P s = fps1; :::; psng, where psi is the preference
relation of student si over colleges including the no-college option,
5. a list of college preferences P c = fpc1; :::; pcng, where pcj is the preference
relation of college cj over students.
Each applicant has a strict preference on C [ fc0g, where c0 denotes the no-
college option. Let cpsi c
0 denotes that student si strictly prefers college c to c0.
Thus, an assignment could be dened given each triple lists of preferences of
students, preferences of colleges, and capacities, i.e. (P s; P c; q).
Let  (s) denote the assignment of student s under matching , and  1 (c)
denote the set of students each of whom is assigned to college c under matching
. An outcome of the college admissions model is a matching of students to
colleges,  : S ! C [ fc0g, which is a function from the set of students to the
set of colleges such that each student is matched to at most one college, and each
college is matched to at most its quota of students, i.e., j 1 (cj)j  qj.
Roth and Sotomayor (1990) introduce and provide a comprehensive account
of college admission problems and other two-sided matching applications. They
dene a matching  as blocked if, for a student-college pair (s; c) ; either
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(1) Student s prefers college c to assignment  (s) and college c has empty
places under matching , or
(2) Student s prefers college c to assignment  (s) and college c prefers student
s to at least one of the students in  1 (c).
A pair that satises either (1) or (2) is called a block pair.
Denition 1 A matching is stable if and only if there are not any block pairs.
Gale and Shapley (1962) prove that a stable matching always exists by the
deferred acceptance algorithm, which also produces an optimal solution for one
side of the matching market. For example, in the college admission model, there
are at least two stable results, which are selected by the student optimal stable
algorithm and the college optimal stable algorithm. We describe the student
optimal matching mechanism as follows.
Algorithm 1 Student Optimal Matching Mechanism (Gale and Shapley(1962)):
Step 1: Each student applies to his rst choice. If the null object is the rst
choice of a student, then he is allotted the null object. Each college tentatively
assigns places to its proposers one at a time according to its preference. Any
remaining proposers are rejected.
In general, at
Step k: Each student who was rejected in step k 1 applies to his next favourite
college. If the null object is the next favourite of an agent, then he is allotted the
null object. Each college considers the set consisting of the students it has been
holding and its new proposers, and tentatively assigns its places to those who have
high order on its preference list. Any remaining students after all the places are
assigned are rejected.
The algorithm terminates when each student is either holding a place at any
college or has been allotted the null object.
At termination, each student is assigned his nal tentative college or the no-
college option. In fact, the student optimal stable mechanism was employed to
address the pre-registration problem in the American medical labour market in
the 1950s (Roth (1984)).
Gale and Shapley (1962) show that "Every applicant is at least as well o¤
under the assignment given by the deferred acceptance procedure as he would be
under any other stable assignment." The outcome of the student optimal stable
mechanism has the following properties: stability, strategy-proofness, fairness,
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resource monotonicity, and population monotonicity. But it violates other prop-
erties such as e¢ ciency, consistency, and group strategy-proofness.2 Dubins and
Freedman (1981) and Roth (1982) establish that truthful-preference revelation is
always in studentsbest interest in one-to-one matching such as marriage market.
Roth (1985) and Roth and Sotomayor (1990) show it also holds for the many to
one matching problem which is the case studied here. Roth (1982) shows that
no stable matching mechanism exists that makes it a dominant strategy for all
agents on both sides of the market to state their true preferences, which implies
that, in the college admission problem, there does not exist any stable matching
mechanisms that are strategy-proof for all colleges and students.
1.1.2 Priority-Based Allocation Mechanisms
Two-sided matching and resource allocation based on priorities are a commonly
observed problem. A priority-based matching problem was rst discussed by
Roth (1991). A priority-based matching mechanism was used to match medical
school graduates (interns) to supervising consultants in three regions of the UK
from the late 1960s, but were eventually abandoned (Roth (1991), Ergin and
Sönmez (2003)). The product of the students ranking of the consultant and
the consultants ranking of the student is used as the basis for the priorities,
thus, which are determined by student and consultants preferences. The highest
priority is referred as a (1, 1) match when a consultant and a student ranks each
other as the rst choice. If the consultant ranked the student rst but the student
ranked the consultant second, referred as a (1,2) match, they had a second highest
priority, as did a consultant who ranked a student second but was ranked rst
by the student, a (2, 1) match. The two schemes di¤ered in how they broke
ties. It could be either in consultants favour, so that a (1,2) match would have
a higher priority than a (2, 1) match, or in the students favour. Roth (1991)
shows these schemes may produce unstable matching. Moreover, he shows any
priority matching scheme will sometimes produce unstable matching.
2The denitions of these properties are as follows: (see Kesten(2004)
Strategy proofness: No agent ever benets by misrepresenting his preferences.
Resource monotonicity: All agents are a¤ected in the same direction (in welfare terms)
whenever the set of available objects shrinks or expands.
Population monotonicity: All agents are a¤ected in the same direction (in welfare terms)
whenever some agents leave without their allotments.
Consistency: The recommendation for any given problem does not change after the departure
of some of the agents with their allotments.
Group stategy proofness: No group of agents ever benet by jointly misrepresenting their
preferences.
Formal denitions of fairness and e¢ ciency can be found in the next section.
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In a priority-based mechanism, the key phase is submitted preferences de-
termining priorities. In the case described in the last paragraph, priorities are
purely determined by the rankings reported by consultants and students. In the
following case, the school choice problem, priorities are determined by the pref-
erences over colleges reported by students plus schoolsorderings over students,
but studentsreported rankings are considered rst.
The school choice problem is one of the most important priority-based match-
ing problems. The most famous one is the Boston school choice mechanism,3
which is in use at several U.S. school districts including Boston, Cambridge,
Charlotte, Minnesota, Seattle and St. Petersburg-Tampa. The key di¤erence
between the school choice model and the two-sided matching model is that in the
former schools are indivisible objects which shall be assigned to students based
on student preferences and schools priorities whereas in the latter parties in both
sides of the market are agents who have preferences over the other side and whose
welfare are taken into consideration. While schools priorities are determined by
the submitted preferences over schools as well as some other rules4 imposed by law
and do not necessarily represent schools tastes, one can formally treat colleges pri-
orities as schools preferences and hence obtain a two-sided matching market (see
Abdulkadiro¼glu and Sönmez (2003), Balinski and Sönmez (1999), Ergin (2002),
and Ergin and Sönmez (2006)).
In a school choice problem, there is a set of students each of whom will be
placed in a school from a set of schools. For each school a strict ordering of
students is determined according to the rules before admission process. Each
student submits a preference ranking of the schools, which together with xed
priorities determine the choice of a matching. Under the Boston mechanism a
student who is not assigned to his top ranked school is considered for his second
choice only after the students who have top-ranked that students second choice.
Therefore a student may lose his priority at a school unless he ranks it as his
rst choice. The match priority likewise is lexicographic under the Boston school
mechanism, which implies that any student-school pair that the student ranks the
school as the rst choice and the student is on the top of the schools ordering has
the highest match priority. In fact, it is also lexicographic concerning preferences:
It rst considers the student preferences and only then the schoolsordering. A
3See Balinski and Sönmez (1999); Chen and Sönmez (2003); Abdulkadiro¼glu and Sönmez
(2003); Abdulkadiro¼glu, Pathak, Roth and Sönmez (2005); Ergin and Sönmez (2006); Kesten
(2004).
4Such as whether a student is handicapped, the proximity of his residence to the school,
whether he has a sibling attending the same school etc.
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similar mechanism was used in Edinburgh in 1967 and 1968 (Roth (1991)). The
mechanism rst considers the (1,1) match, i.e., the student ranks the school as
the rst choice and he has the rst priority at that school; (1,2), (1,3), (1,4), and
so forth follow the (1,1) match. Only when all students rst choice had been
exhausted were other matches, (2,1),...; (3,1),...; etc.
The following algorithm is a brief description of the Boston mechanism.
Algorithm 2 Boston Mechanism (Ergin and Sönmez (2006)):
For each school a strict ordering of students is determined, each student sub-
mits a preference ranking of the schools, and the key phase is the choice of a
matching based on xed orderings and submitted preferences.
Round 1 : In Round 1 only the rst choices of the students are considered.
For each school, consider the students who have listed it as their rst choice and
assign places of the school to these students one at a time following the schools
ordering until either there are no places left or there is no student left who has
listed it as his rst choice.
In general, at
Round k: Consider the remaining students. In Round k only the kth choices of
these students are considered. For each school with still available places, consider
the students who have listed it as their kth choice and assign the remaining places
to these students one at a time following the schools ordering until either there
are no places left or there is no student left who has listed it as his kth choice.
The procedure terminates when each student is assigned a place at a school.
Ergin and Sönmez (2006) suggest a transition from the Boston Mechanism
to an alternative mechanism, the student-optimal stable mechanism, is likely to
result in potentially signicant welfare gains. This transition also eliminates the
needs of students for gaming strategy because truthful preference revelation is a
dominant strategy under the student-optimal stable mechanism.
Balinski and Sönmez (1999) study another priority-based matching problem,
called student placement model. Their model precisely mimics the current Turk-
ish college admissions practices, which was named "multi-category serial dicta-
torship". The Turkish college admission system is centralized and uses a student
placement o¢ ce to assign students to colleges, in fact to the particular faculties
(e.g., engineering, medical, dental, business) of colleges. The "category" here
refers to a faculty with a particular required skill. The multi-category serial
dictatorship allocates places of a college in a particular category to applicants
according to their ranking scores in the test of that category. They dene fair-
ness in a priority-based allocation mechanism as students with better test scores
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being assigned their better choices. They show that the Turkish mechanism is
not Pareto e¢ cient and not even a second-best mechanism5 among fair mecha-
nisms. It is not strategy-proof, and does not necessarily respect improvements in
scores. They also show the student optimal stable mechanism is the only second-
best mechanism, and the only strategy-proof mechanism for college admission in
Turkey.
There are arguments about whether subjective preference or objective ability
should be the rst consideration. Some6 argue that among all fair assignments
society should prefer e¢ cient ones in which students are assigned according to
their comparative advantages (e.g., ability which determines scores in the CCA
mechanism), rather than by their personal preferences. Balinski, Sönmez (1999)
think students should be given the greatest freedom of choice consistent with
their aptitudes, since motivation is more important in ultimate success than mere
scores on standardized exams.
1.1.3 Introduction to the CCA Mechanism
The CCA mechanism is a special case of the priority-based allocation mecha-
nism. It is operated and managed by a non-executive agency in the Ministry
of Education in the central government. Within the system, colleges are either
directly administrated by the Ministry of Education (such institutions are classi-
ed as key colleges of the state, these are usually referred as the good/better
colleges. The power of personnel appointment is held by the Ministry of Edu-
cation.) or managed by local governments (these colleges are administrated by
provincial governments or local governments; such institutions are usually re-
ferred as ordinary colleges, the power of personnel appointment is held by the
government at the local level.). Every year this authority o¤ers a standardized
exam that all students7 who are planning to enter colleges have to take.
The admission system consists of two stages. Stage one is a standard exam,
called National College Entrance Examination, and stage two is the recruitment
procedure which starts immediately after exam results are released. In the exam,
three subjects are mandatory for all students: Chinese, Mathematics and a for-
eign language. Apart from the three mandatory subjects, six other subjects are
also being examined selectively depending on the courses students wish to study
5The second best mechanism does not induce a Pareto e¢ cient outcome, but the best among
all possible outcomes.
6See Fernandez (1998), Epple & Romano (2006), Sallee, Resch & Courant (2008).
7Some students do not need to take the test if they have been recommended to universities
or colleges by their schools. The exceptions are few compared to total applicants.
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in colleges. Besides scores obtained in the exam, the admission also depends on
studentssubmitted order of preferences of colleges. The submitted preferences
form consists of four parts, in which colleges in four phases are lled. Phase
one is known as "Early Admissions", which deals with applications to degrees
in education-related courses, applications to institutions of the armed forces and
the police force, as well as applications to institutions in Hong Kong and Macau.
Phase two is known as "Key Undergraduate Admissions" which deals with ap-
plications to institutions administrated by central government departments and
institutions, in other words, the top universities in the country. Phase three is
called "General Undergraduate Admissions" which deals with applications to in-
stitutions located in the capital of each province; these institutions are usually the
top ones within the province. The fourth phase is dealing with the applications
to the remaining institutions. Students are allowed to list four to six choices of
institutions and courses in each of the admission phase.
The CCA system is similar to the Boston mechanism. The principle is that
it rst considers student preferences and only then collegesorderings. For each
college, a strict ordering of students is determined by exam scores. A college
will consider sending o¤ers to students who do not rank it as their rst choice
only after those who rank it as their rst choice. The specic admission rules of
each college are not necessarily the same, but most colleges adopt a policy called
"Preference Clearance". "Preference Clearance" implies that, rst, a college will
consider to o¤er a place to a student who does not rank it as his rst choice only
when the college can not ll up the quota by those who rank it as their rst
choice. Second, the allocation of degree programmes in a college follows the same
principle. Although in theory it is possible that a student who does not put a
college as his rst choice may still be admitted, the reality is that the chance
is very small because of the large number of applicants. The following example
illustrates the principle explicitly.
Suppose n students are applying to two colleges, c1 and c2; with quota q1 and
q2. Firstly, students have to take the standard exam and report their preferences
before or after the results of the exam are released. The admission o¢ ce will
consider the applications to cj (j = 1; 2) only from those who rank the college
as their rst choice on their submitted preference lists. The top qj students
(according to scores) who rank cj as their rst choice will be allocated a place
at cj. If the quota at cj is not lled by students ranking the college as the rst
choice, the admission o¢ ce will then allocate the spare places to those who rank
cj as the second according to their score ranking. Therefore, if there are more
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students than colleges, then it is possible that a student fails to get a place in
a college even if he has a higher score than at least one student in that college
because he does not put that college at the top of his submitted preference.
Next we describe how the CCA mechanism operates. For simplicity, we as-
sume there is only one phase in the admission process. Students take the exam
and obtain scores. Then every student submits a preference list by ranking a
limited number of colleges. Once scores and submitted preference lists are ready,
the CCA mechanism operates in the following algorithm.
Algorithm 3 The CCA mechanism:
Round 1: Only the rst choices of students are considered. Each college only
considers to make o¤ers to students who list that college as their rst choice one
at a time following their ranking scores, until either the admission quota is lled,
or until all students who list the college as their rst choice are o¤ered a place.
Round 2: Only the second choices of students are considered. Each college
considers to make o¤ers to students who list that college as their second choice
one at a time following their ranking scores, until either the admission quota is




Round k: All remaining students who were not o¤ered a place in previous
rounds of admission are considered. Each college with places available after previ-
ous rounds of admissions will consider and make o¤ers to the remaining students
who list that college as their kth choice one at a time following studentsranking
scores, until either all remaining places are taken or until all students who list
that college as the kth choice are o¤ered a place.
The procedure terminates when each student is assigned a place at a college
or there are no more places available in colleges.
The CCA mechanism has some special features that we need to make clear.
Base Score Base score is the minimum required score to enter a particular
college. This requirement is not set by colleges but by the governmental education
authoritys admission o¢ ce in each province. Since higher education admissions
is administrated at the provincial level, each provincial admission o¢ ce sets the
base score after reviewing the overall performance of students in the exam as well
as their submitted preferences of colleges. Admission o¢ ce in each province sets
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a base score for every college in that province and that base score is only valid
for applicants who took the entry exams in that particular province where the
admission o¢ ce is located. Therefore, it is possible that a college have di¤erent
base scores across di¤erent provinces. A student will surely be o¤ered a place if he
ranks a college as his rst choice and his score is higher or at least the same as that
colleges base score. The central admission o¢ ce publishes a Guide of Admission
in every year, in which students can nd the base scores of all colleges in di¤erent
provinces in previous years as well as the recruiting plans of current year. By
reading and working on this guidance, each student forms his own expected base
scores of di¤erent colleges, and then decides his submitted preference of colleges.
Timing The current CCA mechanism may be operated in three possible se-
quences. The rst sequence is that students have to report their preferences
over colleges before taking the exam; the second sequence is that students report
their preferences over colleges after exam but before results are released; and the
third sequence is that students report their preferences over colleges after results
are released. In the admission operation in 2005, ve provinces adopted sequence
one, sixteen provinces adopted sequence two, and ten provinces adopted sequence
three.8
Obviously, it is the most di¢ cult for students to decide their submitted pref-
erences before taking the exam as they would not be certain about their perfor-
mance in the exam as well as the average performance of other students. Sequence
two makes studentslives easier since they may know how they did in the exams
before reporting their preferences of colleges; but they would be uncertain about
the results and how others did. Sequence three allows students to report their
preferences of colleges after receiving exam scores. It is a huge advantage for
students to maximise the possibility of being admitted since information released
by the admission o¢ ce would contain information on the distribution of overall
student performance in the exam as well as the average scores and the highest
individual scores. The more information students have on the overall exam per-
formance, the less uncertainty there will be. As a general trend, more provinces
are using sequence three in admission operations; and therefore, we only consider
the system with sequece three.
Regional discrimination There exists regional discrimination in the CCA
mechanism. As a general practice, colleges allocate more admission quota to
8Data was from the o¢ cial website of Ministry of Education of the Peoples Republic of
China: http://www.moe.edu.cn/.
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the province where they locate than other provinces. Together with di¤erent
distributions of studentsabilities, such discrimination may cause within a single
college, it has di¤erent base scores from di¤erent provinces. This discrimination
induces problems in e¢ ciency and revelation of preferences. This issue is caused
by some degrees of political considerations and inuences and will not be discussed
in the current context.
1.1.4 Comparisons and Contributions
The CCAmechanism is a special case of a priority-based matching mechanism. As
we mentioned in the last section, a priority-based matching mechanism is di¤erent
from the Gale and Shapleys college admission model. The CCA mechanism
is not an exception. In Gale and Shapleys model, the outcome of matching
depends on the preferences of colleges over students and students over colleges.
In the CCA mechanism, students are the only agents, and colleges are merely
objects to be consumed as public goods. So the main di¤erence between the
CCA mechanism and Gale and Shapleys mechanism is that scores take the place
of preferences of colleges over students and together with submitted preferences
over colleges determine allocations. Therefore, in our model, we do not consider
welfare issues or strategic behavior for the college side. Notions such as the
stability that are central for college admissions problems do not have any direct
meaning in the CCA problems. However, this does not mean that the ndings in
Gale and Shapleys model are irrelevant in the CCA mechanism. We can formally
treat scores as college preferences and hence obtain a two-sided matching market.
Consequently concepts/ndings in a two-sided matching have their counterparts
in our model. Stability is the central notion in the two-sided matching problem
and it is still important in a priority-based matching problem. Ergin and Sönmez
(2006) dene stability in a priority-based matching market as: a matching is not
stable if there is a student-college pair (s; c) such that (1) student s prefers college
c to his assignment; (2) either school c has some empty places or student s has
higher priority than another student who is assigned a place at college c. Balinski
and Sönmez (1999) show that a matching is individually rational, non-wasteful
and fair9 for a priority matching problem if and only if it is stable for its associated
college admissions problem.
The CCA system is similar to the Boston mechanism. They both belong to
the priority-based matching michanism, in which reported preferences of students
9We will dene individually rational, non-wasteful, and fair allocation in next section.
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determine studentspriorities. The main di¤erence between the CCA mechanism
and the Boston school choice mechanism is collegesorderings over students in the
CCA system are only determined by studentsscores, which are obtained from
a standard nationwide exam, while schoolsorderings in the Boston Mechanism
are dependent upon several aspects. As in the Boston Mechanism, students
in the CCA mechanism may have incentives to misrepresent their preferences.
The critical reason for such manipulation is that students can possibly lose their
priorities of being admitted to a college unless they rank that college as the rst
choice. If those students who report the true preferences are rejected by the
reported rst choice, then they may have to accept o¤ers from other colleges
which are on lower ranks of their list of true preferences, or they may lose their
priorities in all colleges and hence end up being excluded from entering higher
education in the worst scenario.
Let us take a look at a simple example that shows the CCA mechanism may
induce unstable matching according to true preferences. Suppose two student s1
and s2 with scores t1 and t2 and t1 > t2. s1 prefers college c2 to c1, but he ranks
c1 as the rst choice because he is not sure if he can be allocated a place at c2.
In the end, assume that s1 is assigned a place at c1, but it is possible that c2
has some open places as some other applicants may have the same thought as s1,
or s2 has been allotted a place at the college c2 because he ranks c2 as the rst
choice. So, it is unstable according to the true preferences. The interesting part
is the result is stable based on reported preferences. The example shows that, in
the CCA mechanism, a student may have incentive to misrepresent his preference
because he needs to keep his priority in the second choice or even less favourite
universities when he is not guaranteed to be allocated a place in his favoured
college.
Compared to litreatures on the Boston mechanism, the main contribution of
the chapter includes three aspects. First, we describe the CCA system from the
perspective of economics. Second, we build up a formal model for the system
under the assumption of perfect information on exam scores. In Nash equilib-
rium of the mechanism, a student who realises that there are no vacancies in his
favourite college may misrepresent his preference, and rank higher the best of
those colleges whose base scores are lower or equal to his score. We will show
that the outcome of the CCA mechanism is the same as the one selected by a
recursive algorithm and the student optimal stable matching mechanism. The
set of Nash equilibrium outcomes is equal to the set of stable matching under
the studentstrue preferences. Given perfect information, the CCA mechanism
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is not truthful revelation of preferences, but it is fair, stable based on either true
preferences or stated preferences, and Pareto e¢ cient. Third and last, we present
a discussion on the CCA mechanism with imperfect information about the exam
score. There are two colleges and three students, and a nite number of scores
dividing students into two di¤erent types. The probability of a student being
high type is public knowledge. We discuss the symmetric pure Bayesian Nash
equilibria and the symmetric mixed strategy Bayesian Nash equilibria. Whether
the model reaches a symmetric pure equilibrium or a symmetric mixed strategy
equilibrium depends on the utility of the better college and the probability of
being a high type student. Given imperfect information, the mechanism is fair
and strategy-proof when the utility is high and the probability is low. In that
case, we have a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium that both types of students
rank the better college as the rst choice. We also discuss the e¤ects of changes of
the utility and the probability on equilibria. The conclusion of the simple model
is used to explain two interesting observations in reality. Contrast to the well
known Boston School system literature, our work discusses the CCA mechanism,
which has some di¤erent properties from the Boston School system,
The organisation of the rest of the chapter is as follows. In section 2, we
describe the model for the CCA mechanism. In section 3, we illustrate the prop-
erties of the mechanism under the assumption of perfect information. In section
4, we discuss the main results of the CCA mechanism under the assumption of
imperfect information. In section 5, we present some concluding remarks and
possible further directions of research.
1.2 The Model
We dene the ingredients in the CCA mechanism as follows.
1. a set of students S = fs1; :::; sng;
2. a set of colleges C = fc1; :::; cmg;




4. a list of studentspreferences Ps = fp1; :::; png, where pi is the strict prefer-
ence relation of student si over colleges including the no-college option;
5. a list of studentsscores t = ft1; :::; tng;
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6. a list of reported preferences RS = fr1; :::; rng;10
7. a list of the base scores of colleges B = fb1; :::; bmg;
Each applicant has a strict preference on C [ fc0g, where c0 denotes the
no-college option and q0 = jSj. Let cipicj denote that student si strictly prefers
college ci to cj. Given each triple lists of reported preferences of students, student
test scores, and capacities of colleges (RS; t; q), we can dene an assignment via
the CCA mechanism.
To implement the CCA mechanism, described earlier, in the context of the
model, it is assumed that students have to submit a strict preference ranking over
all colleges and the no-college option. We will relax this assumption later.
A matching is an allocation of college places to students such that no student
occupies more than one place. Formally it is a function  : S ! C [ fc0g such
that j 1 (cj)j  qj, 8cj 2 C. Student si is not assigned any college place if
 (si) = c0. Given a preference relation pi of student si, initially dened over
C [ fc0g, it is extended to the set of matching in the following natural way:
student si prefers the matching  to the matching 0 if and only if she prefers
 (si) to 0 (si). Student si will be assigned a place at college cj if 1) he ranks
cj as the rst choice in his submitted preference and ti  bj (his score is higher
than the base score of college cj); 2) he ranks cj as the kth choice, ti  bj and
the admission quota of cj can not be lled up in last k   1 rounds.
Next we dene some properties of student placement models summed up by
Balinski and Sönmez (1999).
Individual Rationality: A matching  is individually rational if no student is
assigned to a college that is worse than the no-college option. In other words,
a student will not be assigned a place at a college that he would never want to
attend. Formally a matching  is individually rational if whenever  (si) 6= c0,
 (si) pic0 for all si 2 S.
Non-Wastefulness: A matching  is non-wasteful if, whenever a student si
prefers cj to his assignment ci, cj has all its places lled up. Formally a matching
 is non-wasteful if cjpi (si) and j 1 (cj)j = qj 8 all si 2 S and cj 2 C.
Pareto E¢ ciency: A matching  Pareto dominates a matching 0 if no student
prefers 0 to  and there is at least one student who prefers  to 0. Formally, a
matching  Pareto dominates a matching 0 if ri0 8 all si 2 S and p0 for at
10Here we assume that students can include as many colleges as they want. But as we
described in the introduction, in the practice, students can only list a limited number of colleges
in their reported preferences.
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least one student.11 A matching  is Pareto e¢ cient if it is not Pareto dominated
by any other matching.
Strategy-Proofness: Amatching  is strategy-proof only if the truthful-preference
revelation of preferences is always a dominant strategy for all students.
Fairness: Students with higher test scores should be assigned their more pre-
ferred choices. Formally a matching  is fair if  (sl) = cj, then cjpi (si) implies
tl > ti 8 all si and sl 2 S.
A mechanism is individually rational, non-wasteful, Pareto e¢ cient, strategy-
proof and fair if it always selects an individually rational, non-wasteful, Pareto
e¢ cient, strategy-proof and fair matching. Pareto e¢ ciency implies individual
rationality and non-wastefulness, but the reverse is not necessarily true. An
allocation is fair if no agent envies any other agent whose allotment he has higher
priority for. The mechanism is fair if it always selects fair allocations. Balinski
and Sönmez (1999) argue that a matching is individually rational, non-wasteful
and fair for a placement problem if and only if it is stable for its associated
two-sided matching problem. Although these properties are summed up for a
placement problem, the rst four can be related to a general matching model and
all of them can be applied to a general priority-based matching problem.
The CCA mechanism satises individual rationality because no students will
be allocated to any colleges which are not on their submitted preferences. As
regards other properties, we will discuss them for the CCA mechanism under
di¤erent assumptions in the next section.
1.3 Properties of the CCA Mechanism
1.3.1 Perfect Information
Perfect information means any students scores and preferences over colleges are
known by all students and this is common knowledge. At this state, we assume
there are no ties between scores
Before we establish the equilibrium of the model, let us look at a simple
example, which illustrates how the mechanism works under the assumption of
perfect information.
Example 1 Let S = fs1; s2g be the set of students, C = fc1; c2g be the set of
colleges, and q = f1; 1g be the college capacity vector. Scores and preferences of
11Here rsi
0 implies that  is at least as good as 0 for si.
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students are as follows:
t = ft1; t2g , with t1 > t2;
Ps = fp1; p2g ;with p1 = p2 = fc1  c2  c0g:
Student s1 knows his score is higher than s1, thus he does not need to ma-
nipulate his preference, thus r1 = fc1  c2  c0g. Student s2 has two options:
r2 = fc1  c2  c0g or r02 = fc2  c1  c0g. We have the reported preferences as
follows:
RS = fr1; r2g ;
or
R0S = fr1; r02g :
If the reported preference set is RS, then the system works as follows:
In Round 1, only studentsrst choices are considered. College cj, j = 1; 2,
makes o¤ers to students who list it as their rst choice by following their ranking
scores until either all places are taken or all students who list the college as rst-
choice are o¤ered a place. Student s1 is assigned a place at college c1, student s2
is rejected by college c1 and the process goes to next round;
In Round 2, only studentssecond choices are considered by the college with
places available. Thus, college c2 assign the remaining place to student s2. The
procedure terminates here since each student is assigned a place at a college.
If the reported preference set is R0S, then the system works as follows:
In Round 1, student s1 is assigned a place at college c1, s2 is assigned a place
at college c2 and the admission process is over.








i.e.,  (si) = ci, i = 1; 2. Therefore, RS and R0S are two Nash equilibria for this
example.
Since information is perfect, the student with the higher score knows he would
have a higher priority in any college that he ranks as the rst choice. The student
with the lower score knows he would not have a higher priority no matter which
college he ranks as the rst choice. The student with the lower score will be
assigned a place at the college which he prefers but is not preferred by the student
with the higher score,12 otherwise he would have to consider accepting the o¤er
12In this example, it is the case if p2 = fc2  c1  c0g:
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from his less-preferred college, or he might end up with c0 if he rejects that
less preferred o¤er.13 Within the matching of this example, the student with the
higher score is assigned a more preferred place and there are no empty places left,
thus the outcome is individually rational, fair, non-wasteful, and hence stable.
Therefore, if there are only two agents on both sides of the market, given the
information is perfect, the matching induced by the CCA mechanism would be
stable, and truthful revelation of preferences is a Nash equilibrium strategy for
both students.
Next we explain what would happen if there are more students and more
colleges. Firstly, we keep n = 2, and increase the total quota of colleges, i.e.,
Q > 2. Holding at the number of students, but increasing the number of places
will not a¤ect the outcome in Example 1. The only di¤erence is that students
have more choices. A student with a higher score obtains a place which he most
prefers, and a student with a lower score is assigned a place which he most
prefers apart from the one assigned to student with higher score. Therefore, the
result must be stable and truthful revelation of preferences is a Nash equilibrium
strategy for both students.
Secondly, suppose m = 2, fq1 = 1; q2 = 1g, and n > 2. Consider the following
Example:.
Example 2 Assume there are three students S = fs1; s2; s3g, and two colleges
C = fc1; c2g, the quota is q = fq1 = 1; q2 = 1g. Studentspreferences and scores
are as follows:
Ps = fp1; p2; p3g ;
with
p1 = p2 = p3 = fc1  c2  c0g;
t = ft1; t2; t3g ;
with
t1 > t2 > t3:
s1 will submit his true preference because he has the highest priority in either
college. s2 realised that he has lower priority than s1 in c1 and s1 will rank c1
as his rst choice. Besides, s2 will lose his priority in c2 if he reports his true
preference and s3 reports r3 = fc2  c1  c0g. Therefore, s2s best strategy is
to list c2 as his rst choice with c1 as the second choice. s3 knows he will be
assigned a place at college c2 if he manipulates his preference and s2 tells the
13In this example, it is the case if p2 = fc1  c0  c2g:
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true preference. Therefore, we can have a Nash equilibrium strategy for reported
preferences as follows:14
r1 = fc1  c2  c0g;
r2 = r3 = fc2  c1  c0g:
College c1 assigns its place to student s1, college c2 assigns its place to s2, and







Since there are only three students in this example, the base score of college
cj is just the score of the student who is admitted by cj. Thus, B = ft1; t2; t3g.
In a general case, the base score of a particular college is the equilibrium score
of the least successful placed student in that college if it is lled up. Student si
can observe the ranking of scores and preferences of other students, hence he is
able to work out the base score of each college. si will not rank his true rst
option, say c1, as the rst choice unless ti  b1. In other words, sis rst choice
is his most favourite among those colleges whose base scores are lower than or
the same as ti. The matching in the example is individually rational, fair, and
non-wasteful again as students with higher priority are assigned a more preferred
place and all places have been lled up. In fact, the result of this example can
be generalised as follows.
Proposition 1 Given perfect information, the CCA mechanism is individually
rational, non-wasteful, fair and Pareto e¢ cient; but truthful revelation of prefer-
ences may not be a dominant strategy for all students.
Proof. See Appendix.
Given perfect information, we have a Nash equilibrium in the CCA mecha-
nism, which has the property that a student for whom there are no vacancies in
his favourite colleges may misrepresent his preference, and rank higher his most
favourite among those colleges whose base scores are lower than or the same as
his score. Thus, the Nash equilibrium must be characterised as follows: the stu-
dent with the highest score must get his most preferred option; the student with
the second highest score must get his most preferred option from the remaining
14The other Nash equilibrium would be r1 = r3 = fc1  c2  c0g, and r2 = fc2  c1  c0g.
Both equilibria would lead to the same output.
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places, ..., etc. The process would terminate in the rst round by this Nash
equilibrium.
This is not the only Nash equilibrium. For example, the student with the
lowest score may have di¤erent strategies. Let fs1; s2; :::; s3g denote the set of
students with t1 > t2:::; tn 1 > tn. If sn is only able to nd available places at his
least preferred college, then he may rank any college as his rst choice. If he ranks
the college with place available as his rst choice, which is the rst equilibrium,
then the admission process ends in the rst round, two rounds otherwise. In the
end, fs1; :::; sn 1g are allocated a place at their reported rst choices and sn is
allocated a place at his least preferred college.
Given perfect information, the CCA mechanism is equivalent to the so-called
"recursive algorithm". While the two algorithms are di¤erent in general, they
always yield the same outcome. Given a set of students S = fs1; :::; sng with
n > 2; a set of colleges C = fc1; :::; cmg; a capacity vector q = fq1; :::; qmg; a list
of student preferences Ps = fp1; :::; png; a list of student test scores t = ft1; :::; tng
with t1 > t2:::; tn 1 > tn, the recursive algorithm is as follows:
Algorithm 4 Recursive Algorithm:
Round 1: s1 reports his preference and he will be allocated a place at his
reported rst choice;
Round 2: s2 reports his preference and he will be allocated a place at his
reported rst choice if there is a place available; otherwise he will go to the no-
college option and the process goes to the next round;
......
In general, at
Round k: sk reports his preference and he will be allocated a place at his rst
choice if there is place available, otherwise he will go to the no-college option and
the process goes to the next round
The procedure terminates when each student is assigned a place or there are
no places available.
It is easy to obtain a Nash equilibrium for the recursive algorithm. In the rst
round, s1 reports p1, and he will be allocated a place at his most preferred college;
in the second round, s2 ranks his most preferred college among those remaining
colleges as his rst choice, and he will be allocated a place at that college; and so
on.
In contrast with the equilibria of the CCA mechanism, the process in the
recursive algorithm lasts k rounds while the CCA mechanism may only last one
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or two rounds as we noted, but they will reach the same outcome. In both
mechanisms, students with higher priority are considered before students with
lower priority.
Remark 1 Given perfect information, the CCA mechanism and the recursive
algorithm select the same matching.
We know the outcomes induced by the CCA mechanism given perfect infor-
mation are fair and stable under studentstrue preferences. Ergin and Sönmez
(2006) show that Nash equilibrium outcome of the Boston School mechanism is
equivalent to the stable matching under the true preferences. This claim holds in
the CCA mechanism.
It is well known that, in a priority matching game, the Deferred Acceptance
Algorithm Pareto dominates any other fair mechanisms (Balinski and Sönmez
(1999)), and it is strategy-proof (Dubins and Freedman (1981)). The following
algorithm describes how the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm is applied to the
CCA circumstance.
Algorithm 5 Deferred Acceptance Algorithm:
Round 1: Each student applies to his favourite college. If c0 is the favourite
object of a student, then he is allotted c0. If the total number of students who
apply to college is greater than its quota, say qj, then qj students with the highest
scores are assigned a place temporarily. The remaining students are rejected.
Round 2: Each remaining student applies to his favourite college. If c0 is the
favourite object of a student, then he is allotted c0. If the total number of students
who apply to a college including those students who were temporarily allocated a
place at Round 1 is greater than its quota, say q0j, then q
0
j students with the highest
scores are assigned a place temporarily. The remaining students are rejected.
......
Round k, k  2: Each student who is rejected by a college at step k 1 applies
to his next favourite college. If c0 is the favourite object of a student, then he
is allotted c0. If the total number of students who apply to a college, say ck, is
greater than its quota, qk, then qk students among them with the highest scores
are assigned a place temporarily. The remaining students are rejected.
The procedure terminates when each student is assigned a place at a college
or there are no places left in colleges.
This mechanism is also referred to the "student optimal stable mechanism".
The main di¤erences between the student optimal stable mechanism and the
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CCA mechanism under perfect information is: it is always optimal for students to
report their true preferences in the former mechanism; students may manipulate
their preferences by ranking colleges, which have low order on their true preference
lists, as their rst choices in order to secure a place at those colleges in the latter
mechanism.
Summary 1 Given perfect information, any Nash equilibrium in the CCA mech-
anism, the recursive algorithm, and the student optimal stable mechanism has
the same matching result, and satisfy individually rationality, non-wastefulness,
fairness and Pareto e¢ ciency. The rst two mechanisms do not satisfy strategy-
proofness but the last one does.
One of assumptions in the perfect information case is that no ties exist between
scores. Now we use an example to illustrate the model may violate fairness if we
relax this assumption to allow the existence of ties between scores, and varying
the example slightly, that Pareto e¢ ciency can fail if students can only list a limit
number of colleges in their reported preferences and also there are score ties.
Suppose all students are risk neutral, and a place will be allocated to a student
with 1=k probability if there are k students with the same scores applying to this
place.
Example 3 Assume there are three students S = fs1; s2; s3g, and two colleges
C = fc1; c2g, the quota is q = fq1 = 1; q2 = 1g. Studentspreferences and scores
are as follows:
Ps = fp1; p2; p3g ;
with
p1 = p2 = p3 = fc1  c2  c0g;
t = ft1; t2; t3g ;
with
t1 = t2 > t3:
The utility of c1, u1 = 1, the utility of c2, u2  0:1, and the utility of c0, u0 = 0
to all students.
Given that s1 ranks c1 as the rst choice, if s2 ranks c1 as his rst choice,
then his expected payo¤ is 0:5u1 = 0:5; if s2 ranks c2 as his rst choice, then
his expected payo¤ is u2 = 0:1. Therefore, s2s optimal strategy is to rank c1
as his rst choice. s1 has the same optimal strategy as does s2. Since all this
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information is publicly known by all students, s3 would rank c2 as his rst choice
because he knows he has chance to be admitted by c2. In the end, the place at
c1 will be allocated to s1 or s2 randomly, and the place at c2 is allocated to s3.







Clearly, the outcome is not fair.
Next we assume that t1 = t2 = t3. Students can only put one college in their
submitted preferences, and a student will end up with c0 if he is not allocated
any place. Since 1=3u1 > 0:1, all students will only put c1 in their preferences.
One of the three students will get the place at c1 randomly, and others have to







It is clear that the outcome is not Pareto e¢ cient. Note that if there are no score
ties, then the outcome selected by the CCA mechanism would be the same as the
unrestricted case even though the number of colleges in reported preferences is
restricted.
The two examples imply that the CCA mechanism may violate fairness and
Pareto e¢ ciency if we relax assumptions such as no score ties, or an unlimited
number of colleges in reported preferences.
1.3.2 Imperfect Information
In the last section, we discussed the CCA mechanism under the assumption that
students have all relevant information about each other, including preferences
over colleges and scores. In practice, scores and preferences are not public knowl-
edge, and hence students have imperfect information. In this section, we look
through the CCA mechanism under the assumption of imperfect information. As
a starting point, we simply assume that all the students have identical prefer-
ences and this is common knowledge. Therefore, the only private information is
their scores, which are determined by a number of factors, such as the students
academic ability, his performance on the exam day, and luck. How scores are
realised is not our concern; thus we simply assume that the actual realisation of
scores is observed only by the student, but its ex ante probability distribution is
commonly known among all students. Now the mechanism is a Bayesian game:
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Nature makes the rst move, choosing realisations of the scores that determine
each students type; each student only observes the realisation of his own score
but the distribution of scores is publicly known; each student decides how to ll
in his preferences form based on available information. Thus, here we are looking
for a Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Our concern for the CCA mechanism is on those students whose scores are on
the margin of two colleges. The problem of those students is to decide whether
to rank the better college or the safe alternative as the rst choice. For the same
set of colleges (a good one and an ordinary one), marginal students should have
similar academic abilities among them. For simplicity, we assume these students
have the same academic ability, and then they have the same probabilities of
obtaining a high score and a low score given other symmetric factors. Given
these assumptions, we simplify the problem as follows.
Assume there are two colleges: c1 with utility u > 1; and c2 with utility 1;15
three students: si (i = 1; 2; 3); and two possible scores: th > b1 > tl, where b1
denotes the base score of c1 in the previous year. We call the students with th
as high type, and the students with tl as low type. All students know their own
scores and the probability that another student is high type, denoted by p, and
the probability that another student is low type, denoted by 1   p. The place
of a college will be randomly allocated to a student if there is more than one
applicant to that college with same score. A college will consider sending o¤ers
to students who do not rank it as the rst choice only if no students ranked it as
the rst choice.
Since there are two colleges, students have two possible strategies: Either
ranking c1 as the rst choice or ranking c2 as the rst choice. Denote the rst
and second strategy by r1 and r2 respectively. Dene x as the probability that
a high type student plays r1, and y as the probability that a low type student
plays r1, that is, assuming a symmetric equilibrium in which strategies do not
depend on the students identication. Therefore, the probability that a high
type student plays r2 is 1  x, and the probability that a low type student plays
r2 is 1  y. Given this structure of mixed strategies, there are four possible pure
strategies: x = 1, y = 1, i.e., both types play r1; x = 1, y = 0, i.e., high type
plays r1 and low type plays r2; x = 0, y = 1, i.e., high type plays r2 and low type
plays r1; x = 0, y = 0, i.e., both types play r2.
In order to nd equilibria of the game, we need to derive the expected utilities
for the two types of students. Consider a particular student, say s1. Nature
15Here we simply assume that there is only one place at each college.
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decides his type to be high or low with probability vector (p; 1  p). We will
work out s1s expected utilities when he is a high type and when he is a low type
respectively.
Claim 1 (1) t1 = th.
When he is a high type student, s1s expected utilities from playing r1 and r2
are respectively as follows:
EUhr1 = u (1  px) +
p2x2
3




p2(x  1) [x+ u(x  3y + 2)  1] + p(x  1) [1 + u(y   1)] + 1:
(2) t1 = tl.
When he is a low type student, s1s expected utilities from playing r1 and r2










3  3y + y2 + p
 





p2(3x2   3xy + y2)

;
EU lr2 = p




(p  1)2(1 + y + y2) + 1
3
u(p  1)(y   1) [1  y + p(2  3x+ y)] :
Proof. See Appendix.
For the symmetric pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibria, we have the fol-
lowing proposition:
Proposition 2 There are two possible symmetric pure Bayesian Nash equilibria
in our model under the assumption of private information about scores:
1. x = 1, y = 1, i.e., both types playing r1, is a symmetric pure strategy
Bayesian Nash equilibrium, if
u  2  p+ 2p
2
(p  1)2 ;
2. x = 1, y = 0, i.e., high types playing r1 and low types playing r2, is a
symmetric pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium, if
3  p2
3  3p+ p2  u 
1 + p+ p2
2(p  1)2
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Figure 1: Pure Strategy Equilibria
For u 2 [1; 4], Figure 1 shows possible symmetric pure strategy equilibria. All
the points in Region 1 meet the requirement for the rst equilibrium, which is
x = 1, y = 1. Region 2 includes all of the possibilities that satisfy the condition
for the second equilibrium, which is x = 1, y = 0. Point E denotes the starting
point of the second equilibrium with coordinate (0:279; 1:304).16
On the curve L1, a low type student is indi¤erent between choosing r1 and
r2 if both types of students play r1. Thus, the curve L1 is determined by the
solution to the following equation:
EU lr1(x = 1; y = 1) = EU
l
r2(x = 1; y = 1):
On L1, EUhr1(x = 1; y = 1) > EU
h
r2(x = 1; y = 1).
On the curve L2, a low type student is indi¤erent between playing r1 and r2 if
all high type students play r1 and all other low type students play r2. Therefore,
the curve L2 is determined by the solution to the following equation:
EU lr1(x = 1; y = 0) = EU
l
r2(x = 1; y = 0):
16The coordinates keep three gures after the decimal point.
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On L2, once again, EUhr1(x = 1; y = 0) > EU
h
r2(x = 1; y = 0).
On the curve L3, a high type student is indi¤erent between playing r1 and
playing r2 if all other high type students play r1 and all low type students play
r2. Curve L3 is determined by the solution to the following equation:
EUhr1(x = 1; y = 0) = EU
h
r2(x = 1; y = 0):
On L2, EU lr1(x = 1; y = 0) < EU
h
r2(x = 1; y = 0).
In other regions, we have mixed strategies. See Figure 2.
Proposition 3 There are three possible symmetric mixed strategy equilibria as
follows:
1. In Region 3, high type students play a symmetric mixed strategy with (x; 1  x)
and low type students play the symmetric pure strategy of choosing r2, i.e.,
0 < x < 1 and y = 0;
2. In Region 4, low type students play a symmetric mixed strategy with (y; 1  y)
and high type students play the symmetric pure strategy of choosing r1, i.e.,
0 < y < 1 and x = 1;
3. In Region 5, both types play symmetric mixed strategies with f(x; 1  x) ; (y; 1  y)g,
i.e., 0 < x < 1 and 0 < y < 1.
Proof. See Appendix.
In Region 3, a low type students expected utility of playing r2 is higher
than playing r1. But the di¤erence is falling as u decreases until the curve L4
is reached, on which the low type student is indi¤erent between playing r2 and
playing r1 given that high type students play the equilibrium mixed strategy and
all other low type students play r2. Therefore, the curve L4 is determined by the
solution to the following simultaneous equations:
EUhr1(y = 0) = EU
h
r2(y = 0);
EU lr1(y = 0) = EU
l
r2(y = 0):
In Region 4, a high type students expected utility of playing r1 is higher
than playing r2. But the di¤erence is falling as u decreases until the curve L5,
on which the high type student is indi¤erent between playing r1 and r2 given


















Figure 2: Mixed Strategy Equilibia
students play r1. Thus the curve L5 is determined by the solution to the following
simultaneous equations:
EUhr1(x = 1) = EU
h
r2(x = 1);
EU lr1(x = 1) = EU
l
r2(x = 1):
Now we set p = 0:3, and see how these equilibria vary.17 See Figure 3. We
start from the bottom of Figure 3. In Region 5, the utility of c1 is close to the
utility of c2, thus both types play mixed strategies such that
EUhr1(x
; y) = EUhr2(x
; y);
EU lr1(x
; y) = EU lr2(x
; y):
Given p = 0:3, at each level of u, we can nd explicit solutions of (x; y) from
the functions above. The equilibrium condition is that both types are indi¤erent



















Figure 3: Equilibria ( p = 0:3)
between playing r1 and playing r2:
D5hjp=0:3 : = EUhr1(x; y)  EUhr2(x; y)
=  2:19 + x(0:63y   0:72) + u [2:28  x(0:09 + 0:63y) + 0:63y]
= 0;
D5l jp=0:3 : = EU lr1(x; y)  EU lr2(x; y)
=  0:49  0:63x  0:27x2 + u(1:88  1:17x+ 0:27x2   0:49y)  0:49y
= 0:
We do not give explicit solutions for (x; y) in terms of u as it is too complicated.
Table 1 presents ten equilibrium solutions when u rises from 1:010 to 1:308, and
Figure 4 will show us the changes of xand y over u in Region 5.
u 1.01 1.05 1.09 1.13 1.17 1.21 1.25 1.25 1.3 1.304
x 0.516 0.577 0.637 0.695 0.752 0.809 0.865 0.921 0.935 0.946
y 0.482 0.414 0.347 0.282 0.218 0.155 0.092 0.029 0.013 0
Table 1
When u = 1, which implies that the two colleges have the same utility for
all the students, both high type and low type students will choose either c1 or c2
with a fty percent probability. As u rises, high type students will increase their
probability of playing r1. Thus, the equilibrium x increases. Although increasing











Figure 4: Changes of x and y over u in Region 5
must have raised their probabilities of playing r1 and hence the probability that
they can be admitted by c1 is very low. Therefore, given a low level u, low type
studentsprobability of playing r1, i.e., y, is falling as u increases. When u arrives
at 1.308, y = 0, which means that low type students will play a pure strategy
by ranking c2 as the rst choice; and x = 0:946, which implies that high type
students play r1 by the probability of 0:946. This is the point on L4 when p = 0:3.
In Region 3, by solving the following equation:
D3hjp=0:3 := EUhr1(x; y = 0)  EUhr2(x; y = 0) = 0;




Thus, the equilibrium in Region 3 is
 









High type studentsprobability of playing r1 is increasing in u. High type students
will play this symmetric mixed equilibrium strategy until u = 1:329, which is on
the curve L3, and then change to play the symmetric pure strategy of choosing
r1. Although y is always zero in Region 3, D3l jp=0:3 is decreasing as u rises.
In Region 2, we have the symmetric pure strategy equilibrium, (x = 1; y = 0),














Region: 5 3 2 4 1
Figure 5: Changes of x, y over u when p = 0:3.
have the following equations:
D2hjp=0:3 : = EUhr1(x = 1; y = 0)  EUhr2(x = 1; y = 0)
=  2:91 + 2:19u;
D2l jp=0:3 : = EU lr1(x = 1; y = 0)  EU lr2(x = 1; y = 0)
=  1:39 + 0:98u:
We can see that
d(D2l jp=0:3)
du
> 0. That is because high type students start to use
the symmetric pure equilibrium of r1 once u reaches 1.329, and hence the only
factor a¤ecting low type studentsdecisions is the value of u from that point.
However, low type students will not change their pure strategy until u = 1:418,
which is on the curve L2. On L2, D2l jp=0:3 = 0 and D2hjp=0:3 > 0.
When u > 1:418, low type students will play a symmetric mixed equilibrium






> 0, low type studentsprobability of playing r1 is increasing in u. On
L1, when u = 3:837, as well as in Region 1, both types play the symmetric pure
strategy of ranking c1 as the rst choice.
How x and y vary with u in all regions are presented in Figure 5.
From the preceding analysis, it can be concluded that
Remark 2 (1) High type students are not always choosing a pure strategy by
simply ranking c1 as their rst choice. They would play a mixed strategy if the
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utility of c1 is su¢ ciently low.
(2) Low type students have two possible pure strategies: When the utility of c1
is low, they rank c2 as the rst choice; and when the utility of c1 is su¢ ciently
high, they rank c1 as the rst choice.
Item 1 implies that a high type student has the incentive to rank c2 as his
rst choice for securing the place in c2 by playing a symmetric mixed strategy if
c1 is not su¢ ciently attractive.
Item 2 tells us that a low type students decision is strongly inuenced by the
decisions of high type students. His willingness to choose c1 as the rst choice is
decreasing in x when both types play the symmetric mixed strategies. Once high
type students start playing pure strategy r1, the low type student will increase
the probability of choosing r1 as u increases. When u is su¢ ciently large, he
would just play the symmetric pure strategy of choosing r1 because his gain from
c1 is su¢ ciently high for him to take the risk.
Not only the utility of the better college would a¤ect the equilibria but also
would the probability that a student is high type a¤ect the equilibria. If p is
low, then low type studentspure strategy of choosing r2 may disappear (when
p < 0:279, which is the x coordinate of point E). Moreover, they only need a lower
level of u to start using the symmetric pure strategy of choosing r1 (shown by L1
in Figure 2). It is because low type students realise that a lower p means there is
little chance that competitors are high type, thus they have higher opportunity of
being admitted to c1 if they rank c1 as their rst choice. When p is greater than
the threshold point (p > 0:279), L4 is still climbing up until p = 0:453, but low
type students may play the symmetric pure strategy of r2 given some appropriate
values of u. When p > 0:453, the threshold curve L4 starts falling in p. Low type
students need a higher level of u to go back to the symmetric mixed strategy and
to play the symmetric pure strategy of r1 in p. This is shown by the ascending
curve L2 and L1. It is simpler for high type students. As shown by curve L5 and
L3, they need a higher value of u to trigger the symmetric pure strategy of r1 as
p increases from 0 to 1 because the opportunity that competitors are high type
rises.
The e¤ects of p vary in u. If u 2 [2; 4], then y will fall from 1 to a value
between 0 and 1 and then to 0 as p increases from 0 to 1, while x is always equal
to 1. It is shown in Figure 2, from Region 1 to Region 4 and then to Region 2. y
is decreasing in p in Region 4. If u 2 [1:324; 2], then y falls from a value between
0 and 1 to 0, while x falls from 1 to a value between 0 and 1 as p increase from
0 to 1. It is reected in Figure 2, from Region 4 to Region 2 and to Region 3.
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If u 2 [1; 1:324], then y decreases from a value between 0 and 1 to 0 and x falls
from 1 to a value between 0 and 1 as p increases. It is the change from Region
4 to Region 5 in Figure 2. These changes of strategies indicate that it is more
likely that both types rank c2 as their rst choice when p increases.
The thresholds are graphed by points on those curves, across which at least
one types strategy changes, and they depend on values of p. All curves except
for L4 go up as p rises. The thresholds on L4 increases to the maximum, where
u = 1:324 and p = 0:453, and then falls in p.
We dene fairness as the property that students with higher test scores should
be assigned their better choices. Therefore, if a high type student is rejected by
both colleges and a low type student is allocated a place, then the allocation is
not fair.
In all regions except for Region 1, it is possible to have such a scenario that
two high type students choose r1 and a low type student chooses r2. The resulting
allocation will be that one of high type students is admitted by c1, the low type
student is admitted by c2, and the other high type student is rejected by both
colleges. In this outcome, the high type student who are rejected by both colleges
envies the low type student, thus the allocation is not fair.
In Region 5, since both type students play mixed strategies, we may see that
high type students rank c2 as the rst choice, while at least one of low type
students ranks c1 as the rst choice. One of low type students will be allocated
the place in c1 and one of high type students will be allocated the place in c2.
The probability that this scenario happens is very low as it needs all high type
students choose r2 and at least one low type student chooses r1. In Region 3,
suppose there is only one high type student, who may rank c2 as his rst choice
with a very low probability, and two low type students who play r2. If the high
type student ranked c2 as his rst choice, then he will be allocated the place at
c2 and both low type students will be rejected by c2, but one of them would be
admitted by c1. In all these possible outcomes, the high type student who lost
his opportunity for higher education envies at least one low type student, and
hence fairness is violated.
Fairness always holds in Region 1, where all the students rank c1 as the rst
choice, and a high type student will obtain the place in c2 in the second round
over a low type even if he is rejected by c1 in the rst round.
Summary 2 If scores are private information, the resulting allocation may vio-
late the property of fairness and strategy-proofness.
The following example shows us an unfair outcome.
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Example 4 Let S = fs1; s2; s3g be the set of students, C = fc1; c2g be the set of
colleges, q = f1; 1g be the college capacity vector. Scores are as follows:
t1 = th; t2 = th; t3 = tl:
The utility of c1 is 1:4 and the probability of being a high type student is 0:3.
From Figure 5, we know that this set of u and p will induce a symmetric pure
strategy equilibrium (x = 1; y = 0). Therefore, the reported preferences are as
follows:
r1 = fc1; c2g ;
r2 = fc1; c2g ;
r3 = fc2; c1g :







s2s score is higher than s3s, but he is rejected by both colleges and s3 is allocated
a place in c2. Therefore, the result is not fair.
Proposition 4 If u is su¢ ciently high and p is su¢ ciently low, then the sym-
metric pure Bayesian Nash equilibrium is strategy-proof.
Proof. See Appendix.
The conclusions of our simple model can be used to explain some observations
in practice.
(1) There are many more applicants being rejected by top colleges than by
ordinary colleges.
Top colleges usually have high relative utilities over the next level of colleges.
That corresponds to a high level of u in our model. If u is su¢ ciently high, then
low type students have incentives to risk themselves by ranking the top college
as their rst choice. It is the case in Region 1 or Region 4. Given the same
probability that a student is of high type, the rejection rate is higher in the top
colleges.
(2) When scores in the current year are universally lower than in previous
years,18 there will be more applicants applying to better colleges, vice versa.
18The reason may be the exam is easier than before, or the quality of students is higher than
before.
35
This can be explained by the last conclusion we had above. Scores in the
current year are universally lower than previous years would correspond to a lower
value of p. Each student realises that the probability that any other student has a
higher score is low. Therefore, those whose scores are higher will be condent to
rank c1 as their rst choice, and those whose scores are lower would take a chance
by ranking c1 as their rst choice. On the other hand, we will have the opposite
result when scores in the current year are universally higher than previous years.
We have shown that the CCA mechanism is Pareto e¢ cient under the as-
sumption of perfect information. Next we will discuss the e¢ ciency of the CCA
mechanism in a more general case where scores are private information.
Recall that a matching  Pareto dominates a matching 0 if no student prefers
0 to  and there is at least one student who prefers  to 0. A matching  is
Pareto e¢ cient if it is not Pareto dominated by any other matching. Since we
assume that all students have identical preferences over colleges, swapping any
two students can not improve their welfare simultaneously. Therefore, the only
case that an outcome is ine¢ cient is: if at least one student si prefers a college
cj than his assignment, cj   (si), and there is at least one place available at cj.
Proposition 5 Given imperfect information about studentsscores and identical
preferences, the CCA mechanism is Pareto e¢ cient.
Proof. See Appendix.
In our model, we assume that students have identical preferences, and students
are allowed to include as many colleges as they want in their submitted preference
forms. The e¢ ciency result will fail if we relax either of the two assumptions.
Remark 3 Given imperfect information about studentsscores, the CCA mech-
anism might not be Pareto e¢ cient if
1. Students have di¤erent preferences, or
2. Students are not allowed to include an unlimited number of colleges in their
reported preferences.
We use two simple examples to illustrate the two scenarios. The rst one
assumes that students have di¤erent preferences, and the second one assumes
students can only include a limited number of colleges on their preference forms.
Example 5 Let S = fs1; s2; s3; s4g be the set of students, C = fc1; c2; c3g be the
set of colleges, q = f1; 1; 2g be the college capacity vector, and ft1; t2; t3; t4g be
36
studentsscores. Preferences of students are as follows:
p1 = fc1  c2  c3  c0g ;
p2 = fc1  c2  c3  c0g ;
p3 = fc1  c2  c3  c0g ;
p4 = fc2  c1  c3  c0g :
Suppose that it is publicly known that t2 = t3 > t4, t1 > t2 = t3 with a large
probability and t1 < t4 with a small probability.
Without the uncertainty about t1, and t1 > t2 = t3, s1 reports his true
preference, s2 and s3 will rank c2 as the rst choice, and s4s decision does not




s1 s2 s3 s4
c3 c2 c3 c3

:
A Nash equilibrium for this example is as follows: Given the uncertainty, s2
and s3 will not change their strategy because a 50% chance of being admitted
by c2 is better than a tiny chance of going to c1. This must be true for a small
enough probability that t1 < t4. However, for s4, he would rank c1 as the rst
choice because he has a small chance of being allocated a place at c1, but no
chance of going to c2. For s1, he would put c1 as the rst choice if t1 > t2 = t3,
and rank any college as his rst choice if t1 < t4.
If in fact, say, t1 > t2 = t3, then the outcome is the same as the case with
perfect information. If, say, t1 < t4 and the place at c2 is randomly allocated to
s2, then the outcome is as follows:
0 =

s1 s2 s3 s4
c3 c2 c3 c1

:
0 is Pareto dominated by either of the following matching:
s1 s2 s3 s4
c3 c1 c3 c2

;
s1 s2 s3 s4
c3 c3 c1 c2

:
Therefore, the CCA mechanism is not Pareto e¢ cient.
Example 6 Let S = fs1; s2g be the set of students, C = fc1; c2g be the set of
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colleges, q = f1; 1g be the college capacity vector, and ft1; t2g be studentsscores.
Preferences of students are as follows:
p1 = p2 = fc1  c2  c0g :
The utility of c1 is 1, the utility of c2 is 0:1, and the utility of c0 is 0 to both
students. Suppose that students can only have one choice in their reported prefer-
ences and there are no test score ties. Assume t2 is known by both students, but
t1 is uncertain, so s1 knows whether he has the highest score but s2 is uncertain.
Suppose the probability that t1 > t2 is 0.5, there are no score ties, and hence the
probability that t1 < t2 is 0.5 as well.
With no uncertainty, if it turns out that t1 > t2, then r1 = fc1  c2  c0g,















Clearly, both outcomes are Pareto e¢ cient. Now consider s2. If he ranks c1 as
his rst choice, then his expected payo¤ is at worst 0:5u1 + 0:5  0 = 0:5; if he
ranks c2 as his rst choice, then his expected payo¤ is at most u2 = 0:1. Thus,
his optimal strategy is to rank c1 as his rst choice. For s1, given s2s strategy,
he would rank c1 as his rst choice if t1 > t2 and c2 as his rst choice if t1 < t2.















Clearly, the outcome is not Pareto e¢ cient as s2 will be better of if he was









Therefore, the CCA mechanism is not Pareto e¢ cient even though preferences
are identical and there are no ties.
1.4 Conclusion
In this chapter we presented an analysis on the equilibria of the Chinese College
Admission (CCA). We explained how the mechanism works, and constructed two
formal models under di¤erent assumptions about information concerning scores.
Firstly, we looked through the simple model under the assumption of perfect in-
formation. We established that there is a pure Nash equilibrium in the model.
A student who realises that there are not vacancies in his favourite colleges will
misrepresent his preference, and ranks his most preferred college among those
colleges whose base scores are lower than his score or the same as his score. We
also presented a number of examples to show that the allocation results are fair
and hence stable and strategy-proofness is sometimes violated. Moreover, we
showed that the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes of this game is equal to the set
of stable matching under the true preferences, and it is Pareto e¢ cient. In the
model under the assumption of imperfect information and identical preferences,
we described a particular model where there are two colleges and three students
with two possible scores. The model has two pure symmetric Bayesian Nash
equilibria and three possible mixed symmetric strategy Bayesian Nash equilib-
ria. Which equilibrium obtains depends on the utility of the best college and the
probability of being a high type student. When the utility is high and proba-
bility is low, both types of students rank the better college as the rst choice,
and hence the mechanism satises strategy-proofness and produces a fair alloca-
tion result. However, in any other cases, the allocation could be ine¢ cient and
strategy-proofness might fail. We discussed how the equilibrium varies with the
utility of the best college and the probability of being a high type student. The
conclusions were used to explain two common observations in practice. In the
end, we discussed e¢ ciency of the CCA mechanism given imperfect information.
The CCA mechanism is always Pareto e¢ cient if students have same preference
and are allowed to include as many colleges as they want in the preference form.
The outcome of the CCA mechanism may fail to be Pareto e¢ cient if either of
these assumptions does not hold.
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1.5 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
Proof. Since Pareto e¢ ciency implies individual rationality and non-wastefulness,
if we can prove the result is Pareto e¢ cient, then it must be individual rational
and non-wasteful.
Suppose the outcome is not fair. Then there are two students si and sj with
 (sj) pi (si) but ti > tj: Under the CCA system, this matching can be selected
only in the following process. In round k with k < m, sj is allocated a place at
 (sj) as he submits  (sj) as the kth choice, while si must have submitted  (sj)
as the (k + j)th choice with k + j  m and j  1. In this case, if si ranks  (sj)
as the rst choice, then si would be allocated a place at  (sj) in the rst round,
and hence be better o¤. Therefore, the outcome of the CCA mechanism under
perfect information is fair.
Suppose the outcome is not Pareto e¢ cient. Then there is a matching 0
which dominates the matching selected by the mechanism. So, 0r 8 all s 2 S
and 0p for at least one student, say si, which means si can be made strictly
better o¤. However, if si is better o¤, then he must get a place from another
student, say sj, who is ranked above si because when si makes his choice, he can
only choose the best from the remaining places after students ranked above him.
Unless sj is in turn allocated a place from one ranked above him, he will be worse
o¤. If sj is allocated a place from one ranked above him, then we can repeat the
argument with sj rather than si. Eventually, we will nd a student ranked above
si who is worse o¤. Hence, this can not be a Pareto improvement. Thus, the
outcome of the CCA mechanism is Pareto e¢ cient, and hence individual rational
and non-wasteful.
Suppose all students report their true preferences. If the number of students
who rank ci as their rst choice is greater than qi, then those students whose scores
are lower than bi (the lowest of top qi students who rank ci as their rst choice)
would have incentives to manipulate their preferences by ranking their second
true choices as their submitted rst choices. Therefore, truthful revelation of
preferences is not always a dominant strategy for all students.
Proof of Claim 1:
Proof. (I)
1) s1 uses r1:19
19We only explain the probabilities in this part.
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a. Both s2 and s3s scores are th. Pr (t2 = t3 = th) = p2.
The probability of going to c1 is as follows:
Pr(c1) = Pr (s1 is admitted by c1 conditional on s2 and s3 using r1)
Pr (s2 and s3 use r1)
+Pr (s1 is admitted by c1 conditional on either s2 or s3 using r1)
 [Pr (s2 uses r1 and s3 uses r2) + Pr (s2 uses r2 and s3 uses r1)]





2x(1  x) + (1  x)2.
The probability of going to c2 is as follows:
Pr(c2) = Pr (s1 is rejected by c1 conditional on s2 and s3 using r1)
Pr (s1 is admitted by c2 conditional on s2 and s3 use r1 and s1 being rejected by c1)






b. s2 or s3s score is th, and the others is tl. Pr (t2 = th; t3 = tl) = p (1  p)
and Pr (t2 = tl; t3 = th) = p (1  p) :
Pr(c1) = Pr (s1 is admitted by c1 conditional the student with th using r1)
Pr (the student with th uses r1)




Pr(c2) = Pr (s1 is rejected by c1 conditional the student with th using r1)




c. Both s2 and s3s scores are tl. Pr (t2 = t3 = tl) = (1  p)2.
Pr(c1) = 1; Pr(c2) = 0:
2) s1 uses r2:










b. s2 or s3s score is th, and the others is tl. Pr (t2 = th; t3 = tl) = p (1  p)




(1  x) (1  y); Pr(c2) = x+ 12(1  x):
c. Both s2 and s3s scores are tl. Pr (t2 = t3 = tl) = (1  p)2.
Pr(c1) = 0; Pr(c2) = 1:




























































p2x2 + p (1  p)xy

= u (1  px) + p2x2
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(1  x) (1  y)
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+ p (1  p) (x+ 1) + (1  p)2
= 1
3
p2(x  1) [x+ u(x  3y + 2)  1] + p(x  1) [1 + u(y   1)] + 1:
(II)
1) s1 uses r1
a. Both s2 and s3s scores are th. Pr (t2 = t3 = th) = p2.
Pr(c1) = (1  x)2; Pr(c2) = 0:
b. s2 or s3s score is th, and the others is tl. Pr (t2 = th; t3 = tl) = p (1  p)
and Pr (t2 = tl; t3 = th) = p (1  p).














2) s1 uses r2
a. Both s2 and s3s scores are th. Pr (t2 = t3 = th) = p2.
Pr(c1) = 0; Pr(c2) = x2:
b. s2 or s3s score is th, and the others is tl. Pr (t2 = th; t3 = tl) = p (1  p)




(1  x)(1  y); Pr(c2) = xy + 12x(1  y):































+ 2p (1  p)
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+ 2p (1  p)
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(p  1)y [p(y   3x)  y]
+1
3
u [3  3y + y2 + p (3y   6x+ 3xy   2y2) + 1=3p2(3x2   3xy + y2)] ;
EU lr2 =



























p (1  p) [(1  x)(1  y)] + 1
3
(1  p)2 (1  y)2
	
u






= p2x2   px(p  1)(1 + y) + 1
3
(p  1)2(1 + y + y2)
+1
3
(p  1)u(y   1) [1  y + p(2  3x+ y)] :
Proof of Proposition 2:
Proof. In the rst case, if x = 1, y = 1 is an equilibrium, then EUhr1(x = 1,
y = 1)  EUhr2(x = 1, y = 1) and EU lr1(x = 1, y = 1)  EU lr2(x = 1, y = 1).
EUhr1(x = 1, y = 1)  EUhr2(x = 1, y = 1)  0;
p2(u  2) + 3(u  1)  3p(u  1)  0;
u  3 3p+2p2
3 3p+p2 .
EU lr1(x = 1, y = 1)  EU lr2(x = 1, y = 1)  0;
p2(u  2) + u  p(2u  1)  2  0;
u  2 p+2p2
(p 1)2 :






given p 2 [0; 1].
In the second case, if x = 1, y = 0 is an equilibrium, then EUhr1(x = 1,
y = 0)  EUhr2(x = 1, y = 0) and EU lr1(x = 1, y = 0)  EU lr2(x = 1, y = 0).
EUhr1(x = 1, y = 0)  EUhr2(x = 1, y = 0)  0;
3(u  1)  3pu+ p2(1 + u)  0;
u  3 p2
3 3p+p2 .
EU lr1(x = 1, y = 0)  EU lr2(x = 1, y = 0)  0;
2u+ p2(2u  1)  p(4u+ 1)  1  0;
u  1+p+p2
2(p 1)2 .
Thus, the above two inequalities hold when 3 p
2
3 3p+p2  u 
1+p+p2
2(p 1)2 . This can




2(p 1)2 if p  0:2787. In Figure 1, L1 graphs
u = 2 p+2p
2
(p 1)2 , L2 graphs u =
1+p+p2
2(p 1)2 , and L3 graphs u =
3 p2
3 3p+p2 .
x = 0, y = 1 and x = 0, y = 0 can not be equilibria as high type students will
be better o¤ by playing r1 in both cases.
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Proof of Proposition 3:
Proof. In Region 2, x = 1 and y = 0. We have
EUhr1(x = 1; y = 0) =
1
3
(p2 + (3  3p+ p2)u);
EUhr2(x = 1; y = 0) = (1  p)2 + 2(1  p)p+ p2;
EU lr1(x = 1; y = 0) = (1  p)2u;











EUhr1(x = 1; y = 0) > EU
h
r2(x = 1; y = 0);
EU lr1(x = 1; y = 0) < EU
l
r2(x = 1; y = 0):
Dene D2h = EU
h
r1(x = 1; y = 0) EUhr2(x = 1; y = 0) and D2l = EU lr1(x = 1; y =







Consider decreasing u holding p xed. D2h and D
2
l fall until the curve L3, on
which D2h = 0 but D
2
l < 0. If u keeps falling, then the high types will no longer




r1(x; y = 0)   EUhr2(x; y = 0) and D3l =
EU lr1(x; y = 0)   EU lr2(x; y = 0). EU
j
ri(y = 0), where i = 1; 2 and j = h; l,
implies that the expected utility of the j type by playing ri when the high types
play mixed strategy (x; 1  x) and the low type plays r2. At the equilibrium,
D3h = 0. By solving D
3
h = 0, we have the symmetric mixed equilibrium strategy
in terms of u and p, denoted by x:
x =
 3 + 3p  p2 + 3u  3pu+ 2p2u
p(3  2p+ pu) :
If D3l (x = x
; y = 0) < 0, then x = x; y = 0 is an equilibrium. It can shown that
D3l (x = x
; y = 0) < 0 if u is between L3 and L4. On L4, D3l (x = x
; y = 0) = 0.
If u keeps falling below L4, then D3l (x = x
; y = 0) > 0. Dene D5h =
EUhr1(x; y) EUhr2(x; y) and D5l = EU lr1(x; y) EU lr2(x; y). In Region 5 (p  pE),
we will nd the symmetric mixed equilibria for both types by solving D5h = 0 and
D5l = 0.
Dene D1h = EU
h
r1(x = 1; y = 1)   EUhr2(x = 1; y = 1) and D1l = EU lr1(x =
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Both D1h and D
1
l fall as u decreases until L1, on which
EU lr1(x = 1; y = 1) = EU
l
r2(x = 1; y = 1)
and
EUhr1(x = 1; y = 1) > EU
l
r2(x = 1; y = 1):
Below L1, D1h > 0 but D
1
l < 0, then the low type would play a mixed strategy.
Dene D4h = EU
h
r1(x = 1; y)   EUhr2(x = 1; y) and D4l = EU lr1(x = 1; y)  
EU lr2(x = 1; y). In Region 4, D
4
l = 0 at the equilibrium. By solving D
4
l = 0, we
have
y =
 1  p  p2 + 2u  4pu+ 2p2u
(p  1)2(1 + u) :
If D4h (x = 1; y = y
) > 0, then x = 1; y = y is an equilibrium. It can shown
that D4h (x = 1; y = y
) > 0 if u is between L1 and L2 or L1 and L5. On L2,
D4l (x = 1; y = 0) = 0 and D
4
h (x = 1; y = 0) > 0; on L5, D
4
h (x = 1; y = y
) = 0
and D4l (x = 1; y = y
) = 0. Below L5, D4h (x = 1; y = y
) < 0, then the high
type will play a mixed strategy as well as the low type.
In Region 5 (p  pE), once again we will nd the symmetric mixed equilibria
for both types by solving D5h = 0 and D
5
l = 0.
Proof of Proposition 4:
Proof. When u and p fall into Region 1, all the students report the true prefer-
ence no matter what type they are. The symmetric pure Bayesian Nash equilib-
rium is that both types rank c1 as the rst choice. Since both types of students
preference is identical: c1  c2, the equilibrium is strategy-proof.
Proof of Proposition 5:
Proof. Assume the identical preference is as follows:
c1  c2:::  cm  c0:
If any colleges are ranked below c0, then they can simply be ignored as they wont
be selected in equilibrium.
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Consider Q  n, i.e., when the number of applicants is greater than the total
quota. Suppose the outcome is ine¢ cient, then there must be at least one place
avalaible at a randomly selected college, say cj, j = 1; 2; :::;m. Since Q  n, there
must be at least one student choosing c0, say si. In sis reported preferences, c0
must be above cj, otherwise he would be allocated a place at cj. So, if si simply
switched positions of c0 and cj, then he would be allocated a place at cj, and
hence be better o¤. Therefore, there would not be any unlled places at the end
of admission. The allocation of the mechanism must be Pareto e¢ cient.
Consider when Q > n, i.e., when the total quota is greater than the number
of students. Assume a sub quota Q1 =
Pk 1
j=1 qj < n and Q2 =
Pk
j=1 qj  n,
where k  m. So, if we can prove there is not any place available at a randomly
selected college cj, j < k, in equilibrium, then the result is Pareto e¢ cient. Since
Q1 < n, then n   Q1 students are allocated to ck. ck 1 will not have any places
available because all students who go to ck must have ranked ck 1 in front of ck.
For the same reason, there will not be any places available in cj, j = 1; 2; :::; k 2.
Thus, the outcome of the CCA mechanism is Pareto e¢ cient.
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2 Chapter 2:
A Comparison between Two College Admis-
sion Systems From the Perspective of Corrup-
tion
2.1 Introduction and Literature Review
Millions of Chinese high school graduates sit Chinas national higher education
entry exam in June every year. The exam results determine whether they enter
colleges, or end up not receiving any higher education at all. The exam and
the following admission procedures constitute the Chinese college admission sys-
tem. The importance of the system is increasing as the need for highly educated
employees in the ongoing modernization of China is growing. In order to meet
this need, there has been a huge increase in the number of students entering
the system and the higher education sector. As a result, the number of colleges
increased by 536 from 1985 to 2003, and the number of new students enrolled
in the system rose from 61.9 to 382.2 per 10,000 people.20 The system plays an
important role for every single candidate and the whole society. China has the
largest population in the world, and so far she remains a developing country de-
spite the marked development she has achieved. In order to be competitive in the
job market and have a bright future, taking the exam seems to be the only way
for all young Chinese. The number of applicants therefore far exceeds available
places, particularly for entry into prestigious colleges or colleges in large cities
such as Beijing or Shanghai. The erce competitiveness has resulted in parents
and teachers placing considerable pressure on their children, on their students and
on themselves. Such pressure could start from primary school, or even earlier.
Like any other college admission systems, the Chinese college admission sys-
tem has limitations. The rst criticism concerns the fairness and equality of
opportunity. There exists regional discrimination in the system. Students who
live in the same city as a college can be admitted by the college with lower scores
than students from other areas. The second criticism is about the exam itself,
e.g., the style of questions. Some educators indicate that the exam focuses too
much on subject knowledge and theory rather than the ability to solve problems
in practice. As a result, Chinese students are very good at theoretical subjects
such as mathematics, but lack the ability of carrying out practical tasks com-
20China Statistical Yearbook, 2004
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pared to western students. The third criticism indicates that the exam is like a
"gamble" with betting on the candidates future life. Failure in the exam really
seems to be the end of the world for students. As a consequence, the childhoods
of most Chinese children are full of studying as well as the fear of failure in the
exam. "I spend my waking hours studying and even my spare time is dedicated
to after-school curricula. Life is hard and all my friends worry about failing our
exams. Sometimes I feel I cant cope but I just dont want to let my parents
down." (Davey, Higgins (2005, p.32) The pressure also falls on the shoulders of
schools and teachers, causing the school teaching to serve only for the purpose
of preparation for the exam rather than learning ability and study skills of stu-
dents. The last concern is about corruption. The system has long been hailed as
an e¤ective mechanism to ensure equal education opportunities for all students,
disregarding their backgrounds. But admission scandals have exposed many aws
as well as laying bare its vulnerability to power abuse and corruption. The widely
publicized scandals have also triggered severe doubts about the governments call
for higher education institutions to become business-like and prot oriented. It
seems that the system has not been able to serve its intended purpose, as it seems
to fail providing equal education opportunities for all students.
Due to these criticisms, there has been a heated debate about the college ad-
mission system in China. The main argument here is: Should the current exam
system be replaced by a free market system? In the market system, students are
able to apply to colleges freely, and applications are not determined only by a
one-time exam. The proponents of the current system argue that corruption has
posed a very serious problem in the current admission system. The competitive-
ness of gaining a place in a Chinese higher education institution has given some
individuals the motive to be corrupt. How does a free market system deal with
that?
Corruption in the education sector can be dened as "the systematic use of
public o¢ ce for private benet, whose impact is signicant on the availability
and quality of educational goods and services, and, as a consequence on access,
quality or equity in education" (Education corruption 29, Hallak and Poisson,
2002). Educational corruption has an enormous negative impact on society. It
will undermine public trust in the system or even the government, exacerbates
the quality of education, negatively a¤ects young professionals and students, and
it spreads them distorted values and culture. It is even more distinct in China
as the higher education system has undertaken such an important task to the
development of the country. Despite the serious consequences of corruption in
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education, attention was only drawn to it in recent years, especially from the
economic perspective. Although developing a deep and solid understanding of the
structure of corruption in education is necessary for building strong theories on
its potential causes and impacts on fairness, social welfare and e¢ ciency, we will
not introduce it in detailed context. We only look into one aspect of educational
corruption.
Our focus is corruption in the admission process, thus the denition of cor-
ruption is based on the general denition of the public sector corruption, which
is the use of public resources for private gains. In the current exam system, all
admission procedures are operated by the admission o¢ ce of each college. The
serious competition for a higher education opportunity has given the admission
o¢ ce considerable power, and motive for private gains. Both formal (World
Bank, 2003)21 and informal reports posit that bribes are increasingly necessary
to gain admissions into college programs. The admission o¢ ce is assumed to be
an o¢ cial who acts as an individual agent in either a market system or an exam
system. In order to win a place in a preferred college, a student has to pay illegal
bribes to the admission o¢ cials. Corruption in the market system is hard to
detect as there is not standard criteria to tell a candidates ability. Corruption in
the exam system is conducted in the following ways: selling entry exam papers
in advance to high-paying candidates; the evaluations of oral examinations are
subjective and di¢ cult to monitor, etc. In some former Soviet states, admission
to colleges is for sale: Well-connected applicants or those who bribe or otherwise
inuence the academic authorities responsible for admissions are the ones who
are admitted regardless of their academic qualications (Hallak, Poisson, 2007).
The authoritys objective is to minimize the degree of corruption and the cost
of investigation. When the cost of investigation is relatively high, the o¢ cials of
college have the incentive to be corrupt.
In the market system, the o¢ cial accepts or rejects a student only on consider-
ation from the application materials, which indicate the students performance at
high school, and the students personal statement, and references from teachers,
etc. When the power of investigation is high, the o¢ cials will not take bribes,
and then students with higher abilities are always admitted prior to students with
lower abilities. When the cost of investigation is high and power is low, however,
the o¢ cials will have incentives to take bribes. Application materials and support
documents are the only object that the authority is able to monitor, making the
21World Bank. (2003). Governance and service delivery in Kazakhstan Results of diagnostic
surveys.
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market system relatively subjective. We therefore assume the object that the
authority monitors in the market system are identical across di¤erent students.
Examinations have become a universal method of selecting qualied candi-
dates and distributing limited resources. In the exam system, like the current
one in China, a centralized test allocates college places to individuals according
to the order of exam results. Unfortunately, the exam system can not escape from
corruption because of the considerable private benet motivation. For the same
reason, when the power of investigation is high, the o¢ cials will not take bribes,
then students with higher exam scores are always admitted prior to students with
lower scores. When the cost of investigation is high and power is low, however,
the o¢ cials will have incentives to be corrupt. For example, a place of a college
could be allocated to a student with an unqualied score as long as the student
bribes a su¢ cient amount. We do not provide how exactly the cheating works as
it is not our concern.
We try to look into the two systems in terms of corruption from the perspective
of the authority or the planner of higher education sector. We will discuss three
issues. First is to tell whether or not corruption has inuence on the e¢ ciency in
both systems; if it does, what is the way. Second is to compare the two systems
in terms of the degree of corruption. The last is to discuss the e¤ect of borrowing
constraints.
This work is related to several branches of the literature. There is a massive
literature on matching problems, in which a set of heterogeneous individuals is
mapped into a set of heterogeneous objects or individuals (e.g., marriage market)
with the payo¤ from each match depending on some characteristic of both sides
of match.22 In this literature, the outcome is produced by either a free mar-
ket or a centralized mechanism. A common characteristic is they assume both
sides of the matching have preferences over the other side, and the outcome is
driven by the preferences and a particular mechanism. Lazear and Rosen (1981),
Green and Stokey (1983) and Nalebu¤ and Stiglitz (1983) examine the perfor-
mance of tournament-based compensation schemes relative to individualistic re-
ward schemes. They are concerned with the relative e¢ ciency of tournaments
in environments with moral hazard and how to extract e¤ort from homogeneous
agents. Balinski and Sönmez (1999) study a model of student placement where
scores play the role of matching students to colleges. Roth(1991), Abdulkadiro¼glu,
Sönmez (2003); Abdulkadiro¼glu, Pathak, Roth, Sönmez (2005) and Ergin, Sön-
22See Gale and Shapley (1962), Becker (1973), Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite 91992), Kremer
(1993), Sttinger (1005), Acemoglu (1995), Shimer and Smith (1996), Burdett and Coles (1996),
Epple, Romano and Sieg (2003, 2006), etc.
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mez (2006) study the Boston School Choice Mechanism. Fernandez (1997, 1998)
examines the performance and properties of markets (prices) system and exam
(tournament) system as alternative allocation devices with perfect capital mar-
kets. He shows both systems achieve the e¢ cient allocation results. However,
when borrowing constraints are present, exams (tournaments) dominate markets
(prices) in terms of matching e¢ ciency.
In this context, we use some very basic auction theory to analyse corruption in
the admission problem. Most of the theoretical framework is in Krishna (2002).
The literature in this area views corruption in auctions either as a manipulation
of the quality assessment in complex bids or as bid rigging. The former was
introduced in a seminal paper by La¤ont and Tirole (1991), who assume that the
auctioneer has some leeway in assessing complex multidimensional bids, and is
predisposed to favour a particular bidder. That framework was later adopted by
Celantani and Ganuza (2002), who employ it to assess the impact of increased
competition on the equilibrium corruption and show that corruption may increase
if the number of competing bidders is increased. More recently, Burguet and
Che (2004) consider a scoring auction, make the assignment of the auctioneers
favourite agent endogenous, and assume that bribery competition occurs at the
same time as contract bidding. Their main result is that corruption may entail
ine¢ ciency, and that ". . . the ine¢ ciency cost of bribery is in the same order of
magnitude as the agents (i.e. auctioneers) manipulation capacity" (Burguet and
Che, 2004). Lengwiler and Wolfstetter (2005) propose a model of corruption in
which the auctioneer orchestrates bid rigging by inviting a bidder to either lower
or raise his bid, whichever is more protable.
The aim of this paper is to contrast the performance of the market system
and the exam system under no borrowing constraints and under borrowing con-
straints. With a market mechanism prices do not discriminate among individuals
except with respect to their willingness and ability to pay; accordingly, individu-
als with the same level of bribe expenditures attend the same college, regardless
of their abilities. In the centralized exam system, identical bribe by students with
di¤erent scores (di¤erent abilities) do not lead to the same allocation results. By
bribing the same amount, the higher-score student wins the place. Therefore, the
higher-ability students are less credit constrained than those with identical wealth
but lower ability, thus the former is more likely to be admitted by the college.
This paper attempts to show the superiority of the centralized test system under
the assumption of corruption. Corruption in our model is simply a bribe to the
o¢ cial during the admission process.
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The main contributions of our work are that we use auction theory to obtain
equilibria of the market system and the exam system under the assumption of
perfect capital markets and borrowing constraints. We discuss the e¤ects of
corruption on e¢ ciency in both systems. To our knowledge, the literature has not
considered corruption in higher education sector from this angle. The admission
process can be taken as an auction game as students are bidding for college places
by paying a bribe in the market system, or by paying a bribe and score in the
exam system. The corrupt o¢ cial is the auctioneer, applicants are bidders, and
the bribe money is the bid in the market system, while bribe money and score are
taken as a binding bid in the exam system. College places are allocated to students
who have the highest bids. We show that the allocation results of both systems
are e¢ cient in a perfect capital market. Borrowing constraints can prevent the
two systems from attaining e¢ cient allocations. We also show the degree of
corruption in the market system is always higher than in the exam system. The
degree of corruption is measured by the expected revenue received by o¢ cials.
Thus, expected revenues in each scenario will be provided. In all analysis, we use
some well-known results from standard auction theories, particularlly from rst
prize auction model. However, in the discussion for exam system, we establish an
auction model, in which students compete for college places by combining their
bribes and scores.
We build up our model incrementally throughout the rest of the context.
Section 2 describes the general model. Section 3 illustrates the equilibrium of the
model without borrowing constraints, and contrasts the e¢ ciency and the degree
of corruption between the two systems. Section 4 analyses equilibrium allocation
if there are borrowing constraints, and compares the two systems in terms of
e¢ ciency and degree of corruption. Section 5 summarizes.
2.2 Description of the Economy
2.2.1 Student, Authority, and O¢ cial
This model describes a college admission problem in two di¤erent systems, one
is market-based and the other is exam-based. From now on, we just call the
market-based system as the market system and the exam-based system as the
exam system. There are two sides in the market system: students and colleges.
First of all ,we impose several assumptions on the students side. Assume there
are n students, each of whom is characterized by an endowment of ability, a,
and initial wealth w. For simplicity, we assume that a and w are independently
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distributed according to continuous, di¤erentiable cumulative distributions, F
and H, with probability density functions denoted by f and h and a nite sup-
ports given by [0; 1] respectively. Thus, each student is characterized by a point
in I2  [0; 1] [0; 1] ; and these attributes are un-correlated across students. As-
sume both ability and wealth are unobservable, but the probability distributions
of ability and wealth are commonly known. On the other side, assume there are
m colleges, and the quality q is exogenous and belongs to [0; 1].
Apart from students, in our model, there is an authority, e.g., the govern-
ment; o¢ cials, who are the intermediaries between students and colleges. The
authoritys objective is to minimize the degree of corruption, and the process of




w = W ((   tc ()) ; dc ()) ;
s:t tc ()   ;
  0;
where w denotes the authoritys utility,  denotes the power of investigation,
dc () denotes the degree of corruption,23   is the budget of authority, and tc ()
is the total cost of investigation. The authority nds a value of  to maximise his
utility.
If we assume he is risk neutral, then an o¢ cials objective is to maximise his
expected payo¤. One important assumption is that o¢ cials can not elicit bribes
from students, and hence he can only consider accepting or rejecting bribes.
O¢ cials will not take a students bribe if the student failed to be admitted.
Therefore, o¢ cials pick the bribes which maximise their expected payo¤s from
all studentsintended bribes and reject others. The reason for this assumption
is that eliciting bribes from students or taking all bribes may entail an o¢ cial
to expose him to an exceedingly high risk of detection and punishment. Let 
denote the expected payo¤ of o¢ cials. If the punishment is assumed to be losing
his job, then an o¢ cials expected payo¤ function is as follows.
 = (Y + b)P + 0 (1  P ) = (Y + b)P when the o¢ cial is corrupt,
= Y when the o¢ cial is not corrupt,
where Y denotes the o¢ cials income without taking bribes, b is a particular bribe,
23dc is measured by o¢ cialsexpected revenue from the corruption. A higher total expected
revenue implies a higher degree of corruption.
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and P measures the probability that the o¢ cial is not caught and punished.
Having received a bribe, if bP < Y (1  P ), then the o¢ cial would reject the
bribe; but if bP > Y (1  P ), then the o¢ cial would take the bribe. Thus, the
o¢ cial will not be corrupt when either the probability of being caught or the
legal income is su¢ ciently high. In practice, an o¢ cials income is much lower
compared to bribes. Therefore, in the current context, we simply assume the
legal income is low enough to be ignored, and hence the o¢ cials expected payo¤
can be rewritten as:
 = bP:
Since bP  0, this function implies o¢ cials would take any bribes.
We use an exponential function for the probability: P = x, where x 2 [0; 1)
denotes the object that the authority monitors. x di¤ers in the two systems. In
the market system, x = , where  denotes the degree of non-transparency of
the admission process. A higher value of  means higher probability to keep the
bribe safely, and it is identical for all applicants in the market system. In the
exam system, x = s, where s denotes a students score. Given the same bribe,
an o¢ cial will obtain a higher expected payo¤ from a student with a higher score
than from a student with a lower score for the same reason. If we substitute P in
the payo¤ function by x, then the o¢ cials objective function can be rewritten
as  = bx. In the extreme cases, such as  = 0, and hence P = 1,  = b,
which implies there is no investigation and the o¢ cial can safely keep the bribes;
as  goes to innity, x and hence  approach zero, so the o¢ cial will not take
any bribes. Here we assume these objective functions are publicly known by all
agents.
A risk neutral students objective is to maximise his expected payo¤ from
education, which is the di¤erence between his valuation of education and the cost
of bribe. Here the tuition fee and other costs are not considered in our model,
and hence bribes are the only cost to students. Assume there is an outside
option for all students. Let yc denote the expected aggregate income of a student
in the future if the student receives higher education; let yo denote the expected
aggregate income of a student in the future if the student takes the outside option.
We can take yo as the gain for a student from a college with quality being zero. So,
a students valuation for education at a particular college is the di¤erence between
yc and yo: v  yc   yo. A students yc obtained from a college is assumed to
be determined by the students ability and the quality of the college. Assume
yo only depends on the students ability. There are two more assumptions for yc


















2. Education output function has supermodularity between its arguments.
Students with higher ability can gain more from the same improvement




The second assumption immediately implies that @v
@a
> 0. Since a particular
student values a college with higher quality more, we know that vq > 0. For
simplicity, we assume both yc and yo are linear functions of ability, hence v is
a linear function of ability as well. Figure 6 shows an example for valuation.
The distance between yc;H and yo measures the value of the college with a higher
quality, and the distance between yc;L and yo measures the value of the college
with a lower quality. Figure 6 shows that the values of both colleges are increasing
in ability. The di¤erence of values between the higher quality college and the lower
quality college is increasing in ability, which is in accordance with the second
assumption.
We dene the valuation function as: v = aq.24 In this function, q is assumed
to be exogenous as we do not consider peer e¤ects.25
The main di¤erence between the market system and the exam system is that
24Assume yc = caq, ync = nca, if set nc = 1, c = 1 + 1q , then v = aq.
25Epple and Romano (1998) use a (; b) = b as a students achievement function, where b
is students ability, and  denotes the mean ability of the student body in the school attended.
Since we do not consider peer e¤ects,  is a constant in our model as the quality of college.
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score plays a key role in the latter system. A particular students score is deter-
mined by how much e¤ort the student invests into studying and his performance
in the entry exam. How much e¤ort to invest depends on the students valua-
tion of the higher education; his performance in the exam depends on both his
ability and some other disturbance factors. For simplicity, we assume all other
factors are symmetric between students, and hence the students performance in
the exam is only determined by his ability. We use a weighted sum function to
express score.
s = 0v + (1  0) a;
where v denotes the average valuation for higher education, 0 is a constant and
0 < 1. Given v = aq, we have
s = 0aq + (1  0) a
= (0q + (1  0)) a;
where q denotes the average quality of colleges. Since q  1, then (0q + (1  0)) <
1. Therefore, we can simply use a constant  to substitute (0q + (1  0)). Hence
the score is determined by the following function:
s = a;
where  < 1.
2.2.2 Mechanisms in the Two Systems
In the market system, students apply to their favourite colleges and intend to
bribe the o¢ cials of those colleges. The o¢ cial of a particular college observes
the intended bribes and allocates the places at that college to those students from
whom he gets the highest expected payo¤s, which are determined by the following
function:
m = bm:
Since  is identical for all students, an o¢ cial allocates the places to students only
according to the ranking of their bribes. O¢ cials would take any value of bribes
unless  goes to innity. So, studentsbribes and hence the degree of corruption
will be dependent on the power of investigation only if it goes to innity. If 
goes to innity, then there will not be any corruption in both systems. Thus, for
the purpose of comparison between the two systems, in the current context, we
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simply assume  as a positive value, and hence the game induced by the market
system is the same as a standard sealed-bid rst price auction.
In the exam system, students attend exams, obtain scores, and then choose
which colleges to apply and how much to bribe. The o¢ cial of a particular
college computes his expected payo¤ from all students applying to the college by
substituting studentsbribes and scores to his expected payo¤ function:
e = bes:
The places at that college will be allocated to the students from whom this
o¢ cial gets the highest expected payo¤s. Note that the superscripts m and e in
the functions denote the market and exam systems, respectively.26
A student will go to the college at which he obtains the highest payo¤. The
students payo¤ depends on his valuation for a college and cost for bribing the
o¢ cial of that college, so his choice is not necessarily the college with the highest
quality because he may need to bribe too much to be admitted into that college.
In equilibrium, students optimal bribe will be determined only by valuations of
colleges in the market system but by valuations and scores in the exam system.
In the nal section of this work, the model will incorporate nancial constraints
into a students decision making process. When there exist borrowing constraints,
students have to consider his budget, and we will have some di¤erent results.
To dene an e¢ cient allocation result, we assume complementarity in a stu-
dents valuation of college. This may also be called supermodularity. It means
that, at any given level of quality of college, higher ability students produce more
when given a marginal increase in quality. Complementarity leads to positive
assortative matching, which is the underlying mechanism in the marriage market
model of Becker (1973).27 We will also believe that our focus from a social per-
spective is of value. The distributions of college qualities and student abilities are
exogenous, and there are no peer e¤ects or externalities. Therefore, the principle
of e¢ ciency is to allocate the best resources (places of the best colleges) to those
agents (students) who can use them most e¢ ciently, take them most valuable and
are, thus, willing to pay more for the resources. The e¢ cient allocation result will
lead to maximised total educational output if we consider a students valuation as
the product of education. We also will consider the competition among o¢ cials
26Without special explication, from now on, the superscripts m and e in any functions denote
the market system and the exam system, respectively. If there is no superscript, then it is for
a general case.
27The literature viewing positive matching will be introduced in the next chapter.
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from di¤erent colleges when colleges have identical quality, and the relationship
between the degree of corruption and the di¤erence of quality between di¤erent
colleges.
Next, we start with the model without borrowing constraints.
2.3 Model with One college, One Place under Perfect
Capital Markets
In this section, we will construct a model with perfect capital markets. Perfect
capital markets mean that students are able to borrow money from external
perfect capital markets at a zero rate of interest (for simplicity). Assuming the
capital is external and risk free allows us to avoid endogenous interest rate which
is not the focus of our work. The objective of this part is not only to nd the
equilibrium bribes in the market system and the exam system respectively, but
also to compare the degree of corruption and e¢ ciency in the market system to
the exam system.
We start with the simplest model, where there is only one college with only
one place for admission. This simple scenario is not only a starting point, but also
an application to such circumstances where there is only one vacancy and many
applicants, for instance, the competition for a PhD place at a popular institution.
In the next section, we will extend this simple model to several more general cases
with more places.
2.3.1 Market System
Recall when market is the allocation mechanism, the o¢ cials expected pay is
m = bm. Since  is identical across students, the o¢ cial gains the highest
expected payo¤from the highest bribe, therefore, he will make o¤er to the student
who bribes the most. So, the competition of the place can be considered as a
standard sealed-bid rst price auction.
Next we aim to nd a Bayesian Nash equilibrium bribe for a student in this
game.
The following notations will be used in the whole chapter:
Given a student is ability follow the distribution of F , we let Yk denote the
kth highest of other n  1 abilities, Fk () denote the distribution of Yk, and fk ()
be the corresponding density function.
In this case, a student i with ability a will win the place whenever b (Y1) <
b (a). By using the standard approach in the rst price auction model (see, for
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example, Riley and Samuelson (1981)), we can have a symmetric equilibrium
bribe as follows.
Claim 2 Given perfect capital markets and one college with one place, the sym-
metric equilibrium bribe in the market system satises
bm (a) = qE [Y1jY1 < a] :
Proof. See Appendix.
The optimal bribe of a student is the expected ability of the expected value
of the highest of other n   1 abilities multiplied by q, conditional on his ability
being greater than Y1. The equilibrium bribe is increasing in the students ability.
Therefore, i will win the place whenever Y1 < ai. The equilibrium can be written
as















This expression shows that the bribe is less than the students valuation v. For any
given F (), as the number of students increases, the equilibrium bribe approaches
v.
The following example where ability follows uniform distribution gives us a
more intuitive impression for the equilibrium strategy.








At the equilibrium of this example, each student bribes a fraction of his val-
uation. Clearly, the result is e¢ cient as the student with the highest ability will
bribe the most and be allocated the place.
2.3.2 Exam System
The exam system in this case works in the following procedure. Consider a
particular student.
1. The student takes an exam, and obtains his score, which is linearly deter-
mined by his ability as we assumed, s = a, 0 <  < 1.
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2. In order to maximise his expected payo¤, the student bribes the o¢ cial of
the college which he is applying to.
3. The o¢ cial observes the students score and bribe as well as other students
scores and bribes.
4. The o¢ cial would allocate the place to the student from whom he gets the
highest expected payo¤.
Recall in the exam system, the o¢ cials expected payo¤ function is
e = bes;
where s denotes the probability that the o¢ cial can keep the money safely, i.e.
the probability that corruption is not discovered. The probability is increasing in
the exam score as corruption is more di¢ cult to be discovered if the place has been
allocated to students with higher scores than other students with lower scores.
Therefore, the probability that a student is allocated the place is dependent on his
bribe and score. This expected payo¤ function is public knowledge in students,
so they will decide their bribes based on this function.
Recall a follows a continuous, di¤erentiable cumulative distribution, F (a),
with density function f(x) and a nite support on [0; 1]; and also s = a. So,
exam score follows a distribution with the same distribution function but on a
di¤erent interval [0; ].
Now we dene some notations for the exam system: Let Fs () denote the
distribution of s, fs () denote the corresponding density function. Let Ys;k denote
the kth highest of other n  1 scores and let Fs;k () denote the distribution of Yk,
and fs;k () be the corresponding density function.
In the exam system, a student i with ability a will win the place whenever
be (Ys;1) < b
e (a). A symmetric equilibrium bribe is as follows.
Claim 3 Given perfect capital markets and one college with one place, the sym-












The equilibrium bribe in the exam system immediately implies the expected






Y 1+s;1 jYs;1 < s

:
So, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 6 Given perfect capital markets and one college with one place, the
allocation result is e¢ cient in the exam system.
Proof. See Appendix.
This claim implies that the place will be allocated to the student with the
highest score, and hence a student i with score s will win the place whenever
Ys;1 < s. In the market system, students with higher valuations are willing to
pay higher bribes for the place, and bribes are the only measurement; thus, the
result in the market system is e¢ cient as the student with the highest ability
will be allocated the place. In the exam system, an integration of score and
bribe measures the extent that the student is eager for education. Hence, in the
exam system, students with higher valuations for education will provide higher
expected payo¤s for the o¢ cial. The o¢ cial allocates the place to the student
who has the highest score as well as the highest ability, and hence the outcome
is e¢ cient.
Claim 3 also implies that students will take the power of investigation into
account in the exam system.
Proposition 7 Given perfect capital markets and one college with one place, the
equilibrium bribe in the exam system is decreasing in the power of investigation.
Proof. See Appendix.
The following example with a uniform distributed ability illustrates the result.
Example 8 If abilities are uniformly distributed on [0; 1], then F (a) = a, and



















28This result is by the following functions: v = aq and s = a.
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The result is e¢ cient and it shows that the equilibrium bribe is decreasing
in the power of investigation since @b
e
@
< 0. When  = 0, the optimal bribe
is exactly the same as in the market system. When  goes to the innity, no
students will bribe as they know the investigation is so strict that no o¢ cials
would risk themselves to take the chance.
2.3.3 Market System vs Exam System
Next we compare the two systems in terms of equilibrium bribes, e¢ ciency and
degree of corruption.
Claim 4 Given perfect capital markets and one college with one place, if  6= 0,
then be (a)  bm (a) and a strict inequality holds for all a 2 (0; 1].
Proof. See Appendix.
Claim 4 implies that every types equilibrium bribe is higher in the market
system than in the exam system. As regards the e¢ ciency and the degree of
corruption, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 8 Given perfect capital markets and one college with one place,
the allocation results in both systems are e¢ cient; if  6= 0, then the degree of
corruption in the market system is higher than in the exam system.
Proof. See Appendix.
This claim states the degree of corruption is higher in the market system than
in the exam system, although they can both select e¢ cient allocation results.
Given perfect capital markets, the existence of corruption does not a¤ect the
e¢ ciency of the allocations, but the existence of the exam lowers the degree of
corruption. The following example gives us a clearer idea about this result.
Example 9 If abilities are uniformly distributed on [0; 1], then the expected rev-







(n+ 1) (n+ )
q:
Thus,
E (m)  E (e) = (n  1) q
(n+ 1) (n+ )
> 0:
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The o¢ cials expected revenue is higher in the market system than in the exam
system, and therefore the degree of corruption is higher in the market system than
in the exam system.
2.4 Model with Multiple Places under Perfect Capital
Markets
In the last section, we have looked through the simplest case of the model where
there is only one place for admission in one college. Now we extend the model to
discuss the scenario with more than one place for admission. As we have assumed,
a students valuation for the place at a particular college is determined by the
students ability and the colleges quality. As a result, we need to take the quality
of colleges into account when there are multiple places. Education quality would
be the same for all places in a particular college, and it could either di¤er or be the
same across di¤erent colleges. Next, we will go through the following scenarios:
One college with k places; two colleges with the same quality; k colleges with
di¤erent qualities.
2.4.1 One College with k Places
Consider the case where n students are applying to one college with k places.
The model has become to a discriminatory "price" model and every student has
single-unit demand. In both systems, the o¢ cial assigns the places to the students
from whom the o¢ cial gets the highest expected payo¤s. In the market system,
the o¢ cials only concern is the bribes, so the places would be allocated to the
students whose bribes are above the (k + 1)th highest bribe; however, in the exam
system, the o¢ cial has to consider exam scores as well as bribes.
Market System Given that the expected payo¤ function in the market system
is m = bm, the o¢ cial allocates the k places to the students whose bribes are
above the (k + 1)th highest bribe. The quality of college does not matter as
all places in one college are assumed to have the same quality. Based on this
information, there exists a symmetric equilibrium bribe for all students. We use
the standard approach in the auction model (see, for example, Krishna (2002),
p195) to obtain the equilibrium bribe.
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Claim 5 Given perfect capital markets and one college with k places, the sym-
metric equilibrium bribe in the market system satises
bm (a) = qE [YkjYk < a] :
Proof. See Appendix.
Since all students follow the same strategy, it is clear that the equilibrium
bribe is increasing in a. Therefore, the k places will be allocated to the students
with the k highest ability types, so the allocation result is e¢ cient.
Exam System The equilibrium bribe in terms of scores is as follows.
Claim 6 Given perfect capital markets and one college with k places, the sym-











By using the results in Proposition 6 and 7, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1 Given perfect capital markets and one college with k places, the
allocation result of the exam system is e¢ cient; the equilibrium bribe is decreasing
in the power of investigation.
Market system vs Exam system Next we compare the two systems in terms
of e¢ ciency and degree of corruption. Proposition 8 immediately implies the
following corollary.
Corollary 2 Given perfect capital markets and one college with k places, the al-
location results in both systems are e¢ cient; if  6= 0, then the degree of corruption
in the exam system is lower than in the market system.
Proof. See Appendix.
This claim implies that both systems produce e¢ cient outcomes given perfect
capital markets. The existence of scores lowers the degree of corruption in the
exam system. Clearly, as the investigation is getting stricter, the degree of corrup-
tion in the exam system decreases, while the degree of corruption in the market
system keeps the same unless the investigation is strict enough to eliminate all
kinds of corruptions.
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2.4.2 Two Colleges with the Same Quality
Now we assume the case where there are two colleges, fc1; c2g (each college has
one place, and the admission of each college is managed by one o¢ cial) and n
students, with n  3.29 Here we have a price competition game. This competition
game is similar to a Bertrand model.30 Recall we assume o¢ cials can not elicit
bribes from students, but they may compete for a student by reducing the bribe
he needs to pay. For simplicity, we assume a particular student would bribe the
same amount to the two o¢ cials because the values of the two colleges are the
same. For example, suppose two students fi; jg apply to two colleges fc1; c2g. If
it turns out i will provide a higher expected payo¤to the two o¢ cials, say i > j,
then one o¢ cial has incentives to reduce is bribe to 0i and get i to accept his
o¤er. Since both o¢ cials will use the same strategy, in the end, 01 will be slightly
higher than 2. For simplicity, it is assumed that 
0
1 = 2 in the equilibrium. In
a general game, we assume each o¢ cial observes studentsintended bribes, and
then compete for the student from whom the o¢ cial gets the highest expected
payo¤.
The game induced by the two systems is described as follows:
1. Students realise their abilities and valuations for both colleges. In the mar-
ket system, students go to the next step; in the exam system, students take
the exam, obtain scores and go to the next step.



























o¤er student 1 a required amount, b1;j with b1;j  bIB1 , j = 1; 2.
4. Student 1 selects the o¤er with a lower b1, or choose one randomly if b1;1 =
b1;2, and then student 1 bribes the o¢ cial with b1;j if he chooses college cj.
29We are currently unable to analyse the case with k > 2 colleges.
30Bertrand competition is a model of competition used in economics, named after Joseph
Louis Francis Bertrand (1822-1900). Specically, it is a model of price competition between
duopoly rms with the same marginal cost and producing homogeneous products. The game
results in each charging the price that would be charged under perfect competition, known as
marginal cost pricing. Competing in price means that rms can easily change the quantity they
supply, but once they have chosen a certain price, it is very hard, if not impossible, to change
it.
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5. Suppose student 1 chooses college c1, then the o¢ cial of college c2 would
make an o¤er to student 2 with b2 = bIB2 ; student 2 bribes the o¢ cial of
college c2 with b2.
6. The o¢ cials receive the actual expected payo¤s, f1; 2g, and then make
admission o¤ers to student 1 and 2.
Referring to the standard Bertrand model, the equilibrium strategy of both
o¢ cials will be o¤ering student 1 an amount such that 1 = 
IB
2 . Since the two
o¢ cials will have the same strategy, s1 receives two identical o¤ers, and s1 will
choose one randomly, say c1, and then the o¢ cial of c2 will make an o¤er to s2
with b2 = bIB2 .
The o¢ cialsdecision making process is public knowledge, and hence it will be
in the studentsconsideration. Next, we aim to nd studentsoptimal strategies
in each system respectively.
Market System In the market system, the o¢ cialsexpected payo¤ function
is bm, and hence the competition is on the student with the highest intended
bribe. In equilibrium, bm1 = b
m;IB
2 . Given the o¢ cials strategy, the following
claim gives studentsequilibrium bribes in the market system.
Claim 7 Given perfect capital markets and two colleges (one place at each col-
lege) with the same quality, the symmetric equilibrium bribe in the market system
satises













Again, we use the uniformly distributed ability example to illustrate the equi-
librium.
Example 10 If abilities are uniformly distributed on [0; 1], then F (a) = a, and
the equilibrium satises














It will be worthwhile to compare the results between the following cases: one
college with one place; one college with 2 places; 2 colleges with the same quality
and each college has one place. Let bm;1 (a) denote the equilibrium bribe in the
rst case; bm;2 (a), denote the equilibrium bribe in the second case; and bm;3 (a),
denote the equilibrium bribe in the third case. We have the following claim.
Proposition 9 Given perfect capital markets, in the market system, bm;2 (a) <
bm;3 (a) < bm;1 (a); and the expected revenue for the only o¢ cial in the case of
one college with 2 places is the same as the total expected revenues for the two
o¢ cials in the case of 2 colleges with the same quality and each college having
one place.
Proof. See Appendix.
The rst part of this claim imply that a student shades more of his valuation
and hence when there are more objectives, the same student bribes more in the
rst case than in the last two cases; the competition between o¢ cials gets students
to be more aggressive because a student realises that if his bribe is the highest,
then he will only need to pay the second highest bribe, and hence he also bribes
more in the last case than in the second case. The second part of this claim states
that the degree of corruption is the same in the second and third cases although
students are more aggressive in the third case
.
Exam System In the exam system, the o¢ cialsexpected payo¤ function is






2. Given the o¢ cialsstrategy, the
following claim gives studentsequilibrium bribes in the market system.
Claim 8 Given perfect capital markets and two colleges (one place at each col-


















Proposition 9 immediately implies the following corollary. Let be;1 (s) denote
the equilibrium bribe in the case of one place; be;2 (a), denote the equilibrium
bribe in the case of one college with 2 places; and be;3 (a), denote the equilibrium
bribe in the case of 2 colleges with the same quality and each college having one
place.
67
Corollary 3 Given perfect capital markets, in the exam system, be;2 (s) < be;3 (s) <
be;1 (s); the expected revenue for the only o¢ cial in the case of one college with 2
places is the same as the total expected revenues for the two o¢ cials in the case
of 2 colleges with the same quality and each college having one place.
The comparison between the market system and the exam system is com-
plicated in the case with a general distribution function, so we take uniform
distribution as an example.
Example 11 If abilities are uniformly distributed on [0; 1], then F (a) = a.
























which can be transformed to
be (a) =
n  2
n  1 + aq:




The equilibrium in the exam system has included the power of investigation in the
denominator. Therefore, the amount of any students bribe is lower in the exam
system.
As regards e¢ ciency and degree of corruption, we have the following conclu-
sions.
Corollary 4 Given perfect capital markets and two colleges (one place at each
college) with the same quality, the allocation results in both systems are e¢ cient.
Proposition 10 Given perfect capital markets and two colleges (one place at
each college) with the same quality, the degree of corruption in the exam system
is lower than in the market system.
Proof. See Appendix.
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2.4.3 k Colleges with Di¤erent Qualities
We next turn to a more realistic case where there are k colleges, fc1; c2; :::ckg,
with strictly ranking qualities, q1 > q2 > ::: > qk, and each college has only one
place available for admission; there are n > k students. Student i has di¤erent
valuations for di¤erent colleges, for example student is valuation of college cj
is vij = V (ai; qj), which di¤ers in colleges. Considering the total social welfare,
colleges with better qualities should have higher priority to admit students with
higher abilities because of the supermodularity of education production. There-
fore, we assume that colleges admit students sequentially, i.e., the college with
the highest quality starts the admission procedure rst, and then the college with
the second highest quality, and so on.
The game is described as follows:
1. Students realise their abilities and valuations for all colleges. In market
system, students go to the next step; in exam system, students take the
exam, obtain scores and go to the next step.
2. The admission commences from c1. Students decide how much to bribe
the o¢ cial at c1. The o¢ cial at c1 will allocate the place to the student
from whom he gets the highest expected payo¤ among n students. The
remaining students are rejected and enter the next round.
3. All remaining students bribe the o¢ cial at c2. The o¢ cial of c2 then chooses
the student from whom he gets the highest expected payo¤ among the n 1
students. The remaining students are rejected and enter the next round.
..........
4. In the round k, the last remaining n   k + 1 students bribe the o¢ cial at
college ck. The o¢ cial of ck then chooses the student from whom he gets
the highest expected payo¤ among the n  k + 1 students.
The o¢ cialsdecision making process is public knowledge in students, and
hence it will be in studentsconsideration. Next, we aim to nd studentsoptimal
strategies in each system respectively.
Market System In the market system, one o¢ cial will allocate the place at
his college to the student with the highest bribe. We begin with the simplest
model, in which there are two colleges cH and cL, with quality qH > qL >
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0; n > 2 students compete for the two places. Student is valuations of cH
and cL depend on his ability and qualities of cH and cL, i.e. vi;j = ai  qj, 




. In a healthy system, without bribes, cH
will take the student with the highest ability, and cL takes the student with the
second highest ability based on their applications. Under the assumption of cor-
ruption, however, students have to decide how much to bribe the o¢ cial in cH
when they apply to cH , and how much to bribe the o¢ cial of cL if they failed
to win the place in cH . A symmetric equilibrium consists of two bribe functions
(bmH ; b
m
L ), denoting the bribe strategies in the rst and second admissions, respec-
tively. Assume that the information of the winning student will not be released,
and then the equilibrium bribes in both rounds will be depending on the students
values.31 We are interested in the equilibria that are sequentially rational, which
implies that a student chooses sequential strategies to form the equilibria in both
rounds. We begin with the second round.
In the second round, the admission has completed in cH , but the winners
value is not released, thus, bL is independent of the rst round. The game is
almost the same as in the one-college, one-place case with (n  1) students. Back
to the rst round, a student has to take the expected result of the second round
into account when he decides the optimal bribe in the rst round. Suppose that
all students are following the same strategies, bH in the rst round, and bL in the
second round regardless of what happens in the rst round. The following claim
shows the equilibrium bribes in this game.
Claim 9 Given perfect capital markets and two colleges with di¤erent qualities,
the symmetric equilibrium bribes in the market system satisfy
bmL = qLE [Y2jY2 < a < Y1] ;
bmH = (qH   qL)E [Y1jY1 < a] + qLE [Y2jY1 < a] :
Proof. See Appendix.
The equilibrium bribe in the rst round, bmH , depends on not only the quality
of cH , qH , but also the quality of cL, qL. bmH is increasing in qH but decreasing in
qL.
Let us take an example where a follows uniform distribution.
Example 12 If abilities are uniformly distributed on [0; 1], then the equilibrium
31In the second round, the only updated information of any one of remaining students is that
at least one other students valuation (ability) is higher than his, but this information will not













The gap of quality between the two colleges may cause a students bribe to




 1 + n  2
(n  1)2
;
bmH (a)  bmL (a); otherwise bmH (a) < bmL (a). When bmH (a) < bmL (a), it indicates a
student with ability a who is active in the rst round but fails to win the place in
cH , will be more aggressive in the second round. This is due to the deterioration
of available supply relative to current demand given a small di¤erence of qualities
between the two colleges.
Suppose there are k colleges with di¤erent qualities, q1 > q2 > ::: > qk. We
will derive symmetric bribing strategies (bm1 ; b
m
2 ; :::; b
m
k ) by working backward from
the last round. So rst consider the kth round, the equilibrium bribe is









The equilibrium in the last round does not depend on the bribes in other
rounds. Consider the jth round for some j < k. Now look at student i with ability
a and assume that all other students are following the jth round strategy bmj (a),






Claim 10 Suppose there are k colleges with di¤erent qualities q1 > q2; :::; > qk
and n students applying sequentially. Given perfect capital markets, a set of
symmetric equilibrium strategies in the rst, jth, 2  j  k   1, and kth round








(qL   qL+1)E [YLjYj < a < Yj 1] + qkE [YkjYj < a < Yj 1] ;
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bmk (a) = qkE [YkjYk < a < Yk 1] :
Proof. See Appendix.
Example 13 Abilities are uniformly distributed on [0; 1]. In the last round, the
equilibrium bribing strategy is
bmk (a) =
n  k
n  k + 1aqk:
Proceeding inductively, it may be veried that the bribing strategy in the jth round,
2  j  k   1, is
bmj (a) =
n  k




n  j + 1a (qL   qL+1) :
The equilibrium bribe of a particular student in the jth round is determined
by the number of students and colleges, the students ability, and qualities of all
the colleges.
Exam System As usual, we begin with the simplest model with two colleges
as in the last part. Now an o¢ cial has to take scores and bribes into account and
allocate the place at his college to the student from whom he gets the highest
expected payo¤.
We use the same notations as in the market system. A symmetric equilibrium
consists of two bribe functions (beH ; b
e
L), denoting the bribe strategies in the rst
and second admissions, respectively. The bribe in the rst round depends on the
students values and score. Assume that the information of the winning student
in the rst round will not be released. Thus, in the second round, the bribe
strategy in the second round will only depend on the value of the low quality
college and score.
Claim 11 Given perfect capital markets and two colleges with di¤erent qualities,


























Example 14 Abilities are uniformly distributed on [0; 1]. If a follows uniform
distribution, then s follows uniform distribution as well, but with a di¤erent dis-







(n  1) (n  2)









s  (n  1) (1 + )










It is easy to compare the two systems with the uniformly distributed ability.
Proposition 11 Given perfect capital market and two colleges with di¤erent
qualities, if abilities are following uniform distribution, then the degree of cor-
ruption in the market system is higher than in the exam system.
Proof. See Appendix.
Now consider there are k colleges with di¤erent quality, q1 > q2 > ::: > qk.
In what follows, Y (n 1)s;j denotes the jth highest of n   1 scores, Fs;k denotes
the distribution of Y (n 1)s;k , and fs;k denotes the corresponding density. We will




k) by working backward from the










jY (n k)s;1 < s

;










jY (n k)s;1 < s

:
Next we use the same method as in the market system to nd the equilibrium
in every other round. Consider the jth round for some j < k. Now look at
student i with score s, and assume that all other students are following the jth





k, in the subsequent games.
Claim 12 Given perfect capital markets, a set of symmetric equilibrium strate-



















































The following example shows the result of the model when ability follows
uniform distribution.
Example 15 Abilities are uniformly distributed on [0; 1]. In the last round, the
equilibrium contribution to the o¢ cial in ck is
ek (s) =
n  k




and the symmetric equilibrium bribe strategy is
bek (a) =
n  k















n  j +  + 1
(qL   qL+1) s

;
which can be transformed to
bej (a) =
n  k




n  j +  + 1a (qL   qL+1) :
The equilibrium bribe of a particular student in the jth round is determined
by the number of students and colleges, the students score, the investigation
power and qualities of all the colleges. Given the same conditions and uniform
distribution ability, the degree of corruption in the exam system is lower than in
the market system, but both systems will produce e¢ cient outcome.
Corollary 5 Given perfect capital markets and two colleges with di¤erent quali-
ties, if the ability follows uniform distribution, then the allocation results in both
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systems are e¢ cient but the degree of corruption in the market system is higher
than in the exam system.
The analysis on the CCAmodel under corruption given perfect capital markets
presents studentsequilibrium strategies in di¤erent scenarios, and also compare
of the two systems in terms of e¢ ciency and degree of corruption. Although the
allocation results in both systems are e¢ cient, the exam system dominates the
market system in terms of degree of corruption. It implies that the o¢ cials in
the market system would get more expected revenue than in the exam system.
2.5 Model with Borrowing Constraints
In this section, we look at the model assuming that there are no capital markets
at all. The reason for this market failure is that there is not a well constructed
capital system for students. Another possible reason is that the inability to
penalize recalcitrant borrowers or an unveriable output level would be su¢ cient
to close down capital markets. (Fernandez, 1998) As a result, those who can not
a¤ord the cost of bribing for education have to consider their budgets.
Assume that there are n students, each of whom is characterized by an en-
dowment of ability, a, and initial wealth w. a and w are independent and
distributed on the area of [0; 1] [0; 1] according to the joint distribution F (a; w)
with a density function f (a; w). These attributes are independent across stu-
dents. Assume both ability and wealth are not observed by other students, but
each student knows the probability distribution of other studentsabilities and
wealth. We will refer to the pair (ai; wi) as the type of student i. A students
strategy should be a function of his ability and budget in the market system, and
a function of his score and budget in the exam system. Firstly, we look at the
simplest case of one college with one place and n applicants. For the purpose of
comparison between systems, we use a to substitute s in the equilibrium bribe of
the exam system.32
Che and Gale (1995, 1998) show that, in a rst price auction with borrowing
constraints, there exists a unique, symmetric equilibrium given su¢ cient condi-
tions. We employ their results in our model as follows.
Let Gc (a; w) denote the probability that a random chosen students type, say
(a0; w0), satises a0 < a or w0 < w. We have





f (ea; ew) d ewdea:
32In the exam system, score can be transformed to a function of ability by s = a.
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In the x (x = market; exam) system, we consider the equilibrium strate-
gies of the form Bx (a; w) = min fx (a) ; wg, where x (a) is some continuous,
strictly increasing function in a.33 Consider a student with (a; 1). This stu-
dent e¤ectively never faces nancial constraints and his equilibrium bribe would
be Bx (a; 1) = min fx (a) ; 1g = x (a). A random selected student (a0; w0)
has a lower bribe than type (a; 1) if min fx (a0) ; w0g  x (a) with probabil-
ity F c (a)  Gc (a; x (a)). Therefore, the problem facing a student with (a; 1)
is the same as if all students do not have borrowing constraints, with abilities
drawn from the distribution F c (). By using the standard technique, we can
easily obtain the equilibria in both systems. However, the existence of x () is
not immediate because F c () is determined by x (a) itself. Che and Gale (1998)
show that a technical assumption can ensure the existence of a unique equilibrium
bribe function.34
Next we analyse the two systems respectively.
2.5.1 Market System
In the market system, the equilibrium bribe is of the following form:
Bm (a; w) = min fm (a) ; wg :
The result of Claim 2 implies m (a) must satisfy







m (a) = qE [Y c1 jY c1 < a] ;
where Y c1 is the highest of n   1 draws from the distribution F c, and F c1 () 
F c ()n 1 is the distribution of Y c1 .
If a student with (a0; w0) and 
m (a0) < w0, then he would follow 
m (a0),
otherwise he just bribes his wealth. The strategy entails Leontief isobid curves.
Figure 7 depicts the set of types who bribe the same amount as does type (a0; w0).
We can nd a point (a0; 1) which satises Bx (a0; w0) = 
x (a0). Clearly, there are
33Che and Gale (1995) show that any symmetric equilibrium in a rst price auction with
borrowing constraints must take the form as B (;w), and x () is continuous and strictly
increasing.
34
(n  1)w + G
c (a;w)
Gc1 (a;w)
is strictly increasing in w for all a 2 (0; 1) :
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two possible groups. The rst group consists of those students whose m () is less
than their wealth, e.g., (a0; w0), and the horizontal line with w0 as its abscissa;
the second includes those students whose m () is greater than their wealth and
the vertical line with a0 as its vertical coordinates. All students in the rst group
will bribe their wealth, and the bribes of all students in the second group follow
m ().






Figure 7: Budget Constraint in Market System
Claim 13 With borrowing constraints, the o¢ cials expected revenue in the mar-
ket system is
E [m] = qE [Y c2 ] ;
where Y c2 is the second-highest of n draws from the distribution F
c ().
Proof. See Appendix.
This claim implies that the expected revenue in the case with borrowing con-
straints is of the same form as in perfect capital markets model, but with a
di¤erent distribution for abilities.
This research is from a social planners perspective, and hence e¢ ciency of
outcomes concerns us. If we consider studentsvaluation as the product of edu-
cation, then the e¢ cient allocation results imply the maximal total educational
output. Therefore, the principle of e¢ ciency in our work is therefore to allocate
the places of the best colleges to those students who can use the education oppor-
tunities most e¢ ciently. In the market system, the o¢ cials decide the admission
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only based on the amount of bribe paid by students. Given perfect capital mar-
kets, the allocation result is e¢ cient because students have no nancing problem
and those with higher abilities will bribe more and be accepted. However, under
borrowing constraints, students with higher ability may lose their opportunities
to receive higher education. Let us look at the following example.
Suppose two students, (a0; w0) and (a1; w1) with a0 > a1, are competing for
one place. Without borrowing constraints, student (a0; w0) wins the place be-
cause bm (a0) > bm (a1) even if bm (a0) > w0. With budget constraints, suppose
m (a0) > w0 and w0 < 
m (a1) < w1. Since (a0; w0) can only bribes w0, which
is less than m (a1), he will be rejected by the o¢ cial although he has a higher
ability. This scenario is graphed in Figure 8. Point (a0; w0), (a1; w1) denote the
two types respectively, and m (a) represents an increasing, symmetric function of
a. So, Bm (a0; w0) = 
m (a0) and Bm (a1; w1) = 
m (a1). Since 
m (a0) < m (a1),
Bm (a0; w0) < B
m (a1; w1), and hence (a1; w1) will be accepted. Generally speak-
ing, any types which fall in the shadow area in Figure 8, e.g. (a1; w1), will bribe
more and win the place with higher probability than student (a0; w0) although
they have lower abilities. Note that the shadow area above the curve m (a)
indicates the types who are not subject to the budget, so their bribes follow
m (a). The shadow area below the curve represents the types who are limited
by their budgets, so they bribe their budgets, which however are higher than w0.
This example suggests that allocation results with borrowing constraints may be












Figure 8: Ine¢ ciency of the Market System
ine¢ cient.
Degree of corruption is another feature concerning us. Recall the expected
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received bribe in the perfect capital case satises
E [m;p]  qE [Y p2 ] ;
and the expected received bribe in the case with borrowing constraints satises
E [m;c]  qE [Y c2 ] ;
where Y p2 and Y
c
2 denote the second highest of n draws from the distribution
F () and F c () respectively. Therefore, if the relationship between F () and
F c () satises E [Y p2 ] > E [Y c2 ], then the degree of corruption is greater in the
unconstrained case than in the constrained case.
2.5.2 Exam System
In the exam system, the equilibrium strategy is assumed to be of the following
form:
Be (a; w) = min fe (a) ; wg ;
for some function e (a) increasing in a. Note we do not use score in the function
as we can substitute s by a to make the model simpler. For the same reason as
in the market system, it must be that e (a) < a.
The result of Claim 3 implies e (a) must satisfy
e (a) = v   (1 + ) q
Z a
0
F c1 (y) y
























where Y c2 is the second-highest of n draws from the distribution F
c ().
Proof. See Appendix.
For the same reason, the allocation result in the exam system may be in-







Figure 9: Market System and Exam System I
borrowing constraints. If F () and F c () satises E [Y p2 ] > E [Y c2 ], then the de-
gree of corruption is greater in the unconstrained case than in the constrained
case.
2.5.3 Market System vs Exam System
Claim 3 immediately implies that e (a)  m (a) and a strict inequality holds
for all a 2 (0; 1]. This result is graphed in Figure 9. The curve m (a) is above
the curve e (a) for all a 2 (0; 1].
We use a simple example to compare the two systems in terms of e¢ ciency.
Consider a student S1 with type (a0; w0), who has higher ability but lower wealth
than student S2 with type (a0; w0) and a0 > a0, w0 < w0. S1 and S2 are competing
for one place. An e¢ cient outcome is supposed to allocate the place to S1 since
S1 has a higher ability than S2. Given Claim 3, we have the following possible
outcomes as graphed in Figure 10, Figure 11 and Figure 12.
1. See Figure 10. Consider S1s endowment point is below 
m and e. Since
a0 < a0, and w0 < w0, S2s three possible endowments are in area a0S1w0.
(a) When a0 2 (a1; a0), for instance S(1)2 , S2 wins the place in both systems.
The allocations are ine¢ cient in both systems as the student with lower









































Figure 12: Market System and Exam System IV
(b) When a0 2 (a2; a1), for instance S(2)2 , S2 wins in the market system,
but S1 wins in the exam system. The allocation is e¢ cient in the exam
system, but ine¢ cient in the market system.
(c) When a0 2 (0; a2), for instance S(3)2 , S1 wins in both systems. The
allocations are e¢ cient in both systems.
2. See Figure 11. Consider S1s endowment point is below 
m and above e.
Since a0 < a0, and w0 < w0, S2s two possible endowments are in area
a0S1w0.
(a) When a0 2 (a1; a0), for instance S(1)2 , S2 wins the place in the market
system, but S1 wins in the exam system. The allocation is e¢ cient in
the exam system , but ine¢ cient in the market system.
(b) When a0 2 (0; a1), for instance S(2)2 , S1 wins in both systems. The
allocations are e¢ cient in both systems.
3. See Figure 12. Consider S1s endowment point is above 
m and e. Since
a0 < a0, and w0 < w0, S2s only possible endowment is in area a0S1w0. There
is only one possible result. When a0 2 (0; a1), S1 wins in both systems. The
allocations are e¢ cient in both systems.
The outcomes above show that allocation results could be ine¢ cient in both
systems because of borrowing constraints. However, for the same set of students
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and colleges, the allocation results induced by the exam system are always ef-
cient if the allocation results induced by the market system are e¢ cient, and
the allocation results induced by the exam system may be e¢ cient even if the
allocation results induced by the market system are ine¢ cient. So, we conclude
the exam system dominates the market system in terms of e¢ ciency.
As regards degree of corruption, the following claim implies that, once again,
the exam system is less corrupt than the market system with borrowing con-
straints.
Proposition 12 Given borrowing constraints, the allocation results in both sys-
tems may be ine¢ cient, but the exam system dominates the market system in
terms of e¢ ciency; the degree of corruption in the market system is greater than
in the exam system.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition here is that the existence of exams and scores has lowered the
amount of bribe, and hence the e¤ect of borrowing constraints on e¢ ciency. With
borrowing constraints, allocation results in both systems may be ine¢ cient, how-
ever, exams possess greater allocation e¢ ciency than markets. Di¤erent scores
imply di¤ering probabilities of being caught, and thus exams give students with
higher a ability but a lower budget a higher chance of being admitted. The o¢ -
cials expected revenue is higher in the market system than in the exam system
even with borrowing constraints.
2.6 Conclusion
The national college entry examination is used in China to decide whether stu-
dents are admitted by colleges or not. There are many criticisms of this system.
One of them is that many students may lose the opportunity of being educated at
colleges because of poor performance in the exam even though they are talented
but are not capable of taking exams. Another criticism focuses on corruption in
the admission process. These critics suggest abandoning the exam system and to
adopt a market system, in which each college decides to accept or reject a student
by face-to-face interviews or base on average performance in high school which
could only be shown in application materials. In the sense of telling the real
ability of students, the market system could perform better than the exam sys-
tem. However, the conclusion may be di¤erent if we include the considerations of
corruption. Corruption in this piece of work mainly implies that students have to
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bribe admission o¢ cials with the result that investment may not be productive.
The more important is that the allocation result could be ine¢ cient as a result of
corruption. We dene e¢ ciency as when students with the highest valuations of
higher education have a higher priority of being admitted. Studentsvaluations
are determined by their abilities and qualities of colleges. In this chapter, we nd
the equilibria of the two systems under di¤erent assumptions, and then compare
the two systems in terms of e¢ ciency and the degree of corruption.
We rstly assume that students have no borrowing constraints. They can
borrow money for bribing and pay that back after graduation. It has been shown
that the e¢ ciency of allocation would not be a¤ected in either the market or
the exam system. Places are allocated to students according to the ranking of
abilities. However, the degree of corruption is higher in the market system than
in the exam system because of the higher equilibrium bribe in the market system.
This result holds in both the simplest model with one place and the models with
multiple places or multiple colleges. The reason is that exams and scores provide
criteria for the authority to supervise admission o¢ cials, and students include it
into their decision making process. As intuition would suggest, the equilibrium
bribe is decreasing in the power of investigation.
The allocation may not be e¢ cient when students have borrowing constraints
because a higher ability student could lose his priority as his budget would not
allow him to bribe as much as he would like. We show that the exam system is
better than the market system in terms of e¢ ciency. The exam system may be
ine¢ cient, but it dominates the market system because the existence of exams
and scores reduces the e¤ect of budget constraints on e¢ ciency. Once again, the
expected amount of bribe in the exam system is lower than the market system,
and hence the degree of corruption in the market system is greater than that in
the exam system.
The conclusion is favours the exam system. However, there are many other
aspects that further analysis should take into account, such as the cost of taking
the exam, etc. The conclusion may change if we include these factors. Another
way that the conclusion might change is if corruption in the market system can
be avoided or made less serious by reinforcing the investigation system or using a




Proof of Claim 2:
Proof. Assume there exists such a symmetric equilibrium involves student i
bribing bm (a) where bm (a) is di¤erentiable and increasing in a, @b
m
@a
> 0. Student i
is following an optimal strategy to maximise his expected payo¤ if he realises that
everyone else is bribing according to bm . We have a Bayesian Nash equilibrium
since we have assumed that the game is symmetric. Consider what happens if
student i with ability a bribes bm (z) instead of bm (a), which is the equilibrium
strategy.
The expected payo¤ of student i is
i = F1 (z) (v   bm (z)) :
Maximizing the expected payo¤ with respect to z yields the rst order condi-
tion,
f1 (z) (v   bm (z))  F1 (z) bm0 (z) = 0:
At a symmetric equilibrium it is optimal to report z = a, so we obtain
f1 (a) (v   bm (a))  F1 (a) bm0 (a) = 0;
f1 (a) (aq   bm (a))  F1 (a) bm0 (a) = 0
as v = aq.
@
@a
[bm (a)F1 (a)] = aqf1 (a) :
Since bm (0) = 0, student with zero ability will bribe nothing. Integrating and







= qE [Y1jY1 < a] :
Proof of Claim 3:
Proof. Assume there exists such a symmetric equilibrium involves student i
bribing be (s) where be (s) is di¤erentiable and also satises that e (s) = be (s) s
is di¤erentiable and increasing in s, @
e
@s
> 0.We now look at a particular student
85
i. Suppose student i bribes be (z) instead of equilibrium strategies, be (s).
Student is expected payo¤ is
 = Pr (win) (v   be (z))
= Pr
 
be (z) s   (Ys;1)

(v   be (z)) :
Note we use s as the probability of keeping the bribe safely. This is because
the students score is observed by the o¢ cial, and hence the probability of being
caught does not change even if i pretended to be some other types.































(v   be (z)) :




























































vs   e (s)

= Fs;1 (s) ;
fs;1 (s)
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Proof of Proposition 6:
Proof. The place will be allocated to the student from whom the o¢ cial gets



























2664(1 + ) s   (1 + )























Thus, the o¢ cial gets the highest expected payo¤ from the student with the
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highest score, and hence he will allocate the place to this student. Since the
student with the highest score has the highest ability, therefore, the result must
be e¢ cient.
Proof of Proposition 7:
Proof. Let   (s; ) denote E

Y 1+s;1 jYs;1 < s

. We have  s > 0 and   < 0 as
Ys;1 < s < 1.










  +  s  ln s

. We have be < 0 as   < 0, s
  > 0 and  s  > 0, ln s < 0.
Thus, the equilibrium bribe is decreasing as the power of investigation.
Proof of Claim 4:































since s = a.

































Therefore, we have be (a)  bm (a) and a strict inequality holds for all a 2 (0; 1].
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Proof of Proposition 8:
Proof. In both systems, the place is allocated to the student with the highest
ability, i.e. highest valuation. So, the results are e¢ cient in both systems.
To compare the degree of corruption between the two systems, we need to
derive the o¢ cials expected revenue.
The expected revenue in system x (x = market; exam) is
E (x) = nE (bx;ex) ;
where E (x) denotes the expected revenue, and E (bx;ex) denotes the ex ante
expected bribe of a particular student with ability a in the market system, marked









E (be) f (a) da:
Clearly, E (bm;ex)  E (be;ex) if and only if E (bm)  E (be).
Given
E (bx) = Pr (Win in the x system) bx (a)
and for a particular student, the probabilities of being allocated the place in the
two systems are the same, therefore the inequality of E (bm)  E (be) is equivalent
to bm (a)  be (a).
Claim 3 immediately implies that E (bm)  E (be) and a strict inequality holds
for all a 2 (0; 1]. Therefore, E (bm;ex) > E (be;ex), and hence E (m) > E (e).
The expected winning bribe in the exam system is lower than in the market
system, which implies the degree of corruption is lower in the exam system.
Proof of Claim 5:
Proof. Consider what happens if student i bribes bm (z) instead of bm (a), which
is the strategy in equilibrium.
The expected payo¤ of student i is therefore
i = Fk (z) (v   bm (z)) :
35See denition of ex ante expected value in Krishna (2002) p20.
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Maximizing the expected payo¤ with respect to z yields the rst order condi-
tion,
fk (z) (v   bm (z))  Fk (z) bm0 (z) = 0:
At a symmetric equilibrium it is optimal to report z = a, so we obtain
fk (a) (v   bm (a))  Fk (a) bm0 (a) = 0;
fk (a) (aq   bm (a))  Fk (a) bm0 (a) = 0
as v = aq.
@
@a
[bm (a)Fk (a)] = aqfk (a) :
Since bm (0) = 0, student with zero ability will bribe nothing. Integrating and







= qE [YkjYk < a] :
Proof of Claim 6:
Proof. Consider what happens if student bribes be (z) instead of be (s) which is
equilibrium strategy. Student is expected payo¤ is
 = Pr (win) (v   be (z))
= Pr
 
be (z) s  e (Ys;k)

(v   be (z)) :
Note we use the product of be (z) s as the contribution to the o¢ cial by i because
even if i bribes be (z) which is di¤erent with his equilibrium strategy be (z), the
probability of keeping the bribe is still s for the o¢ cial. Now we let S denote
the inverse function of e.
Pr
 
























(v   be (z)) :
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vs   e (s)

= Fs;k (s) ;
fs;k (s)
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Combine with be (0) = 0, which implies that student with zero ability will


























































Proof of Claim 7:
Proof. Let Im denote the symmetric equilibrium expected payment of a partic-
ular student. Suppose other students are following the equilibrium strategy bm.
If this student bribes bm (z) instead of bm (a). Then the expected payo¤ for this
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student is dened as
m (z; v)  F2 (z) v   Im:
The rst order condition gives
@m (z; v)
@z




At the equilibrium, it is optimal to bribe z = a, so we obtain that for all y,
@Im
@y
= qf2 (y) y:
Thus,








Now we consider the same student at the equilibrium. If he is allocated a
place, then his bribe could be either the highest which means a > Y1 or the
second highest which implies Y2 < a < Y1. In the rst possible case, student 1
pays the second highest bribe, b (Y1); in the second case, he pays b (a).
Now we derive the expected payment when his bribe is the highest. The
density function of Y1, conditional on the event that Y1 < a, can be written as




(n  1) f (y)F (y)n 2
F (a)n 1
:
Thus, the expected payment when his bribe is the highest can then be written as















b (y) f (y)F (y)n 2 dy:
The expected payment when he is the second highest can then be written as
Im;2  (n  1) (1  F (a))F (a)n 2 b (a) :
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So the total expected payment satises






















Di¤erentiating with respect to a on both sides of the equation gives that
(n  1)
264 b
m (a)F (a)n 2 f (a)
+
 
(n  2)F (a)n 3 f (a) (1  F (a))  F (a)n 2 f (a)

bm (a)
+ (1  F (a))F (a)n 2 bm0 (a)
375
= aqf2 (a) :
Since
F2 (a) = F (a)
n 1 + (n  1) (1  F (a))F (a)n 2 ;
we have
f2 (a) = (n  1) (n  2)F (a)n 3 f (a) (1  F (a)) :
Hence,
bm (a)F (a)n 2 f (a) +
 
(n  2)F (a)n 3 f (a) (1  F (a))  F (a)n 2 f (a)

bm (a)
+ (1  F (a))F (a)n 2 bm0 (a)
= ap





Dividing both sides of the equation by F (a)n 3 gives us
bm (a)F (a) f (a) + ((n  2) f (a) (1  F (a))  F (a) f (a)) bm (a)
+ (1  F (a))F (a) bm0 (a)
= aq [F (a) f (a) + (n  2) f (a)  (n  1)F (a) f (a)] :
Rearrange it as
(n  2) f (a) aq = F (a) bm0 (a) + (n  2) f (a) bm (a) :
The solution to the function is as follows:36























Proof of Proposition 9:
Proof. Now we compare the current model to the case of one college with one
place. Let bm;1 (a) denote the equilibrium in case of one place, bm;2 (a) denote the
equilibrium bribe in case of two colleges, and bm;3 (a) denotes case of one college
with two places.


































36We used the following formula to solve the function:

























, hence bm;3 (a) < bm;1 (a).
Substitute F2 (a) = F (a)
n 1 + (n  1) (1  F (a))F (a)n 2 into bm;2 (a) and
rearrange it, then we obtain





(n  1)F (y)n 2   (n  2)F (y)n 1





(n  1)F (y)n 2   (n  2)F (y)n 1






(n  1)  (n  2)F (y)





(n  1)  (n  2)F (y)
(n  1)  (n  2)F (a)

> 1, we have
(n  1)F (y)n 2   (n  2)F (y)n 1
























(n  1)F (y)n 2   (n  2)F (y)n 1




and hence bm;2 (a) < bm;3 (a).
Recall that the expected payments of a particular student in the second and

















E (b) f (a) da:
Therefore, the expected revenue for the only o¢ cial in the second case is the same
as the expected revenues for the two o¢ cials in the third case.
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Proof of Claim 8:
Proof. Let Ie denote the symmetric equilibrium expected payment of a particular
student. Suppose other students are following the equilibrium strategy be. If this
student bribes be (z) instead of be (s). Then the expected payo¤ for this student
is dened as







where Fs;2 is the probability he wins or the probability that be (z) s exceeds the
second highest competing e (Ys;2).





































Now we let ' be the symmetric equilibrium expected payo¤ by the student. If






At an equilibrium it is optimal to report z = s, thus,
fs;2 (s)S




































On the other hand, consider this student, winning implies his score s is either
the highest which means s exceeds the highest of the other n 1 abilities, Ys;1 < s
or the second highest which means s is lower than the highest of the other n  1
scores, but higher than the second highest of the other n 1 scores, Ys;2 < s < Ys;1.
The bribe this student pays is an amount such that his contribution to the o¢ cial
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is the second highest bribe,  (Ys;1), b =  (Ys;1) =s, when he has the highest score,
and his own bribe, b (s), when he has the second highest score.
First, we need to derive the expected payment when his score is the highest.
The density of Ys;1, conditional on the event that Ys;1 < s, can be written as
f
(n 1)








(n  1) fs (y)Fs (y)n 2
Fs (s)
n 1 ;
so the expected payo¤ to the o¢ cial from the student with the highest score
satises















 (y) fs (y)Fs (y)
n 2 dy:
The expected payo¤ to the o¢ cial from the student with the second highest score
satises
'2 = (n  1) (1  Fs (s))Fs (s)n 2  (s) :
The total expected payment is




e (y) fs (y)Fs (y)





e (y) fs (y)Fs (y)












(n  2)Fs (s)n 3 fs (s)  (n  1)Fs (s)n 2 fs (s)

e (s)








Fs;2 (y) = Fs (s)
n 1 + (n  1) (1  Fs (s))Fs (s)n 2 ;








(n  2)Fs (s)n 3 fs (s) (1  Fs (s))  Fs (s)n 2 fs (s)

e (s)





s1+ (n  1) (n  2)Fs (s)n 3 fs (s) (1  Fs (s)) :
Rearrange it,
(n  2) fs (s)
q

s1+ = Fs (s)
e0 (s) + (n  2) fs (s)e (s) :





















































Proof of Proposition 10:
Proof. The expected winning bribe in system x (x = m; e) is
E (x) = nE (bx;ex) :
Since E (bx;ex) =
R 1
0
E (bx) f (a) da, then we only need to compare E (bx).














We substitute s by a since s = a,








In the market system, the expected revenue is



















. Thus, E (m) > E (e).
Therefore, the degree of corruption in the exam system is lower than the
market system given two same quality colleges.
Proof of Claim 9:
Proof. We use the conclusion in the rst section to obtain bL. The symmetric



















= qLE [Y2jY2 < a < Y1] ;
where Y (n 2)1 is the highest of remaining n 2 abilities and F
(n 2)
1 (a) denotes the
distribution of Y (n 2)1 .
Student has to take the expected result of the second round into account when
he decides bnH , the optimal bribe in the rst round. Suppose that all other students
are following the same rst round strategy bmH , and all students will follow b
m
L in
the second round regardless of what happens in the rst round. Assume student
bribes bmH (z), z 6= a, instead of bmH (a), which is the equilibrium bribe. The total
payo¤ is
(z; a) = F1 (z) [vH   bmH (z)] + (n  1) (1  F (z))F (a)
n 2 [vL   bmL (a)] ;
where the rst term results from the event Y1 < z, i.e., the student wins the place
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in the rst round with a bribe of bmH (z). The second term results from the event
Y2 < a  z  Y1, i.e., he fails in the rst round, but wins in the second.
The rst order condition is
f1 (z) [vH   bmH (z)]  F1 (z) bm0H (z)  (n  1) f (z)F (a)
n 2 [vL   bmL (a)] = 0:




[vH   bmH (a)] 
f1 (a)
F1 (a)




[vH   vL] +
f1 (a)
F1 (a)
[bmL (a)  bmH (a)] ;






H (a)] = f1 (a) [vH   vL] + f1 (a) bmL (a) ;












= [qH   qL]
Z a
0




















= [qH   qL]E [Y1jY1 < a] + E [bmL (Y1) jY1 < a]
= [qH   qL]E [Y1jY1 < a] + E [qLE [Y2jY2 < Y1] jY1 < a]
= [qH   qL]E [Y1jY1 < a] + qLE [Y2jY1 < a]
= (qH   qL)E [Y1jY1 < a] + qLE [Y2jY1 < a] :
Proof of Claim 10:
Proof. The equilibrium bribe in the last round is regardless of the previous
rounds, and hence it can be taken as a independent game. The result can be
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found easily by using the previous result,
bmk (a) = qkE [YkjYk < a < Yk 1] :
Now consider the equilibrium bribe for student i, bmj (a), in the jth round,
with j = 1; :::; k   1. Consider if he bribes slightly higher, say bmj (a+ "). If
Yj < a, he would win but pay more than he would do if he bribe bmj (a). His
expected payo¤ increases by
Fj (a)

bmj (a+ ")  bmj (a)

:
On the other hand, if a < Yj < a + ", he would have failed in the jth round
with his equilibrium bribe, whereas bribing higher results his winning. Now there
are two sub cases. In the event that Yj+1 < a < Yj < a+ ", he would have failed
in the jth round but won in the j+1st. In the event that a < Yj+1 < Yj < a+ ",
however, he would have failed in both the jth and the j+1st rounds, and possibly
won in a later round, say the lth for some l > j + 1. When " is small, however,
the probability that a < Yj+1 < Yj < a + " is very small and it is of second
order in magnitude. Thus, the contribution to the expected gain from all events
in which the student fails in both the jth and the j + 1st rounds can be safely
neglected when " is small. The overall expected gain from bribing bmj (a+ ") is
the probability that a < Yj < a+ " times the di¤erence in the equilibrium bribe
paid tomorrow and the bribe paid today, which is approximately
[Fj (a+ ")  Fj (a)]
 




vj+1   bmj+1 (a)

:
Equating the two equations, dividing by ", and taking the limit as "! 0, we









bmj (a)  bmj+1 (a)

;










































jY (n j)1 < a
i
= (qj   qj+1)E [YjjYj < a] + E





In order to solve the function, we work backward from the second last round.
bmk 1 (a) = (qk 1   qk)E [Yk 1jYk 1 < a] + E [bmk (Yk 1) jYk 1 < a < Yk 2]
= (qk 1   qk)E [Yk 1jYk 1 < a] + qkE [E [YkjYk < Yk 1] jYk 1 < a < Yk 2]
= (qk 1   qk)E [Yk 1jYk 1 < a] + qkE [YkjYk 1 < a < Yk 2] ;
and proceeding inductively in this fashion results in the solution for all j =




(qL   qL+1)E [YLjYj < a < Yj 1] + qkE [YkjYj < a < Yj 1] :
Proof of Claim 11:
Proof. We begin with the second round. In the second round, beL is independent
of the result of the rst round. We can derive the equilibrium bribe in the second
round by using the conclusion in the rst section. The symmetric equilibrium



























Y 1+s;2 jYs;2 < s < Ys;1

:
Student has to take the expected result of the second round into account when
he decides how much to bribe in the rst round. Suppose that all other students
are following the rst round strategy beH , and all students will follow b
e
L in the
second round, regardless of what happens in the rst round. Assume student
bribes beH (z), z 6= a, instead of beH (a), which is the equilibrium bribe. The total
payo¤ is


















n 2 [vL   beL (s)] ;





, i.e., the student
wins the place in the rst round with a bribe of beH (z). The second term results
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< Ys;1, but Ys;2 < s i.e., he fails in the rst round,
but wins in the second.





































n 2 [vL   beL (s)] :
In equilibrium, z = s and the rst order condition can be rearranged as
fs;1 (s)
e
H (s) + Fs;1 (s)
e0
H (s) = s
fs;1 (s) vH   fs;1 (s)







0 = sfs;1 (s) (vH   vL) + fs;1 (s)eL (s) :





























































Y 1+s;2 jYs;1 < s

:
















Y 1+s;2 jYs;1 < s

:
Proof of Proposition 11:
Proof. As we have shown, we only need to compare the expected winning bribes
in the two systems to tell which system is better. The total expected payment to
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E (a1) qH  
1
n
E (a1) qL +
n  2















(n  1) (1 + )











(n+ ) (n+ 1)
qH +
(n  1) (n2   3n  2)
(n+ 1) (n+ ) (n+    1)qL:
Since
n (n  1)





(n  1) (n2   3n  2)




the degree of corruption in the exam system is lower than the market system in
this model with di¤erent-quality colleges.
Proof of Claim 12:
Proof. The equilibrium bribe in the last round is regardless of the previous
rounds, and hence it can be taken as an independent game. The result can be










Suppose the equilibrium contribution to the o¢ cial of cj from student i is
ej (s) in the jth round but consider if he bribes slightly higher, say b
e
j (s+ "),
and contribute ej (s+ "). If Ys;j < s, he would win but pay more than he would
do if he contributes ej (s). His expected payment increases by
Fs;j (a)





On the other hand, if s < Ys;j < s+ ", he would have failed in the jth round
with his equilibrium bribe, whereas bribing higher results his winning. Now there
are two sub cases. In the event that Ys;j+1 < s < Ys;j < s+", he would have failed
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in the jth round but won in the j+1st. In the event that s < Ys;j+1 < Ys;j < s+",
however, he would have failed in both the jth and the j+1st rounds, and possibly
won in a later round, say the lth for some l > j + 1. When " is small, however,
the probability that s < Ys;j+1 < Ys;j < s+" is very small, it is of second order in
magnitude. Thus, the contribution to the expected gain from all events in which
the student fails in both the jth and the j + 1st rounds can be safely neglected
when " is small. The overall expected gain from contributing ej (s+ ") is the
probability that s < Ys;j < s + " times the di¤erence in the equilibrium bribe
paid tomorrow and the bribe paid today, which is approximately













Equating the two equations, dividing by ", and taking the limit as "! 0, we






















s (vj   vj+1) 
 





= fs;j (s) s
 (vj   vj+1) + fs;j (s)ej+1 (s) :




























































ej+1 (Ys;j) jYs;j < a < Ys;j 1

:







Y 1+s;k 1jYs;k 1 < s
















Y 1+s;k jYs;k < Ys;k 1















Y 1+s;k jYs;k 1 < s < Ys;k 2

:


























Y 1+s;k jYs;j+1 < Ys;j

















Y 1+s;k jYs;j < s < Ys;j 1

:























Proof of Claim 13:
Proof. The expected bribe by a randomly selected student (a0; w0) from the
group of students whose types are graphed by the Leonitief isobid curve in Figure
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7 is the same as the expected bribe by the type (a0; 1). It satises
E [Bm (a0; 1)] = Pr [Win]Bm (a0; 1)
= F c (a0)




yf c (y)n 1 dy:
The expected revenue of the o¢ cial or the expected winning bribe is just the sum
of the ex ante (prior to knowing their abilities) expected bribes of the students.
The ex ante expected bribe of (a0; 1) satises
E [Bm;ex (a0; 1)] =
Z 1
0














f c (a0) da0





y (1  F c (y)) f c (y)n 1 dy:
The expected payment to the o¢ cial is just n multiplied by E [Bm;ex (a0; 1)], and
hence




y (1  F c (y)) f c (y)n 1 dy:
Note that the distribution of Y c2 is
F c2 (y)  nF c (y)
n 1   (n  1)F c (y)n :
The associated density function is
f c2 (y) = n (n  1) (1  F c (y))F c (y)
n 2 f c (y)
= n (1  F c (y)) f c (y)n 1
= n (1  F c (y)) f c (y)n 1 :
107
Thus, the expected revenue can be written as
E [c;m] = q
Z 1
0
yf c2 (y) dy
= qE [Y c2 ] ;
where Y c2 is the second-highest of n draws from the distribution F
c ().
Proof of Claim 14:
Proof. For a randomly selected student (a0; w0), there must be a type with
w = 1, say (d; 1), whose equilibrium bribe satises
Be (a0; w0) = B
e (d; 1) .
The expected bribes by the type (d; 1) is as follows:
E [Be (d; 1)] = Pr [Win]Be (d; 1)






y1+f c (y)n 1 dy:
The ex ante expected bribe of (d; 1) satises
E [Be;ex (d; 1)] =
Z 1
0








y1+f c (y)n 1 dy









f c (d) dd







y1+ (1  F c (y)) f c (y)n 1 dy:
The expected revenue of the o¢ cial is just n multiplied by E [Be;ex (d; 1)], and
hence






y1+ (1  F c (y)) f c (y)n 1 dy:
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Since
f c2 (y) = n (1  F c (y)) f c (y)
n 1 :
















Proof of Proposition 12:
Proof. The rst part of this claim is clearly established in Figure 10, 11, 12.
They show three possible outcomes: both systems lead to ine¢ cient results; both
of them bring e¢ cient allocations; only the exam system has an e¢ cient result.
Therefore, although both systems may produce ine¢ cient results, the exam sys-
tem is likely to be better than the market system while here is no possibility that
the market system performs better than the exam system in terms of e¢ ciency.
For degree of corruption, we need to look at the expected revenues for the
o¢ cial. In the x (x = m; e) system, E [x] = nE [Bx;ex]. The ex ante expected














where a0 is a ability such that Bm (a0; 1) = Bm (a; w). The ex ante expected bribe











y1+f e;1 (y) dy
d
!
f e (d) dd;
where d is a value such that Be (d; 1) = Be (a; w).
Given a same particular student with type (a; w), d  a0. We can have this
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result from di¤erent cases in Graph 9, 10 and 11. In the cases of Graph 9 and
10, d < a0, while in the case of Graph 11, d = a0. Therefore, we haveR d
0





yf e;1 (y) dy 
Z a0
0
yf e;1 (y) dy:
In addition, f e (d)  f e (a0) if d  a0, hence





yf e;1 (y) dy

f e (a0) da0:
Combing with the inequality f e (a0) < fm (a0) and hence f e;1 (y) < fm;1 (y), we
have E [Be;ex] < E [Bm;ex]. So, nE [Be;ex] < nE [Bm;ex], and hence E [e] <
E [m]. The expected winning bribe is greater in the market system than in the
exam system, therefore the degree of corruption in the exam system is lower than
in the market system.
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3 Chapter 3:
The Cost of Attending College and Positive
Self-Sorting
3.1 Introduction and Literature Review
The principle of "easy admission but strict graduation" was proposed by some
scholars in the last decade to replace the current Chinese college admission sys-
tem. In fact, one of two college admission systems in France follows that proposed
principle. This chapter explores the properties of this type admission mechanism
in France from the economic perspective.
At the start of the 2006-2007 higher education academic year, there were 2.287
million students in France enrolled into the higher education admission system.
Among these students, 1.357 million of them applied to the universities, 113,500
of them applied to the university institutes of technology and 76,000 of them
applied to preparatory courses for the top graduate schools.37 Higher education
in France covers all studies after the baccalaureat (Alevel equivalent). There
are two systems that coexist side by side:
(1) An open system in the universities: Most students study under this system
(1.357 million out 2.287 million in 2006-2007). All baccalaureat holders have the
right to enter this system without any prior selection procedure. Universities o¤er
an extremely wide range of studies;
(2) A selective system with a limited number of places: Admission is by
competitive examination, entrance examination or application form, with an in-
terview where appropriate. This is the system in use in the grandes ecoles (top
graduate schools such as the Ecole Nationale dAdministration French Senior
Civil Service School Ecole Nationale Superieure national post-graduate school
and the top engineering and business schools), the institutes universitaires de
technologie (IUTs university institutes of technology) and the institutes univer-
sitaires professionnalises (IUPs university institutes of professional education).
These establishments train mainly public-sector and private-sector senior and
middle managers.
The second system is more similar to the prevalent college admission mech-
anism in other countries, e.g., USA, Britain, etc. In the prevalent system, in
which admission is operated through competitive procedures, a positive assorta-
tive matching may be produced, where the higher ability students are accepted
37Source: Ministry of National Education, Advanced Instruction, and Research, France.
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by the higher quality institutions and the lower ability students are allocated
to the lower quality institutions. The mechanism with competitive procedures
naturally produces the positive sorting if a students performance is positively
correlated to his ability, and the mechanism is well designed. However, in the
rst admission system of the French higher education sector, students have the
right to enter universities without any prior selection procedure. Is the sorting
still positive assortative? If the answer is yes, what is the driving force?
The purpose of this research is to discover the driving force that sorts students
into di¤erent quality colleges in a free choice system such as the open system at
French universities. It has important implications at both a practical and theoret-
ical level. From the practical perspective, it provides an analysis of an alternative
mechanism for the current CCA mechanism. In theory, it looks through the allo-
cation of students and resources from a new angle. At the end of this introduction,
we will explain why our approach is di¤erent from the literature.
Given a distribution of student ability and a limited pool of resources, we
model the planners decision to establish colleges and set a "task level" for each
college, and also the allocation of resources to colleges. Ignoring entry frictions,
the main cause that drives a student to select a college may be the cost of accom-
plishing the task. At a particular college, the task level and studentsabilities are
the determinants of cost for students to complete the educational qualication.
For example, students have two options: One is to choose a good college but with
high requirement, and the other is to choose an ordinary college but with low
requirement. The cost that a higher ability student completes the requirement
of the better college is lower than a lower ability student. If all students ob-
tain the same qualication from the same college, then the higher ability student
may select the rst choice, while the lower ability student may choose the second
college.
Certainly, there are other factors that could inuence students choice, such as
tuition, budget constraint, geography consideration and therefore transportation
costs, spatial considerations, and preference of subjects, etc. If these factors
are assumed to be symmetric, then di¤erent ability students will have di¤erent
decisions only due to variant costs. The cost depends on abilities and task levels.
Thus, in our work, abilities are still the key of sorting them to institutions as
the central feature of other related works. In Epple, Romano and Sieg (2006),
colleges attempt to attract the higher ability students by designing appropriate
tuition and admission policies. In Fernandez and Gali (1997), Fernandez (1998),
prices and borrowing constraints play the role of sorting students in a market
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system, and prices and exam results decide the matching of students to colleges
in an exam system. In our model, we include the cost into students utility
function, and drop tuition and income e¤ects on students utility. We believe
this approach is reasonable because the di¤erence of tuition for undergraduate
study across colleges in some countries is not large enough to inuence students
decision.
Our model may apply to a more general case other than to the higher educa-
tion sector. In any circumstances where a central planner is maximizing output
by dividing a group of people into di¤erent task levels and allocating them with
limited resources, our model is able to solve for an optimal solution if the plan-
ner does not set any entry requirements, this group of peoples abilities follow
some identical distribution, and the cost of completing a task level di¤ers among
people.
For example, a rm is designing a mechanism to stimulate workersoutput.
The manager is not able to observe any individual workers ability, but the dis-
tribution of workersabilities. The manager sets up some groups with di¤erent
levels of rewards or qualications and allocates allocable resources to each group.
These rewards or qualications require workers to accomplish some specic tasks.
Since the manager does not have knowledge of a particular workers ability, he
would have to let workers choose appropriate levels of tasks by themselves. A
workers concern is the qualication and the cost of accomplishing the required
task of that qualication. All workers in a task will obtain the same qualication;
thus their gains would be the same. The costs, however, will di¤er as workers
vary in their abilities. The managers purpose is to maximise the total output,
which is the aggregate of all individual outputs. Individual output depends on
the workers ability, resources per worker, and the motivation (qualication) ob-
tained upon completing the task. In such a game, an equilibrium can be reached
by working backword from the end of the game. At the end of the game, workers
select the task that maximises their utilities and produce outputs. At the begin-
ning, the manager sets up the optimal task levels and allocation of resources to
maximise the expected total output by taking workersdecisions into account.
Although this model can apply to a wide range of scenarios, we concentrate
our focus on the higher education sector. Therefore in our model, the market is
composed of the higher education planner, colleges (for simplicity, we use colleges
to represent higher education institutions in the rest context), and students. In
such an economy, a central planner has limited amount of resources and he needs
to decide the number of colleges, a task level for each college and the allocation of
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resources; a group of continuum students whose abilities follow some distribution
can either choose an outside option, or go to college. The planner does not have
the information about the ability of any particular student, but he knows the
distribution of students abilities. The planners objective is to maximise the
total education output which is the aggregate output of individual education.
The individual output of a particular student depends on the students ability,
resources per capita, and the task level of that college. In order to maximise
total output, the planner determines the number of colleges, designs an identical
task level for all students at each individual college, and allocates the allocable
resources to all colleges.
Our model is driven by a few simple assumptions: (1) there is complemen-
tarity between resources and ability, task and ability, task and resources in the
education output function. In other words, the production function satises su-
permodularity; (2) students have a cost function which has converse property to
the production function, we call it submodularity: given any level of task, the
student with higher ability faces a lower rise in cost when given a marginal in-
crease in the task level; (3) a students utility depends on the value gained from
the completion of the given task and the cost incurred, the value is concave while
the cost is strictly converse in task level. These assumptions yield that the plan-
ner would set up a tiered structure with sorted task levels, and students select
the most suitable college. Therefore the system produces a tiered structure that
sorts students by their abilities and results in an optimal output overall.
This work is closely related to the literatures on the assortative sorting and
allocation of resources in higher education. Using the ability of individuals to
sort or segregate themselves across various dimensions and in di¤erent spheres is
a topic of concern in many countries, e.g., di¤erent races, incomes, and abilities
are sorted into di¤erent residences, workplaces, schools, and households (Fernan-
dez (2002)). Kremer and Maskin (1996) present some evidence that sorting by
skill level at the workplace has increased. They nd that the e¢ cient match-
ing in their model depends on the distribution of skill in the matching market,
because the trade-o¤ between the asymmetry and the complementarity in the
match output function depends on the relative scarcity of highly-skilled workers.
As we mentioned, even without an explicit plan, students will sort themselves into
di¤erent quality colleges. Students are distributed among these colleges largely
according to their academic abilities. The requirement of completing the study
and obtaining the qualication in each tier, and the public spending per student
at each level are strongly and positively associated with studentsaverage ability.
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The driving force of the positive sorting was rstly discussed by Becker (1973).
In his theory of marriage, Becker (1973) dened positive assortative mating as a
positive correlation between the values of the traits of husbands and wives. He
argued that the positive assortative mating is generally optimal in most circum-
stances.
Theorem 1 Positive assortative mating-mating of likes-is optimal when
@2Z (Am; Af )
@Am@Af
> 0;
where Z denotes aggregate output, Am denotes males ability and Af denotes
females ability, because aggregate output is then maximised. Negative assorta-
tive mating-mating of unlikes-is optimal when the inequality is reversed. (Becker
(1973))
This theorem indicates that, in the marriage market, higher-quality men and
women marry each other rather than selecting lower-quality mates when these
qualities are complements: a superior woman raises the productivity of a superior
man and vice versa. Becks theorem can be applied to other matching or sorting
problems when the concern is the aggregate output produced by two sides of the
market, e.g. colleges and students, rms and employees, etc. The agent of likes
or unlikes is optimal as traits are complements or substitutes, because superior
types reinforce each other when traits are complements and o¤set each other
when traits are substitutes. The condition in the theorem is commonly referred
to as the (strict) supermodularity condition of the match output function Z. See
Topkis (1998) for a comprehensive mathematical treatment of supermodularity,
and Milgrom and Roberts (1990) and Vives (1990) for applications in game theory
and economics.
Arnott and Rowse (1987) nd that any type partition in a case of allocating
students to various classes within an elementary or secondary school is possi-
ble. The partition depends on the strength of peer e¤ects, which was initially
dened in Coleman (1966). Peer e¤ects have been employed in a large amount
of literatures to explain the positive sorting.38 These literatures nd that having
better peers tends to improve a students own academic performance, and many
nd the e¤ects to be larger for students with low abilities than for those with
38See Coleman (1966), Henderson, Mieszkowski, and Sauvageau (1976), Hoxby and Terry
(2000), Zimmer and Toma (2000), Checchi and Zollino (2001), Robertson and Symons (2003),
McEwan (2003), Epple and Romano (1998), Epple, Romano and Sieg (2003, 2006).
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high abilities. Epple and Romano (1998) construct a model of private and pub-
lic secondary schools in order to analyse the e¤ects of voucher reforms. Epple,
Romano and Sieg (2003) and Epple, Romano and Sieg (2006) present a general
equilibrium model of the market for higher education. In their model, colleges
seek to maximise the quality of the educational experience provided to their stu-
dents. The quality of colleges is assumed to depend on peer ability and income
of the student body, and also the instructional expenditures per student. Since
peer e¤ect is an important component of college quality, students will seek out
colleges with high ability peers. Meanwhile, colleges will attempt to attract high
ability students in order to improve quality. Their model yields the hierarchy
of colleges in equilibrium about the distribution of students according to income
and ability, and the price policy adopted by colleges. In most cases that consider
peer e¤ects, outcomes are inuenced by the distribution of income (exogenous
endowment). We do not include peer e¤ects into our model as our assumption of
supermodularity is enough to obtain an assortative matching outcome.
Kremer (1993) highlights the role of positive assortative matching in economic
development. In his model of a one-sided, many-to-many matching market, each
rm consists of a xed number of workers each employed for a production task.
Workers have di¤erent skills, with a higher-skilled worker less likely to make mis-
takes in his task performance. Self-matching would be obtained in equilibrium
where each rm employs workers of identical skills. Kremer uses this form of
positive assortative matching to explain the large wage and productivity di¤er-
ences between developing and developed countries that cannot be accounted for
by their di¤erences in the levels of physical or human capital.
Fernandez and Gali (1997) and Fernandez (1998) compare the market system
to the exam (tournament) system under the assumption of complementarity be-
tween student ability and college quality. They assume a continuum of exogenous
quality for schools, and the education output depends on student ability and col-
lege quality. Students sort themselves into di¤erent tier schools by maximizing
education output. They also discuss the e¤ects of borrowing constraints on the
e¢ ciency. Sallee, Resch and Courant (2008) have a perspective of central planner
similar to ours. They assume complementarity and xed costs of building up col-
leges are su¢ cient to construct an optimal tiered system that sorts students by
ability and results in discontinuous spending and educational output per student
for essentially identical students at the margin between schools. Although the
assumptions from existing literatures are di¤erent, the peer e¤ects and comple-
mentarity are looking at the same thing. In the end, these di¤erent approaches
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would have given the same result. Our model only assumes the supermodular-
ity and ignores the peer e¤ects, but we will reach the same positive assortative
sorting.
The main contribution of this work, in contrast with existing literature, is
that we pay more attention to studentsconsiderations of costs when they decide
whether or not and where to be educated. Based on the assumption of super-
modularity for utility function and production function, we present a general
equilibrium from a planning perspective and explain how students sort them-
selves into colleges with di¤erent quality optimally. This work could apply to
both the admission sorting of education market, or any other scenarios concern-
ing sorting and resource allocation. To our knowledge, this piece of work raises
some issues that do not appear in the previous literature. Although we reach
the same positive assortative matching result as of in most of the literature, all
roads lead to Rome, and our approach is di¤erent from others. The presence
of a submodular cost function for students and other assumptions allows us to
construct the model with central planning but free choice for students. We are
standing for a central education planner whose output will be maximised, but
students are not allocated by the planner, which is in most literature with social
planners, e.g., Sallee, Resch and Courant (2008). In our model, the central plan-
ner can not allocate students to colleges and students are free to make decisions.
Our model assumes that the planner is concerned about the total outputs and a
student cares only his utility. The output of a student in a college depends on
his ability, resources per student, and the task level of that college. A students
utility is the di¤erence between gains from the college and costs of accomplishing
the task, so it depends on the students ability and the task level. The assumption
of supermodularity of the production and utility functions provides the planner
with the motivation to set up di¤erent task levels. Our model yields a result that
the hierarchy of colleges emerges in equilibrium, the optimal design of task levels
and resource allocation, and studentschoice making such as to have a positive
sorting. In the discussion on the optimal number of colleges, we have inconsistent
conclusion with the work of Sallee, Resch and Courant (2008). The planner will
only set up a nite number of colleges even if the xed cost is zero. This di¤erent
result is rstly because we let students select colleges freely by considering stu-
dentsmaximised utilities. We think this makes sense in such systems as "easy
admission but strict graduation", where students do not have any requirements
to enter higher education institutions. Secondly, we include task level into educa-
tion production model, which combining with free choices of students determine
117
a small number of colleges even though the xed cost is low. By including task
level into our model, we think requirements of colleges do have positive e¤ects on
higher education outputs.
The work is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the economy and lays
out the key elements of the general model. Section 3 denes the equilibria in
a one-college case and a two-college case; compares the two systems in several
aspects, and considers the model by taking xed cost into account. Section 4
presents the conclusion.
3.2 The Model
3.2.1 Description of the Economy
The economy in our model consists of two sides:
1. We think of the ministry of education as a social planner, who has a total
resource 
 which is free to allocate. The planner decides the number of
colleges, N . The xed cost of setting up a college is denoted by . The
planner also sets a vector of task levels for each college fT1; :::; Tj:::; TNg.
After subtracting the xed cost from total resources, the planner allocates
the remainder to colleges, which is denoted by R, R = 
   N. The pro-
portions of total resources allocated to each college are denoted by vector
fp1; :::; pj:::; pNg. The planner has an objective function W , which denotes
the total education output.
2. There is a continuum of potential students who di¤er with respect to their
ability levels. Let x denote a students ability, which follows a continuous
distribution. A particular students educational output is determined by
the production function q (x; r; T ) (where r = pR
w
, pR measures the amount
of resource available to the college, and w is the measure of students in
the particular college). It is thus assumed that a students output depends
on resources per capita in his college. The students gain from his college
is determined by a function V (T ), and his cost function is C (x; T ). Let
u = U (x; T ) = V (T ) C (x; T ) be the utility function. There is an outside
option with constant utility u0 available to all students.
Note that students have a di¤erent output function from the utility function.
The di¤erence is that resources per student have been included in the output
function. Excluding resources from the utility function is a controversial assump-
tion. Our opinion is that the qualication achieved from colleges is the only
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thing matters to students, while the planner is concerned about what students
would have actually contributed to colleges. Task level in our model is taken
as the requirements to achieve qualications; thus it is in the students utility
function as a higher task level means a better qualication. The same quali-
cation gives the same gain to di¤erent students. Employers in a job market are
only concerned about studentsqualications, not how much resources students
occupy in colleges. Therefore, resources per student are not in the gain function.
In order to benet from a better qualication, students have to make more ef-
fort which incurs higher cost. Given the same task level, costs are di¤erent for
di¤erent types of students; thus we have C (x; T ). Another reason of excluding
resources from the utility function is that it is not easy for students to realise the
resources allocation. Students ability and resources per student are employed as
inputs in the production function can be found in many literatures (Sallee, Resch
and Courant (2008); Epple (2003); Arnott and Rowse (1987)). Task level in our
model, however, is the third determinant of output. q is capturing not only the
output of students but also a short-hand for college output, i.e., it adds the two
together. If a college has good students (higher a) and a higher T , then it is likely
to be a better college and attracts better academics, etc. So it is plausible that
extra resources to that college have a higher marginal product. For example, the
college can allow these good academics to have more time for research since the
resources could pay for teaching assistants etc.; or if the students are research
students, then the resources allow for better equipment and facilities. The re-
search output will be improved. Therefore, higher r; x and T increase the output
of the college, and hence the planners welfare.
This is a two sided market between the planner and students. From the
planners point of view, total outputs are to be maximised; on the other side,
students maximise their own utilities. The moves of the planner and students
obey the following order:
1. The planner is endowed with total resources 
 and he observes students
ability distribution F as well as the xed cost of setting up a college .
2. The planner decides the number of collegesN , designs task levels fT1; :::; TNg
for each college, and allocates allocable resourcesR to each college fr1; :::; rNg.
3. A set comprising a continuum of students receives abilities, which are drawn
from distribution F (x). Having observed fT1; :::; TNg and an outside op-
tion, students simultaneously select colleges that maximise their utilities.
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The planner knows the individual production function, ability distribution,
utility function, and the outside option. It is a simple sequential decision making
game. We therefore use backward induction to discuss the model. Let us look at
the decision problem of students rst.
3.2.2 The Decision Problem of Students
In this section, we discuss the students decision given the set of task levels and
the outside option. As we described in the last section, there is a continuum of
potential students who di¤er in their ability levels x in the economy.
Assumption 1: The distribution of ability F (x) is continuous and di¤eren-
tiable with a corresponding density function by f (x) over a nite interval [x ; x].
Next we turn to focus on how a students selection is made. A students utility
has been assumed to equal his gain from the college qualication minus the cost
of accomplishing the task. The gain for a particular college j is the same for all
students involved in that college, and is expressed as vj = V (Tj).
Assumption 2: V (T ) is twice di¤erentiable, increasing, and concave in T , i.e.,
V1 (T ) > 0, V11 (T )  0; and V (0) = 0.
The cost function of student i who studies at the college is given by ci =
C (xi; T ).
Assumption 3: C (x; T ) is twice di¤erentiable, increasing, and strictly convex
in T , i.e., C2 (x; T ) > 0 and C22 (x; T ) > 0; it is decreasing in x, i.e., C1 (x; T ) <
0; it satises dc
dT
! 1 as x ! 0 and C (x; 0) = 0; it is submodular, i.e.,
C12 (x; T ) < 0.
Submodularity of the cost function implies that given any level of task, a
higher ability students cost rises more slowly than that of a lower ability student
given a marginal increase in the task level. In other words, it is relatively easier
for the high ability student to accomplish a tougher task. The second part of
Assumption 3 indicates the cost rises to the innity when ability is zero. The last
part of Assumption 3 implies the cost is zero when the task level is zero. This
assumption rules out the possibility for zero ability students to enter any college
with positive task level.
Given the gains and costs functions, the utility function of student i obtained
from college j is
U (xi; Tj) = V (Tj)  C (xi; Tj)
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Combining Assumption 2 and Assumption 3 implies that the utility function
is strictly concave and single-peaked in T , i.e., U22 (x; T ) < 0;39 U (x; 0) = 0;
supermodularity, i.e., U12 (x; T ) > 0,40 which means, given the same task level, a
higher ability student earns more utility than a lower ability student at the same
college.
Supermodularity means that, at the same level of task, the marginal utility of
achieving a higher level task is higher for students with higher abilities. Note that
resources are not in students utility function. However, in the next section, we
will see that resources per student are one of determinants in the output function.
T
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Figure 13 shows a simple example presenting the utilities of two students at
the same college. One has ability of xH , and the other has xL. They share
the same gains curve since they attend the same college, but the costs curve
of the higher ability student is atter than the lower ability student due to the
submodularity of the cost function. The distance between the gains curve and the
costs curve measures the utility. These curves immediately imply U22 (x; T ) < 0
as already noted. For instance, the distance between V (T ) and C (xL; T ) starts
from zero, where both gains and costs are zero, and increases to the maximum,
where the task level is marked as TL, and then falls to zero where costs equals
gains again. As we can tell from Figure 13, the di¤erence between two cost curves
is increasing in T , which is consistent with our assumption of U12 (x; T ) > 0. Let
Tm denote the task level that maximises the utility of the corresponding type.
39U22 (x; T ) = V11   C22 (xi; Tj) < 0, thus U is strictly concave, and hence single-peaked.
40If c is submodular,  c is supermodular, and hence u = v   c is supermodular.
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Proposition 13 The utility of a student with lower ability is maximised at a




In Figure 13, we use TH to denote the task level maximizing the high ability
types utility. Proposition 13 yields that TL < TH . Since they share the same
gains curve, and the high ability types cost curve is atter, the high ability
students utility is greater than the low ability types for any positive task level
by Assumption 2 and Assumption 3.
Assumption 4: Each student has an outside option of u0, independent of x.
Given the outside option, student is objective is to nd a college j that
satises the following condition:
ui;j  max [u0; ui;k] 8 all k 6= j:
Let T0 denote no higher education; thus all students face N + 1 options. The
equilibrium will be a many-to-one mapping from the set of students to the set
of colleges with di¤erent task levels including the outside option fT0; T1; :::TNg.
Our concern is whether or not students will be positively sorted to the colleges
which have been ranked by task levels, in other words, whether or not the higher
ability types would go to colleges with the higher task levels.
Now we dene positive sorting.
Denition 2 Given a set of ranked colleges including the outside option with
task levels fT0; T1; :::TNg with T0 < T1 < T2; :::; TN 1 < TN and two types x, y
with x < y, a mapping result does not have positive sorting if given Tj0 < Tj, type
x chooses college j and type y selects college j0.
If a mapping result has positive sorting, then a student selects college j if and
only if xj;l  x  xj;h, where xj;l and xj;h denote the lowest type and the highest
types at college j, respectively.41
Our assumptions about the utility function and the design of colleges yield
the following proposition.
Proposition 14 Under Assumption 3 and 4, given a set of colleges including the
outside option ranked by task levels as T0 < T1 < T2 < ::: < TN , the equilibrium
assignment has positive sorting.
41Sallee and Resch (2008) dene a partition to be monotonic if and only if, for the least and
greatest elements xk and xk in each school, a student x is assigned to school k if and only if
xk  x  xk.
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Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 14 implies that, in equilibrium, the group of students with the
highest ability select the college with the highest task level, the group of students
with the second highest ability choose to attend the college with the second
highest task level, and so on. Students who choose the outside option would be
the ones with the ability lower than those with the lowest ability who choose the
college with the lowest task level.
Proposition 15 Any two adjacent colleges in terms of task levels share the same
marginal types, i.e., there are no overlaps or gaps of abilities between two adjacent
colleges.
Proof. See Appendix.
The highest type of any lower level college or outside option is the same as
the lowest type of the adjacent higher level college. Marginal types are indi¤erent
between the two adjacent colleges. They will earn the same utility from the two
colleges.
3.2.3 The Planners Decision Problem
The planner aims to maximise the total output, which is the aggregate of the
continuum of studentsoutput. Any individual students output is assumed to
be a function of that students ability, resources per student and task level in a
particular college. The output of student i in college j is given by
qi;j = q (xi; rj; Tj) ;




We assume all arguments are complementary (supermodular). In contrast to
the assumption of submodularity in the students cost function, supermodularity
implies positive cross partial derivatives. The formal assumption for the output
function is as follows.
Assumption 5: The output function q () : R3+ ! R, is a twice di¤eren-
tiable, increasing, concave, and supermodular function of its arguments, and hence
q1 (x; r; T ) > 0, q2 (x; r; T ) > 0, q3 (x; r; T ) > 0; q11 (x; r; T ) < 0 ,q22 (x; r; T ) < 0,
q33 (x; r; T ) < 0; q12 (x; r; T ) > 0, q13 (x; r; T ) > 0, q23 (x; r; T ) > 0. The output is
zero if one of the arguments is zero, i.e., q (0; r; T ) = q (x; 0; T ) = q (x; r; 0) = 0.
The cross partial derivatives represent the supermodularity. q12 (x; r; T ) > 0
means at any given level of resources per student, the higher ability student
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produces more when given a marginal increase in resource; q13 (x; r; T ) > 0 implies
that at any given level of task in each college, the higher ability student produces
more when given a marginal increase in task level; q23 (x; r; T ) > 0 represents
that at any given level of task, a student in a college with higher resources per
student produces more when given a marginal increase in task level.
We use utilitarian social welfare function (Sallee, Resch and Courant (2008))
to express the total output. The aim of the planner is to maximise the aggregate






















where recall that xj;l and xj;h represent the lowest and highest abilities in college
j (8j = 1; 2; :::; N), wj denotes the size of college j, i.e., the total measure of
students in college j, wj =
R x;h
xj;l
f (x) dx. Given this output function, the planner
will simultaneously choose the optimal number of colleges, N , design task level
for each college, fT1; :::; TNg, and decide the optimal allocation of total resources




The maximization is subject to the following constraints.
1. Budget constraint:
N +R  
;
where 
 is the total resources. The sum of total xed costs and the total allocable




We assume that the planner will invest all resources into colleges.
2. Feasibility constraint:
pk  0 8 k:
This rules out negative allocations.
3. Identity constraint:
0 < T1 < T2 < ::: < TN :
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The identity constraint implies that colleges are identied by the task levels,
and we assume they are ranked from the lowest (denoted by 1) to the highest
(denoted by N). It is clearly ine¢ cient for the planner to set up a college with
a zero task level as output will then be zero. Consider there are two colleges
with the same task level, say Tj. Students whose abilities satisfy U (x; Tj) 
max (u0; U (x; Tk 6=j)) would select one of the two colleges randomly. One would
think it would be sub-optimal as a single college would lead to the same output
and save on . This is not quite a complete argument as the output would vary
if r di¤ered between colleges. The planner would allocate more resources to the
college having a higher average ability. However, it will not be optimal to set
the same task level for two colleges with di¤erent average abilities and resources
per student. Therefore, the planner will not set the same task level for two or
more colleges in equilibrium. Note that Proposition 14 and Proposition 15 imply
that, given 0 < T1 < T2 < ::: < TN , x1;h = x2;l;x2;h = x3;l; :::xN 1;h = xN;l, hence
from now on we use xj to denote the lowest type in college j, which is also the
highest type in college j   1 8j = 2; 3; :::; N . In the college with the highest task
level, the highest type should be x since type x does not have any other options
better than joining college N . However, type x1 is indi¤erent between college 1
and the outside option. Note that all marginal types are di¤erent from each other
otherwise an empty college may exist. The bottom type x1 in the lowest level
college, however, may be the same as the lower bound x, in which case all types































pk  0 8 k;
0 < T1 < T2 < ::: < TN :
In equilibrium, x1, x2, :::, xN are determined by fT1; :::; TNg. Since we have




3.3.1 Denition of Equilibrium
To dene the equilibrium, we need to nd the optimal number of colleges, the
equilibrium task levels and allocation proportions of resources for the planner,
and to consider the choices made by students. In our work, the economy will
reach a "free choices" equilibrium, where students select colleges as they will. We
assume that the planner anticipates how students allocate themselves to colleges
and only needs to choose the optimal number of colleges, to design the task levels
and allocate resources to each college. Students select any college or the outside
option freely to maximise utilities. The equilibrium the Nash equilibrium of this
game and is dened as follows:
Denition 3 The equilibrium of the economy consists of strategies of students
and the planner such that:
1. By taking account of students decisions and the distribution of students
abilities, the planner decides the number of colleges, and the vector of re-
sources allocation and vector of task levels to maximise total output.
2. Given N colleges, the outside option and task levels, student i selects college




where uk denotes the utility from any other college.
Resources and ability, task levels are complements in production. This imme-
diately yields the following conclusion.
Proposition 16 Given any two colleges ki and kj with 0 < Ti < Tj, if wi  wj
in equilibrium, then 0 < ri < rj and 0 < Ri < Rj.
Proof. See Appendix.
This proposition implies that if the measure of students at a higher level college
is less than a lower level college, then total allocable resources and resources per
capita are higher at the higher level college than the lower level college.
3.3.2 The Optimal Design When N = 1
The planners decision consists of two steps: (1) choosing the optimal number
of colleges; (2) setting the optimal level of tasks and the optimal allocation of
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resources. We isolate the two steps by beginning with the second stage. Fixing
the number of colleges will simplify our model so we derive the equilibrium only
consisting of fT1;:::TNg and fp1;:::pNg. If the number of colleges is given, the xed
cost is not our concern at this stage, and only the amount of allocable resources
and the distribution of studentsability matter.
We start with the simplest model, where there is only one college. In this case,
the planner does not have to consider how to allocate resources as he will invest
all resources into the only college. Therefore, the planner only needs to gure out
the optimal design of task level for this college in order to maximise total output
by considering the compatibility condition of students. For simplicity, assume
that a students ability is uniformly distributed on [0; 1], hence f (x) = 1. This
assumption will not substantively a¤ect our model. Under these assumptions,
the planners objective model is
max
T











s.t. 0 < T;
where x1 denotes the lowest ability in the college. Since the ability follows a
uniform distribution on [0; 1], the measure of students in the college is w = 1 x1.
The compatibility condition implies students will join the college if and only
if u  u0, where u denotes the utility obtained from the college, and u0 denotes
the utility obtained from the outside option. At the equilibrium, the marginal
student is indi¤erent between the outside option and attending college, i.e.,
U (x1; T ) = u0:
This equation tells the planner how to nd the marginal ability in the college.
By solving this equation for x1, which must be unique, the bottom ability is
determined by a function g:
x1 = g (T; u0) :
The task level has a direct positive impact on individual output. However, it
has a negative e¤ect on the size of the college.
Proposition 17 At the optimal task level, T , if x1 = g (T ; u0), then U2 (x1; T ) 











The intuition behind Proposition 17 is shown in Figure 14. Given the outside
option u0, there must be a marginal type who is indi¤erent between attending the
college and choosing the outside option. V (T ) and C (x1; T ) denote the gain and
cost of that type of students. Since U (x1; T ) strictly concave and single-peaked
in T , we can nd two task levels such that U (x1; T ) = u0, which are denoted by
T  and T 0 with T 0  T . T  and T 0 will be equal if type x1 maximises his utility
at T . The proposition implies that the planner will only choose T  as the task
level. It is because T  and T 0 will attract the same set of students whose abilities
are higher than x1, but the higher task level produces more education output.
The second part looks at how the marginal type changes in the equilibrium task
level. If the planner increases the task level from T , then type x1 will leave the
college as cost increases more than gain. Any increase in the task level will cause
the marginal type to leave the college.42
Type zero will not choose to attend any colleges under the assumption that
dc
dT
!1 as x goes to zero; the planner would not set a task level such that x1 = 1
as it means the top college is empty and unused. Therefore, the optimum will
be an interior solution. First-order necessary condition for an interior solution
follows from the unconstrained optimization problem. The rst order condition
of with respect to T will give us the optimal solution for T by substituting out
x1 with function g.
42An equivalent way of looking at this is to note that g is initially decreasing but beyond
some point increasing, and an optimal government policy must choose a point on the upward
sloping part for the reasons we outline.
128
Claim 15 The F.O.C. of the one-college case is:












where q2 denotes q2 (x1; r; T ), q3 denotes q3 (x1; r; T ) and r = R1 x1 .
Proof. See Appendix.43
This equation states that the marginal output of a unit increase in the task
level must be zero in equilibrium. Given the same level of total resources, pro-
duction of each student depends not only on the task level, but also on resources
per student, which is determined by resources and the measure of students. An
increase in the task level will directly increase output because output of each
student is increasing in task level; this is represented by the third term. How-
ever, output will decrease due to the change of size of the college. The rst
term measures the loss of output due to losing marginal students. The second
term represents the increase in output because those students still in the college
produce more due to a smaller size of the college. The overall e¤ect is zero in
equilibrium.
Next we use an example to illustrate the model.
Assume that C (x; T ) = T
2
x
; V (T ) = T , and hence U (x; T ) = T   T 2
x
. These
functions satisfy the assumptions about the cost, gain and hence utility functions.





Note that the outside option needs to satisfy u0  0:25 in order that x1  1;44
and when u0 = 0, x1 = T .
For output, assume that
q (x; r; T ) = (xr) T :
The Cobb-Douglas education output function has the properties as we assumed.
43We did not derive the second derivative of W with respect to T , but it does not matter too
much as the interior solution has to satisfy the rst order condition.
44 T 2
T u0  1, so T
2   T + u0  0. Therefore, 1 
p
1 4u0




2 . If u0 > 0:25, then




The total output function in the one-college case can be rewritten as
max
T




s.t. 0 < T < 1
where x1 = T
2
T u0 and r =
R
1 x1 .


















































As we can see, the amount of total resources does not a¤ect the equilibrium,
but the outside option does. The following numerical example provides some
properties which can not be analysed in a general case.
Conjecture 1 If U (x; T ) = T   T 2
x
and q (x; r; T ) = (xr)0:5 T 0:5, the maximised
output falls and the ability of the bottom type rises as u0 goes up, but the optimal
task level does not vary monotonically.
We are not able to prove this claim in a general case, but we believe it to be
true. The increase in u0 implies the college is less attractive; thus some bottom
types of students will leave the college if the planner does not change the task
level. Given the increase in u0 at a relatively low level, the planner could lower
the task level, which is high, to keep some of the students who are leaving. At
this stage, the e¤ect represented by the rst term in the rst order condition
dominates the e¤ect measured by the other two terms. But the planner will
only keep part of all leaving types as the output would drop if the task level is
set too low. Therefore, x1 rises at this stage. When u0 approaches the upper
limit, the increase in output by retaining students is less than the decrease due
to a lower task level, which means the last two terms in the rst order condition
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U0 0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.20 0.22 0.24 0.25
T* 0.581 0.567 0.553 0.539 0.524 0.509 0.495 0.481 0.471 0.465 0.467 0.475 0.490 0.500
X1 0.581 0.588 0.596 0.607 0.618 0.633 0.653 0.678 0.713 0.759 0.817 0.885 0.960 1
r 2.387 2.427 2.475 2.545 2.618 2.725 2.882 3.106 3.484 4.149 5.464 8.696 25.000 N/A
W* 0.437 0.430 0.421 0.412 0.401 0.390 0.376 0.360 0.340 0.314 0.279 0.227 0.138 0
U0: Outside option;
T*: Optimal task level;




dominates. So, the optimal task level increases. The outside option is like a rival
of the college, so an increase in the outside option must reduce the output of
the college. Therefore, W falls as u0 increases. An increasing task level plus u0
increasing cause x1 to rise at this stage as well. The following numerical result
and the diagram support the claim.
Table 2 presents the optimal task levels, bottom types, and maximal outputs
given di¤erent values of u0.45 The ability of the bottom type rises as u0 increases
from 0 to 0.24. The optimal task level decreases until u0 reaches 0.18, and then
starts increasing. It goes to 0.5 as u0 approaches 0.25, and x1 approaches 1.
Figure 15 presents how total output curves vary in the task level given di¤erent
values of u0. Given a value of T , the outside option is smaller, more is total output.
When the outside option is too large, plausible task levels are few. For example,
suppose u0 = 0, the planner has the largest number of plausible task levels, and












Figure 15: Total Output Given Di¤erent u0
45The numerical and graphical results in this section are calculated by Mathematica and
Excel.
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3.3.3 The Number of Colleges
In the last section, we considered the case where there is only one college. But
the planner has to decide the optimal number of colleges before setting the task
levels and allocation of resources. The number of college should be determined
by the total resources and the xed cost of setting up a college. Since this is a
sequential game, the planner as the rst mover has to take studentsdecisions
into account. Apart from the task levels, studentsconcerns include the outside
option. Therefore, the outside option should be in the planners consideration.
In this section, we discuss the number of colleges given the total resources, xed
costs and outside option.
Two-College Case Under the same assumptions as in the one-college case,
the planner designs the task level for each college and allocates a proportion of
total allocable resources to each college in order to maximise total outputs.
Assume there are two colleges, and denote the one with the lower task level
by k1 and the other one with the higher task level by k2. Since there are two
colleges, the planner has to consider the allocation of resources. By choosing the
proportion of resources to k1, p, the proportion of resources to k2, 1  p, and the
task levels in each college, T1 and T2, the planner can have all students sorted
themselves into each college or to stay in the outside option. Note that the results
of this case are easily translatable to the case of more colleges.
























s.t. 0 < T1 < T2:
Where x1 and x2, the marginal abilities, are functions of T1 and T2, which are
the factors that the planner is able to control. Student is decision is according
to the rule that he selects k1 if U (xi; T1)  U (xi; T2) and U (xi; T1)  u0, or k2 if
U (xi; T2)  U (xi; T1) and U (xi; T2)  u0, or the outside option if U (xi; T1) and
U (xi; T2) are less than u0.
In equilibrium, the bottom type in 1 satises
U (x1; T1) = u0
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and the top type in 1, which is identical to the bottom type in 2, satises
U (x2; T1) = U (x2; T2) :
The rst equation states that the bottom ability type student is indi¤erent be-
tween the outside option and k1; the second equation implies that the marginal
type student is indi¤erent between k1 and k2.




2 (T1; T2) :
The bottom type of k1 only depends on T1 and the outside option. The top type
in k1 which is the same as the bottom type in k2 is determined by T1 and T2. The
bottom type in k1 still follows Proposition 17.
Proposition 18 x2 is increasing in both T1 and T2, i.e., g21 (T1; T2) > 0 and
g22 (T1; T2) > 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 18 can be extended to a general case with any number of colleges.
Given any number of colleges, we use xk+1 to denote the top type in a particular
lower level college ck, which is identical to the bottom type in the adjacent higher
level college ck+1, and we dene gk+1 (Tk; Tk+1) = xk+1. Then:
Corollary 6 gk+11 (Tk; Tk+1) > 0 and g
k+1
2 (Tk; Tk+1) > 0.
We can use the simple example from the one-college case to illustrate the
claim. If U (x; T ) = T   T 2
x
, then x1 =
T 21
T1 u0 and x2 = T1 + T2. More gen-
erally, xk+1 = Tk + Tk+1; 8k = 1; :::; N   1. Clearly, gk+11 (Tk; Tk+1) > 0 and
gk+12 (Tk; Tk+1) > 0.
In the two-college model, we can derive the rst order condition for an interior
solution of the objective function. If we substitute the solutions to x1 and x2 into
the initial objective function, then we have
cW (T1; T2; p) =W  T1; T2; p; g1 (T1; u0) ; g2 (T1; T2)
46The solutions are unique by the fact that U1 (x; T ) > 0 and u12 (x; T ) > 0.
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The rst order condition of the new objective function is as follows:
cWT1 = W4g11 (T1; u0) +W5g21 (T1; T2) +W1 = 0;cWT2 = W5g22 (T1; T2) +W2 = 0;cWp = W3 = 0;
where Wi denotes Wi (T1; T2; p; g1 (T1; u0) ; g2 (T1; T2)), i = 1; 2; 3; 4; 5.
The rst and second equations represent the equilibrium conditions for the
design of task levels. The changes of T1 and T2 have direct and indirect e¤ects on
output. Since the task level is a factor of individual output function, any change
of the task level will have a direct impact on total output. The indirect e¤ects
consist of the change of measure e¤ect and the congestion e¤ect47.
The rst term of the rst equation measures the overall indirect e¤ect of T1
through x1, which includes the loss due to the students who left k1, and the
increase in output of those still in the college. The second term measures the
overall indirect e¤ect of T1 through x2, which is a little more complicated than
the e¤ect through x1. Consider an increase in the task level of k1: the bottom
type in k2 will therefore go to k1, i.e., x2 rises. The indirect e¤ect through x2
consists of the loss of students in k2, and the corresponding increase in k1; and the
combined marginal benet of changing size of k1 and k2. The last term measures
the direct e¤ect of T1, which is positive, therefore the rst two indirect e¤ects
must have an overall negative e¤ect.
The rst term of the second equation measures the overall indirect e¤ect of
T2 through x2, and the second term measures the direct e¤ect of T2.
Lemma 2 Wx2 < 0:
Proof. Since W2 > 0 and g22 (T1; T2) > 0, Wx2 < 0 follows immediately fromcWT2 = W5g22 (T1; T2) +W2 = 0.
This implies that the e¤ect on total output of an increase in x2 is negative
at the equilibrium, which means the loss due to losing students from k2 is larger
than the contribution of rising resources per student due to the falling size.
The third equation states the equilibrium condition for resource allocation.
























47Congestion e¤ect: Changes of the measure of students will inuence resources per capita
for those who are already in the college, and hence outputs.
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The equation states that the marginal output of a unit resource spent on either
college must be the same in equilibrium. The individual output depends on the
resources per student, so that one unit extra resource has to be divided by the
number of students, 1
wi
; i = 1; 2. By multiplying the derivatives by 1
wi
, we have
the individual marginal increase in output given one unit increase in resource.
By integrating, we get the total marginal output.
The next section investigates the relationship between the task level in the
one-college and the task levels in the two-college case.
The results of the two-college case are easily transferrable to any value of N .
At the equilibrium, the compatibility condition for type xi to choose college kj
(1  j  N) is as follows:48
uj  max (u0; ui) 8 i 6= j:
When 2  j  N , denote the bottom marginal type in kj by xj. Proposition 15
implies that xj is indi¤erent between cj and cj 1 in equilibrium:
U (xj+1; Tj+1) = U (xj+1; Tj) :
At college k1, the bottom type x1 is indi¤erent between k1 and the outside option
in equilibrium:
U (x1; T1) = u0:
We use gj to denote the function expressing the bottom type in college j. It
is easy to conclude that each marginal type is determined by task levels of two
adjacent colleges, hence xj = gj (Tj; Tj 1) and x1 = g1 (T1; u0).
































pk = 1, pk > 0:
48See Denition 2.
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We obtain the optimal task levels and allocation of resources by solving the rst
order condition for an interior solution of the objective function.
Comparison Between the One-College System and the Two-College
System
=0: Sallee, Resch and Courant (2008) argue that if there are no xed costs,
the optimal solution features a unique level of funding (a unique school) for each
students ability that is funded at a positive level. In the proof of the proposition
in their model, Sallee, Resch and Courant (2008) argue that the planner has
incentives to set up more schools to feature di¤erent level of resources for di¤erent
student ability because of the supermolarity of the production function. In our
model, we include the task level in the production function, and assume that
the planner can not allocate students arbitrarily. Without the rst di¤erence,
our model would have the same result as theirs. If there is no xed cost, then
the planner sets up an innite number of colleges, yielding a unique task level
(unique college) for each positive ability type. At the optimum, each college has
such a task level that maximises the corresponding students utility. This follows
straightforwardly from the supermodularity of students utility function and the
planners production function. In our model, the same result obtains although the
planner can not allocate students arbitrarily. The supermodularity of students
utility function ensures that they will sort themselves into colleges with di¤erent
task levels.
Now we look at the rst di¤erence. The following proposition presents a result
of our model by including the task level in the production function. Let W 1 and
W 2 denote the maximised total outputs in the one-college case and two-college
case respectively.
Proposition 19 Given  = 0,
a. if T is allowed to be zero, then the two-college system is at least as good as
the one-college system, W 2  W 1 ;
b. when the optimal task level in the one-college system is smaller than the
task level that maximises the utility of the highest type, the two-college system




Part a of this proposition implies that the two-college system will not be
worse than the one-college system under the strong assumption that T is allowed
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to be zero. Part b states that the two-college system always does better than
the one-college system under some circumstances. However, if we withdraw the
assumption that T is allowed to be zero, then this proposition does not always
hold. Consider the case when u0 = 0 and T  is equal or greater than the task
level that maximises the utility of the type with the highest ability. It is likely
that the planner can not nd any positive task level such that total output of the
two-college system is higher than the one-college system. The following numerical
example will illustrate this scenario.
Suppose a students utility function is U (x; T ) = T   T 2
x
, and his output
function is q (x; r; T ) = (xr) T .49
In the rst place, we assume  = 0. The problem is whether or not the planner
has incentives to set up a new college. We have had the optimal task levels and
maximal output from the one-college case.50 Thus, the planner will establish a
new college if the maximal total output from the two-college system is higher
than output from the one-college system.
If we assume  =  = 0:5, and R = 1, then the total output function in the











0:5 T 0:52 dx














x2 = T1 + T2:








We are not able to work out a general expression for the equilibrium task level
in terms of u0. But by giving di¤erent values to u0, we can calculate the optimal
task levels as shown in Table 3. In this case, the planner will not set up a new
49We assumed  =  = 0:5 in the one-college case.
50See Table 2.
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U0 0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.20 0.22 0.24 0.25
T* 0.581 0.567 0.553 0.539 0.524 0.509 0.495 0.481 0.471 0.465 0.467 0.475 0.490 0.500
T1* 0 0.023 0.050 0.083 0.120 0.163 0.209 0.258 0.306 0.353 0.397 0.438 0.479 0.500
T2* 0.581 0.573 0.564 0.554 0.544 0.534 0.525 0.517 0.511 0.506 0.503 0.501 0.500 0.500
P* 0 0.019 0.042 0.073 0.109 0.154 0.204 0.261 0.314 0.368 0.414 0.435 0.459 N/A
X1 0 0.176 0.250 0.300 0.360 0.422 0.491 0.564 0.641 0.720 0.800 0.880 0.960 1
X2 0.581 0.596 0.614 0.637 0.664 0.697 0.734 0.775 0.817 0.856 0.900 0.939 0.980 1
r1 0 0.045 0.115 0.217 0.359 0.560 0.840 1.237 1.784 2.706 4.140 7.373 22.950 N/A
r2 2.387 2.428 2.482 2.554 2.652 2.792 2.992 3.284 3.749 4.389 5.860 9.262 27.050 N/A
W* 0.437 0.433 0.427 0.421 0.412 0.402 0.390 0.373 0.352 0.324 0.285 0.230 0.139 0
ΔW 0 0.003 0.006 0.009 0.011 0.012 0.014 0.013 0.012 0.010 0.006 0.003 0.001 0
U0: Outside option;
T*: Optimal task level of one-college system;
T1*: Optimal lower task level;
T2*: Optimal higher task level;
P*: Optimal allocation of resources;
X1: Bottom type of the college with lower task level;
X2: Bottom type of the college with higher task level;
r1: Resources per student of the college with lower task level at the equilibrium;
r2: Resources per student of the college with higher task level at the equilibrium;
W*: Maximized output under two task levels;
ΔW: Difference of output between the one-college case and two-college case.
Table 3
college when u0 = 0.
Proposition 20 Given  = 0, if q (x; r; T ) = (xr)0:5 T 0:5 and U (x; T ) = T   T 2
x
,
then the two-college system does not do better than the one-college system when
u0 = 0; the two-college system does better than the one-college system when 0 <
u0 < 0:25.
Proof. See Appendix.
The following numerical results support our claim. Table 3 shows us the
optimal task levels, allocations of resources, bottom types of the two colleges,
maximal outputs and the increase in output from the new system as u0 varies.
Figure 16 and Figure 17 present the contrasts of the two systems.
The high task level falls and the low task level rises as u0 increases. Note the
task level in the one-college case does not change monotonically. The di¤erence
between the two new task levels decreases as u0 rises. When u0 goes to 0.25,
which makes the available types contract to 1, the di¤erence disappears. The
bottom types in the new systems have lower abilities than the bottom types in
the one-college system. It implies that more students take higher education in
the new systems. But the di¤erence decreases as u0 rises. The increase in total
output from the new system rises when u0 is small and then falls after the peak
where u0 = 0:12 as u0 increases. The result about p supports Proposition 16,


































The intuition behind these results is as follows. When u0 is small, the optimal
task level in the one-college case would be high, so that the direct e¤ect of a rising
task level (increasing output) is small and the indirect e¤ect (decreasing output)
is large, and hence the di¤erence between T 2 and the original task level is small.
Meanwhile, T 1 needs to be low enough to yield a large positive indirect e¤ect to
balance the large direct e¤ect by T 2 . In the extreme case, where u0 = 0, it is not
possible to nd a T 1 to balance the e¤ect of changing the higher task level. As
u0 rises, the optimal task level in the one-college system falls until it reaches the
minimum point. At this point, the direct e¤ect of a rising task level increases and
the indirect e¤ect falls. Therefore T 2 falls and the di¤erence between T

2 and the
original task level rises. On the other hand, as u0 rises, the possible downward
room for T 2 decreases because T

1   u0 > 0. This negative e¤ect increases as u0
rises. Therefore, the increase in total output between the two cases stops rising
when the negative e¤ect exceeds the positive e¤ect, then starts falling.51 The
increase in T 1 has a positive e¤ect on T

2 , hence the decrease of T

2 slows down.
In the stage when the optimal task level of the one-college case increases, T 2 still
falls but at a decreasing rate because of the e¤ect of T 1 , and the increase in total
output keeps falling. As u0 approaches 0.25, T 1 and T

2 approach 0.5, and the
increase in total output goes to zero.
In this example, the output of the one-college system is higher than the total
output of any two colleges which are not empty when u0 = 0. This result would
change if we transform the production function. Suppose q (x; r; T ) = (xr) T .
Numerical results show that when u0 = 0, the planner will set up the second
college only if  +  < 1, i.e. the production function has decreasing returns
to scale.52 This results also show that the increase in output of the two-college
system over the one-college system is rising as  decreases. On the other hand,
when  +  is too large and u0 is su¢ ciently small, we found that the two-
college system does not do better than the one-college system. For instance,
when  =  = 0:9 and u0 = 0:01, the total output of the two-college system
approaches the maximum only if the low task level goes to zero and the high task
level goes to the optimal task level of the corresponding one-college system.
Table 4 and Figure 18 show the trends of optimal task levels and outputs in
both cases as  changes. When  < 0:5, it is more protable for the planner
to establish a two-college system as  goes to zero. On the other side, this
observation supports our analysis on the e¤ects of the outside option in the two-
51See Table 3, u0 = 0:12.
52See Table 4, where we simply assume  =  and hence the production function is
q (x; r; T ) = (xr)

T. W 2 > W

1 for  6=  as long as +  < 1:
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0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90
T* 0.116 0.239 0.360 0.475 0.581 0.680 0.771 0.854 0.930
W1* 0.673 0.542 0.476 0.444 0.437 0.452 0.492 0.564 0.695
W2* 0.747 0.605 0.514 0.454 0.437 0.452 0.492 0.564 0.695
ΔW 0.074 0.063 0.038 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
    : Power of inputs in the production function;
T*: Optimal task level in the one-college case;
W1*: Maximial output in the one-college case when u0=0;





college case. The optimal task level in the one-college case falls as  decreases, so
that the upward room for a higher task level and the downward room for a lower
task level increases, and hence the output of the two-college system is possibly

















Figure 18: Task levels and outputs.
We have bee unable to establish whether or not the three (or more)-college
system would do better than the two-college system, but we believe that it should
depend on the elasticity of inputs, i.e.  and . When the elasticity is very low,
it could increase the output to break one college into two or more colleges. On
the other side, when the elasticity is high, the planner would rather keep a small
number of colleges. Sallee, Resch and Courant (2008) propose that if there are
no xed costs, the optimal solution features a unique level of funding (a unique
school) for each student ability that is funded at a positive level. Thus, there
must be an innite number of colleges if studentsabilities follow a continuous
distribution. The analysis on our model has shown that the number of colleges
is not necessarily innite.
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 6=0: If  6= 0, then the resource constraint is N+R  
. In the optimum,
N+R = 
. Given 
, the planners decision is dependent upon the optimal total
outputs of the two systems. Since  6= 0, the allocable resources are decreasing
as N rises. Therefore, the planner would set up the second college only if the
new system can produce a higher output than the one-college system although
R2 < R1. When the xed cost is too high, the decrease of allocable resources may
cause the total output of the two-college system to be lower than the output of
the one-college system. In that case, the planner will not establish a new college.
Let us see the following example.
Suppose u0 = 0:12.53 If  = 0 and the total resources are 
, then the total
output in the one-college case is W 01 = 0:376

0:5, and the total output in the
two-college case is W 02 = 0:39

0:5:54 Figure 19 shows how the total output varies
in 
 when  = 0. The total output of the two-college system is higher than the
one-college system for all positive 
.









Figure 19: Outputs vs total resources when  = 0:
If we let  = 0:1, then the total output in the one-college case is W 0:11 =
0:376(
  0:1)0:5, and the total output in the two-college case is W 0:12 = 0:39(
 
0:2)0:5. Figure 20 presents the changes of W over 
 when  = 0:1. When
R < 1:54, the output is higher in the one-college case. When R > 1:54, the output
is higher in the two-college case. This example shows that given a constant xed
cost, the optimal number of colleges is weakly increasing as 
 rises. Figure 21
shows how total output changes as 
 rises in a general case when  increases from
zero. The planner will start setting up the rst college when 
 = , and W1 rises
53The result can be applied to all cases with di¤erent u0.
54Since equilibrium conditions do not depend on R, the optimal task levels do not change
even though R varies. Therefore, we have this output functions simply by substituting the











Figure 20: Outputs vs total resources when  = 0:1.
as 
 increases. The planner decides to set up a new college when W2 = W1. W2
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Figure 21: Outputs vs total resources in a general case:
On the other hand, if we assume 
 = 1 and the xed cost changes, then the
total outputs in the one-college and two-college cases are functions of . When
u0 = 0:12; W

1 = 0:376(1   )0:5 and W 2 = 0:39(1   2)0:5. Figure 22 shows the
changes of the total outputs of the two cases as  changes. When  < 0:066,
the output is higher in the two-college case; and when  > 0:066, the output is
higher in the one-college case. This example implies that given a constant total
resources, the optimal number of colleges is weakly decreasing as  rises:
3.3.4 StudentsWelfare
The last point that concerns us is studentswelfare. We do not provide any
general conclusions, but a numerical example to illustrate the e¤ects of the two
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Figure 22: Outputs vs xed costs.
systems on studentswelfare. Consider the case where u0 = 0:12. Our question
is whether or not all students are better o¤ if the planner sets up a new college.
A particular student with ability x is better o¤ if u1 < u2, where uj denotes
his utility in the j-college case, j = 1; 2. Let k1 denote the college with the low
task level and k2 denote the college with the high task level. Those students who
attend k1 rather than taking the outside option must be better o¤and the bottom
type of k1 is indi¤erent between k1 and the outside option. For other students
in k1, who attended the college in the one-college case, their utilities from the
college in the one-college system are




and their utilities from k1 in the two-college system is




When x < 0:704, u1 < u2, and hence all the types between 0.491 and 0.704 are
better o¤; when x > 0:704, u1 > u2, and hence those whose ability is between
0.704 and 0.734 are worse o¤. On the other hand, if x chooses k2, then his utility
from attending k2 is





u1 > u2 for all x 2 [0:734; 1].55 Therefore, all the types in k2 is worse o¤compared
to the one-college case. The reason that those students whose abilities are between
0.734 and 1 choose k2 instead k1 is the task level of k1 is too low for them.
However, the utilities gained from k2 is less than the utility from the college in
the one-college case because the task level of k2 is too high.
Remark 4 A system with more colleges does not necessarily lead to higher util-
ities for all students.
3.4 Conclusion
This chapter presented a framework for sorting students and allocating resources
to colleges from a planners point of view. The intuition comes from the French
higher education admission system. Without any entry requirements, how do
students sort themselves into di¤erent colleges with various education qualities?
Do they all choose to go to the college with the highest quality? This piece of
work tries to build up a model to analyse these questions by introducing the
cost of completing a specic task into the model. In the French higher education
admission system, di¤erent quality colleges have di¤erent levels of performance
requirements which can be treated as "Tasks" in our model. Students have to
take the cost into account when they choose colleges. Although there is no entry
requirement, students will sort themselves by maximizing their utilities. There
are undoubtedly many other factors that may a¤ect a students utility, such as the
interest rate, tuition fee, distance to the school, living cost, nancial constraints,
and so on. Indeed, all benets of attending a particular school could be included
into the gains from that school, while all disadvantages could be included in
the costs. However, that will make the model asymmetric and too complicated.
Therefore, this model abstracted from such factors. These asymmetric factors
combining with incomplete information could explain why the central planner
has di¢ culty in controlling the system and why some universities in Paris are
overcrowded.
Our work simply assumes a students gain from college only depends on the
task level, which is similar to the degree of a university, and the cost of completing
the task is determined by the task level and the students ability. An important
assumption about the cost function is submodularity between task level and abil-
ity. A student selects a college or the outside option that maximises his utility.
55Note that 0.491 and 0.734 are the lower marginal types at each college respectively. See
Table 3.
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We dened the concept of positive sorting as students sort themselves into dif-
ferent levels of colleges according to their abilities. The higher ability types go
to the higher level colleges. We showed that given a positive ranked colleges by
task levels, students will sort themselves positively.
The planners objective is to maximise total output which is the aggregate
of all individual studentsoutputs. The crucial assumption is supermodularity
between arguments in production function. We derived the equilibrium in the
simple models of one college and two colleges, and the results can be translated
to anN college case. At the optimum, the planner has maximised the total output
by designing task levels and allocation of resources and students have maximised
utilities as well. We use a specic utility and production function to illuminate
our model. We concluded that the optimal number of colleges is not necessarily
innite even if there are no xed costs. When there are xed costs, the planner
has to balance the benet of the new college against the reduction of the allocable
resources. The optimal number is determined by total resources, xed costs and
the outside option. An increase in the total output does not necessarily mean all
students are better o¤ from a system with more colleges.
This model is rather simple and may miss out some other important factors.
Nevertheless, it captures a number of key features about such a sorting problem
where one side of the market has to incur certain costs in order to accomplish
the qualication provided by the other side. It explains why high ability students
are more willing to attend a higher quality institution than low ability students.
Also, our model o¤ers an explanation for a tiered system, and why higher quality
universities are allocated more resources.
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3.5 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 13:
Proof. Given the utility function, U (x; T ), the rst order condition for maxi-
mizing utility function with respect to T is
U2 (x; T
m) = 0:
By taking the rst derivative with respect to x on both sides of U2 (x; Tm) = 0,
we have
U21 (x; T
















Proof of Proposition 14:
Proof. For any college j, which is not empty, consider the highest ability and the
lowest ability, denoted by xj;l and xj;h. In order to prove the equilibrium sorting
is positive, it is su¢ cient to show that any type in college j + 1 (if j + 1 is not
empty and j  N   1), denoted by X (j + 1), are higher than xj;h and any type
in college j   1 (if j   1 is not empty and it denotes the outside option if j = 1),
denoted by X (j   1), is lower than xj;l.
If positive sorting fails, then 9 xk 2 X (j + 1), with xk < xj;h or 9 xk 2
X (j   1), with xk > xj;l. In the rst case, as type xk selects j + 1, U (xk; Tj) 
U (xk; Tj+1); type xj;h selects j, then U (xj;h; Tj)  U (xj;h; Tj+1). Therefore we
have
U (xj;h; Tj+1)  U (xj;h; Tj)  U (xk; Tj+1)  U (xk; Tj) ;
which contradicts the assumption of supermodular utility given xk < xj;h, hence
type xk will not choose college j + 1 if xk < xj;h. In the second case, 9 xk 2
j   1 > xj;l, which means for type xk, U (xk; Tj)  U (xk; Tj 1); for type xj;l,
U (xj;l; Tj)  U (xj;l; Tj 1), therefore we have
U (xk; Tj)  U (xk; Tj 1)  U (xj;l; Tj)  U (xj;l; Tj 1) ;
which again contradicts the assumption of supermodular utility given xk > xj;l,
hence type xk will not choose college j   1 if xk > xj;l.
Therefore, in equilibrium, the result is positive sorting.
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Proof of Proposition 15:
Proof. Suppose that the highest type in college j  1 is di¤erent from the lowest
type in the adjacent higher level college, say college t, i.e., xj 1;h 6= xj;l. There
must exist a type z such that xj 1;h < z < xj;l and does not choose college j   1
or college j because we have assumed xj 1;h and xj;l are the highest and lowest
marginal type in each college respectively. If type z selects college j + 1 or even
a higher level college, say j+, then we have U (z; Tj)  U (z; Tj+); but since xj;l
has chosen j, so U (xj;l; Tj)  U (xj;l; Tj+); thus
U (xj;l; Tj+)  U (xj;l; Tj)  U (z; Tj+)  U (z; Tj) ;
which contradicts the assumption of supermodular utility given z < xj;l. If type z
selects j 2 (j  2) or even a lower level college or the outside option, say (j   1) ,









U (xj 1;h; Tj 1); thus









which contradicts the assumption of supermodular utility given xj 1;h < z.
Therefore, such a type of z that xj 1;h < z < xj;l does not exist, hence
xj 1;h = xj;l;
i.e., there are no overlaps or gaps between any two adjacent colleges.
Proof of Proposition 16:
Proof. Without loss of generality, suppose j < N . Dene the total out-
put of kj as h (xj; xj+1; rj; Tj) =
R xj+1
xj
q (x; rj; Tj) dx; the total output of ki as
h (xi; xi+1; ri; Ti) =
R xi+1
xi
q (x; ri; Ti) dx. Proposition 14 implies that xj; xj+1 >
xi; xi+1 given Tj > Ti.
Suppose kj has a lower resources per student than ki, i.e., rj < ri, then
Rj < Ri as wj  wi at the equilibrium. The total output of the two colleges is
written as

















Now consider a positive transfer of resources from ki to kj. Since a students
decision does not depend on the allocation of resources, the marginal types would
not alter if the planner only changed the allocation of resources and kept the same
task levels. Therefore, marginal types at ki and kj would not change if there is
such a transfer. Therefore, the total output after the swap is










































So, it is optimal to set " > 0, which contradicts the optimality of the proposed
solution. Therefore, ri < rj and Ri < Rj.
Proof of Proposition 17:
Proof. Consider the marginal type x1. Recall V (0) = C (x1; 0) = 0, V11 (T )  0,
C22 (x; T ) > 0, and hence U22 < 0. Then there must be two positive solutions
(identical or di¤erent) for the following function:
V (T )  C (x1; T ) = u0:
Let T1  T2 denote the two solutions. Therefore, U2 (x1; T )  0 at T1 and
U2 (x1; T )  0 at T2, where strict inequalities hold if T1 < T2. The optimal task
level should be the identical solution or one of the two di¤erent solutions.




















where strict inequalities hold if T1 < T2. Therefore, the planner will choose T2.
Thus, T  = T2, and hence U2 (x1; T )  0 at T , where strict inequalities hold if
T1 < T2.
At the optimal task level, T , taking the rst derivative on both sides of the
following equation:
U (x1; T ) = u0;
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with respect to T gives
U1 (x1; T )
@x1
@T
+ U2 (x1; T ) = 0:




=  U2 (x1; T )
U1 (x1; T )
:
Since U1 (x1; T ) > 0, then gT  0. Therefore, x1 rises given any increase in
T .56
Proof of Claim 15:
Proof. The rst derivative of W with respect to T is
WT = W2 (T; x1)
@x1
@T
+W1 (T; x1) ;
where





















q3 (x; r; T ) dx:
F.O.C. sets WT = 0, and as in equilibrium x1 = g (T; u0), it can be rearranged as












where q2 denotes q2 (x1; r; T ), q3 denotes q3 (x1; r; T ) and r = R1 x1 .
Proof of Proposition 18:
Proof. In the equilibrium, since the top marginal type in the lower level college is
identical to the bottom marginal type in the higher level college, the marginal stu-
dents in college 1 and college 2 must have the same utility, U (x2; T1) = U (x2; T2).
In Figure 23, T1 and T2 must be on two sides of the task level that induces the
maximal utility for x2.
56If gT = 0, then VT   C2 (x1; T ) = 0 at T , which means type x1s utility is maximised.
Therefore, given any changes of T , type x1 will leave the college and the bottom ability will
rise.
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Now consider a marginal increase from T1 to T 01: the utility of the top type
student in college 1 is higher than the utility of the bottom type student in college
2, i.e., U (x2; T 01) > U (x2; T2), by the single peakedness of students utility. Thus
the bottommarginal student in college 2 will switch to college 1, hence the bottom
type in college 2 rises, which implies g21 (T1; T2) > 0.
By the same logic, a marginal increase in T2 will lead to U (x2; T 02) < U (x2; T1),
which implies that the increase squeezes the bottom marginal student in college

























Figure 23: E¤ects on x2:
Proof of Proposition 19:
Proof. a. If we found a two-college system that replicates the output of the op-
timal one-college system, then part a of this proposition would have been proved.
The planner can simply set up a new college with zero task level, keep the college
in the one-college system the same and allocate all the resources to the origi-
nal college. The total output is the same as before, W2 = W 1 . Note that W2
needs not to be maximised. The planner is able to change the task levels of the
two colleges as well as the allocation of resources to maximise the total output.
Therefore, W 2  W2 = W 1 .
b. Denote the optimal task level in the one-college system by T  and the
task level that maximises the utility of the highest type by T t . If T
 < T t ,
then U2 (x; T ) must be positive at T  for some types whose abilities are higher
than x1, which is the bottom type in the one-college case. Suppose the planner
sets up a new college with task level T 0 and T  < T 0 < T t . For those types,
151
U (x; T ) < U (x; T 0), and hence they will go to the new college. Denote the
lowest type of those going to the new college by x2. Note that x1 does not
changed because T  keeps the same.
Resources per student in the one-college case is r = R
1 x1 , and the resources per
student in the new system is r1 =
pR
x2 x1 , r2 =
(1 p)R
1 x2 for each college respectively.
If p = x2 x1
1 x2 , then r1 = r2 = r. Since the output of a particular student is
increasing in the task level given the same resources per capita, we obtainZ 1
x2
q (x; r; T ) dx <
Z 1
x2
q (x; r; T 0) dx:
HenceZ x2
x1
q (x; r; T ) dx+
Z 1
x2
q (x; r; T ) dx <
Z x2
x1
q (x; r; T ) dx+
Z 1
x2
q (x; r; T 0) dx;
Z 1
x1
q (x; r; T ) dx <
Z x2
x1
q (x; r; T ) dx+
Z 1
x2
q (x; r; T 0) dx:
Therefore, W2 > W 1 , where W2 denotes total output of the new system. Note
that T  and T 0 need not to be the optimal task levels, so the W 2  W2 > W 1 .
Proof of Proposition 20:
Proof. When u0 = 0, the output of the one-college system is 0.437. The total
output of the two-college system approaches 0.437, which is the maximum, when
T1 goes to zero and T2 stays at the optimal task level of the one-college system.
Therefore, the two-college system can not do better than the one-college system
when u0 = 0:
When 0 < u0 < 0:25, there are two possible circumstances.
First, UT = 0 at T  for the bottom type. T  must be lower than the task level
that maximises the utility of the highest type, otherwise the college in the one-
college system would be empty. Proposition 19 has shown that the two-college
system produces more total output than the one-college system in this case.
Second, U2 (x1; T ) 6= 0 at T  for the bottom type. There must be two positive
solutions for T to the following function:
U (x1; T ) = u0:
One of the solutions is T , and denote the other one by T 0. At the equilibrium
U(x1; T
0) = U(x1; T
): By using Proposition 17 and Figure 14, we know that
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T 0 < T  and U2 (x1; T ) < 0 at T  and U2 (x1; T ) > 0 at T 0 for type x1. Suppose
the planner sets up a new college with task level T 0. Consider those students
whose abilities are higher than the bottom type, x > x1. The supermodularity
of the utility function, U12 (x; T ) > 0, immediately implies U(x; T 0) < U(x; T ).
Therefore, these types would stay in the college with T . Consider those students
whose abilities are lower than the bottom type, x < x1. They will not go to
the college with T  and T 0 because U(x; T ) < U(x1; T ) = u0 and U(x; T 0) <
U(x1; T
0) = u0. In the end, the new college does not recruit any students.
Now suppose the planner changes the task level of the new college from T 0 to
T1 and T1 = T 0 + , where  is a positive number, and allocate a small amount of
resources to that college. Our aim is to show the total output of the new system
is increasing as  rises from zero. In other words, the rst derivative of the total
output in terms of  is positive when  goes to zero.
Let x01 denote the bottom type of the new college. The bottom type of the




we obtain T 0 + T  = x1, and hence x2 = x1 + . Therefore, the total output of







x1 +   x01
0:5















x1 +   x01










1  x1   
T 
0:5  








(x1   T  + )2
x1   T  +   u0
;
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we obtain the rst derivative of W2 with respect to 
@W2
@
=  1:5 (T )0:5

1  p





0:5 (T )0:5 (1  p)
 
1  (x1 + )1:5










(x1   T  + )0:5
 









(p)0:5 (x1 +   x01)
1:5
+1:5 (x1   T  + )0:5

p







2 (x1   T  + )
(x1   T  +   u0)
  (x1   T
 + )2
(x1   T  +   u0)2
!!
:


















(1  p)0:5 (1  x1)1:5
+ lim
!0











(x1   T )0:5
;
B =  




















2 (x1   T )
(x1   T    u0)
  (x1   T
)2





[A+B + C] is determined by term C. The limit of the last term in the square
brackets is innity and the sign is directed by the sign of the following expression
(x1p)
0:5 u2 (x1   T )0:5
(x1   T    u0)2
,
which is positive.
Therefore, W2 is increasing as  goes up from zero, and hence W2 is greater
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than W 1 for some positive : Once again, W2 is not necessarily the maximal
output. The planner is able to nd the optimal T 1 and T

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